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FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
This year, the University of Denver College of Law celebrates its
centennial. We were unaware when we began law school that we would
be honored to graduate in the 100th class. But as members of this year's
Executive Board of Editors, we are now publishing the Review during the
law school's centennial celebrations. As part of the celebrations, the Re-
view promises to publish not only two general issues, a symposium and
the Tenth Circuit Survey, but also a commemorative, centennial issue.
All issues will be special-incorporating ideas or editorial comments
from past Denver University Law Reviews, publishing lectures presented
during the various centennial events and expanding or changing the ex-
isting law review format to reflect past or future trends. For instance, in
1982 the Review published profiles of the Colorado Supreme CourtJus-
tices, authored by their colleagues, prominent attorneys and judges.
During this centennial year, we will publish biographical sketches of the
Colorado federal and state appellate judges who graduated from the
University of Denver College of Law (formerly Westminster Law
School).
Another special feature borrowed from a past law review is a series
of editorial comments, similar to those previously written by Lowell
Noteboom, Editor-in-Chief of the Review in 1963. These editorials dis-
cuss the value of (1) law reviews and law review membership, (2) stu-
dent-written case comments and notes and (3) symposiums. Modelled
after Mr. Noteboom's, our Editorials provide a new estimation of the
value of these endeavors as well as an historical perspective.
THE ARTICLES
Choosing articles for a general issue requires specific, if not some-
what arbitrary, standards. This Issue contains pieces to advance the dis-
cussion of issues currently on the forefront of the law. The topics
selected for this Issue include (1) a discussion of the prior restraint doc-
trine pertaining to obscenity cases with a special focus on the rap group
2 Live Crew's confrontation with Florida courts, (2) an analysis of the
Secretary of the Interior's current study into the development of the
Alaska Wilderness Refuge (3) an interpretation of the "manage or oper-
ate" language in the civil Racketeering Influenced and Corruption Or-
ganizations Act (RICO), which the United States Supreme Court
analyzes this term in Reves v. Ernst & Young, and (4) a review of a book
for practitioners, co-authored by Professor Emeritus Christopher
Munch of the University of Denver College of Law, in the areas of pat-
ent, copyright and trademark law.
This Issue also includes three student pieces, all concerning differ-
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ent aspects of Colorado law. These articles offer practical information
regarding issues pertinent to our home state. In one piece, the author
compares the Colorado and Texas deceptive trade practice statutes and
suggests how the Colorado statute can be used more effectively without
resorting to the draconian measures of the Texas statute. The other two
student pieces discuss compelling issues in the criminal defense arena-
battered spouses who kill their abusers and deific decree claims in in-
sanity pleas.
The two criminal defense articles discuss the current state of Colo-
rado law in defenses to murder accusations and provide insight into
practical application of the existing law. The first piece, a Note on bat-
tered spouses, advocates the use of the Colorado self-defense statute
and expert testimony regarding the Battered Spouse Syndrome in cases
where battered spouses, accused of murdering their abusers, claim self-
defense. This Note offers a resolution to the dilemma of allowing the
Battered Spouse Syndrome as an independent defense. The Note ar-
gues that current Colorado law allows this expert testimony and a self-
defense instruction should be given when the jury, not the judge, finds
the battered defendant's actions are reasonable. The second piece, a
Comment on the recent Colorado Supreme Court decision of People v.
Serravo, criticizes the decision for not recognizing the deific decree doc-
trine as an insanity defense. The Comment argues that a deific decree
claim should be an independent defense rather than a separate element
in the insanity defense.
The Review hopes to facilitate the College of Law's centennial cele-
bration by offering a volume of useful scholarship to benefit the legal
community and, ultimately, society at large. Finally, we extend special
thanks to the members of the Review who began work on this Issue dur-
ing the summer in order to successfully publish prior to the United






THE LAW REVIEW-WHAT VALUE?
Over the years, the institution known as "the Law Review" main-
tained a prestigious post in the law school environment. An often
sought-after position, membership on a law review also maintained its
fortunate dominance as a law firm interview drawing card, which job
placement advertisements repeatedly confirm. But despite the law re-
view's unchanging position, the question of "what value is there in law
reviews and law review membership?" remains a viable debate on the
law school campus-as it was in 1966, when Lowell Noteboom ad-
dressed this question in the Denver University Law Review.
Any editor of a symposium issue will recount that the reactions of
practitioners, solicited for publication in a law review, range from luke-
warm to immediate affirmative. Why then do some attorneys eagerly
present their legal analysis and criticisms in law reviews or bar associa-
tion journals, while others "would rather be just trying cases" instead?
In 1966, Mr. Noteboom highlighted the academic and lawyering skills
advantages of law review membership or publication, but omitted a sig-
nificant consideration of the modern day lawyer-one not overlooked by
law firms in hiring interviews-rainmaking.
Rainmaking, or the power to develop a lucrative client base, may be
an unseemly topic to some, expecting more than just dollars and cents
from a law review editor. But the demands of law school and clerking on
students certainly make the economic analysis of whether to participate
in law review a reality. And rainmaking is an important and necessary
skill, such that some law firms, whose attorneys publish often, realize the
marketing power behind the written-word. Naysayers frequently ques-
tion the authoritativeness of a law review citation in a brief or opinion.
Yet citations to law reviews are common because the written-word influ-
ences. As professionals very aware of (and good at) the art of persua-
sion, lawyers routinely present their persuasion via the written-word.
Publishing in a law review is another way a lawyer persuades. And in
this competitive global marketplace, clients look for experts. Publishing
says "you are the expert."
Yet Mr. Noteboom was astute for his day and the skills that he noted
were acquired through law review membership remain extremely impor-
tant today. In today's economy, these skills-precision, attention to de-
tail, editing, research and scholarly analysis-intensify as ingredients for
success in a difficult market. No one can deny that the economy and
joblessness are major concerns to the modern lawyer-this year's presi-
dential elections themselves show the economy ranks as the number one
issue! This economic concern makes bringing the best skills to thejob a
more urgent concern than perhaps it was in 1966. Furthermore, law
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review articles make excellent research tools, evidenced by the fact that
they are offered on both Westlaw and Lexis databases.
"The law review man gains much from his experience to be sure,"
claimed a previous Editor-in-Chief. But one thing that certainly has
changed since then is law school demographics. In 1966, it is not un-
likely that the phrase "the law review man" was completely accurate be-
cause no women were members of the Review. This year, half of the
100th graduating class will be women, the Editor of this Issue is a wo-
man, and, last year, an outgoing Board of Editors elected a woman to
the position of Editor-in-Chief for the first time in seventy years. To
that I am compelled to add and end with: "We've come a long way!"
Diana A. Cachey
Editor-in-Chief
RESTRAINT OF CONTROVERSIAL MUSICAL EXPRESSION AFTER
SKYYWALKER RECORDS, INC. v. NAVARRO AND BARNES




There's music in the sighing of a reed;
There's music in the gushing of a rill;
There's music in all things, if men had ears;
Their earth is but an echo of the spheres.'
There has been considerable debate concerning the propriety of,
and protection which should be afforded, allegedly sexually graphic,
violent or profane forms of artistic expression. 2 Various forms of
popular art, notably music and photography, received widespread
publicity for shocking and highly explicit content. 3 In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,4 the United States Supreme Court recognized that,
"[m]usic is one of the oldest forms of human expression" which has
historically been subject to censorship due to its appeal to the intellect
and emotions.5
In the last several years, the lyrical content of popular music and art
has received heightened scrutiny from both legislators and private
citizens. 6 Perhaps the most noted incident in this explosive arena
involves the well-known rap music group, 2 Live Crew which gained
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The University of Toledo. Former
Professorial Lecturer, Washington College of Law, The American University. Former As-
sistant General Counsel, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. B.A., 1975,
J.D., 1978, University of Virginia. I sincerely appreciate the help of Steven V. Saia, student
assistant, my wife, Paulette, and all of my family and friends who provided great support
during this effort.
1. LORD BYRON, LORD BYRON: DON JUAN 498, Canto XV, Stanza V.
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Chuck Phillips, 'Rap Jam '91' Show
Called Off in Ohio, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at F II (reporting the cancellation of a rap
concert that had been targeted for possible obscenity); 2 Live Crew Appeals, NEWSDAY, Mar.
26, 1991, at 16 (reporting "2 Live Crew's" appeal of a federal ruling that their album is
obscene).
3. Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.R.I. 1990)
(enjoining the Town of Westerly from conducting a show cause hearing to review
circumstances relevant to an establishment's entertainment license, prior to the
performance of a 2 Live Crew concert); see also Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Gallery Indicted in
Mapplethorpe Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at 1. More recently, the rap artist Ice-T has
come under intense scrutiny as a result of the inclusion of the song, Cop Killer on his latest
compact disk. Carla Hall & Richard Harrington, Ice-T Drops 'Cop Killer', WASH. POST, July
29, 1992, at Al.
4. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
5. Id. at 790.
6. Atlantic Beach Casino, 749 F. Supp. at 39 (focuses on the lyrical content of music).
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considerable disrepute from the release and performance of material
from its album entitled, As Nasty as They Wanna Be. Noted for its sexually
explicit lyrics, As Nasty as They Wanna Be garnered sales well in excess of
one million copies7 and led to sell-out concerts. The group's highly
publicized performance of this material led to the first federal court
ruling regarding obscenity in popular music in the case of Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro.8 In the words of United States District Court
Judge Gonzalez:
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919), that the
First Amendment is not absolute and that it does not permit
one to yell "Fire" in a crowded theater. Today, this court de-
cides whether the First Amendment absolutely permits one to
yell another "F" word anywhere in the community when com-
bined with graphic sexual descriptions. 9
The plight of 2 Live Crew is not an isolated situation. Other artists,
including painters, sculptors, photographers and writers have been in-
volved in this continuing controversy within the artistic community. 10
More recently, critics of rap artist, Ice-T's song, Cop Killer, have lobbied
publicly for the condemnation of the work and its exclusion from the
artist's album.'1
Within the legal community, discussion of controversial forms of
expression has centered on the question of whether such expression
merits Constitutional protection. 12 As in Skyywalker, cases have ex-
amined and evaluated the content of such works to determine if the art
is obscene and, consequently, not protected by the Constitution.' 3 As
established by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
14
courts apply local standards of obscenity to determine whether artistic
expression is obscene. 15 Although obscenity determinations are made
7. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
rev'd, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1lth Cir. 1992); David Gates & Peter
Katel, The Importance of Being Nasty, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 52.
8. 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960
F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 582.
10. In fact, the display of certain photographic art by Robert Mapplethorpe generated
considerable controversy which led to the cancellation of showings and the limitation of
funding provided galleries and institutions which displayed the art. Dennis Barrie, a mu-
seum curator in Cincinnati, Ohio, faced a jury trial on misdemeanor obscenity charges
resulting from a showing of Mapplethorpe's work. Tom Mathews, Fine Art or Foul?, NEWS-
WEEK, July 2, 1990, at 46. Ajury subsequently found Mr. Barrie innocent of these charges.
11. While there has been no judicial determination of the protected status of Ice-T's
song, Cop Killer, various politicians, celebrities and members of police organizations have
sharply criticized the song's lyrics as an incitement to violence. The artist maintains that
the song merely expresses anger. Ultimately, the artist and Time-Warner, the record com-
pany which manufacturers and distributes Ice-T's recordings, have voluntarily agreed to
delete Cop Killer from Ice-T's album. See supra note 3; Steve Marshall, 'Cop Killer' Cut Pulled
from Album, USA TODAY, July 29, 1992, at IA.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 17 and 24.
13. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 587-96.
14. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
15. Id. at 24-25 (noting that two elements of the Miller test, the "average person" and
the "contemporary community standards," apply local community standards to determine
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by local authorities, 16 the ultimate determination remains both difficult
and elusive.17
In the aftermath of Skyywalker, its ultimate reversal, and the more
recent public outcry over Ice-T's song, Cop Killer, there remains a serious
question regarding the extent of protection afforded artistic or musical
expression in circumstances where the content may by suggestive, pro-
vocative or controversial. 18 The Supreme Court's decision in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc. 19 indicates an apparent willingness to examine the con-
tent of controversial, expressive conduct.20 This inquiry involves a pre-
carious balance of the right to freely express ideas and opinions through
song, particularly live performances, and the myriad of societal interests
which justify the suppression of allegedly obscene, profane or inflam-
matory expression.
2 1
Because of the Constitutional significance of the right to free ex-
pression, any government attempting to prevent the promotion or dis-
tribution of controversial art bears a significant burden to justify the
prior restraint of such expression. 22 This burden notwithstanding, a
critical question remains as to whether these restraints may inhibit or
chill expression of artists such as 2 Live Crew or Ice-T.
A limitation on expression may not be enforced prior to a judicial
determination of the protected nature of such expression. 23 Given the
results in Skyywalker and Barnes, and despite the criticisms voiced by
whether certain expression is obscene; a third element does not use local community stan-
dards, rather, it analyzes whether the work taken in its entirety has literary worth).
16. Id' at 24, 30.
17. Anne L. Clark, Note, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be". Popular Music On Trial, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1481, 1514-20 (1990); see also Denise Z. Kabakoe, Note, Obscenity Decisions
Based On Procedural Mechanisms Are Patently Offensive, 10 Loy. ENT. LJ. 679 (1990)(noting
that courts can escape defining obscenity through procedural mechanisms).
18. The group 2 Live Crew may provide courts with additional musical material for
scrutiny with the anticipated release of a new album, Sports Weekend. See Edna Gundersen,
Pop's Profile Gets a Boost from Jackson, U2 Albums, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at 5D.
19. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
20. Id at 2462-63. Although Barnes primarily involves the issue of Constitutional pro-
tection of expressive conduct, the Court's Constitutional law analysis could prospectively
apply to artistic speech such as music. See generally infra text accompanying notes 241-50.
21. See Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.R.I. 1990)
(balancing the harms and interests to each party to determine whether to grant or deny an
injunction).
22. Id. at 41 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
23. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990) revud on
other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992) (quoting South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975), which reaffirmed that the
minimum procedural safeguards necessary for a system of prior restraint to pass due pro-
cess scrutiny must provide that:
[flirst the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the ma-
terial is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judi-
cial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the
purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination
must be assured),
Id. at 600-01; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980) (noting
that a "temporary" prior restraint relevant to adults only theaters bears a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutionality, even if the prior restraint was issued by a state court
judge); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (attacking
the lack of procedural safeguards in the attempt to restrict the performance of "Hair");
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some scholars in the legal community,24 the prior restraint doctrine has
become an important protection from the impermissible abridgement of
free musical expression.
This article demonstrates the continued viability of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the protection of controversial musical expression
through the examination of the Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach decisions.
Through discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, this arti-
cle illustrates the growing willingness of the federal judiciary to examine
and possibly restrict the content of artistic expression. Particular atten-
tion is given to the influence and effect of the prior restraint doctrine as
applied to 2 Live Crew's musical expression.
In order to establish the foundation from which the prior restraint
doctrine evolved, Section II of the article provides a basic background of
the primary federal law applicable to First Amendment guarantees of
free expression and the limitations which can be placed upon musical
expression. Section II then delineates the specific components of the
prior restraint doctrine and relates them to the attempted restriction of
free musical expression.
Section III traces the factual predicate and judicial reasoning con-
tained in the principal cases of Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach. An exami-
nation of these cases introduces the controversy surrounding 2 Live
Crew. This section also examines the recent case of Luke Records, Inc. v.
Navarro25 which reversed the Skyywalker court's finding that As Nasty As
They Wanna Be is obscene under Miller standards. The discussion then
focuses on the controversy and ultimate holding in Barnes as it relates to
the Supreme Court's willingness to examine, and possibly restrict, con-
troversial musical expression.
Section IV of the article analyzes the respective decisions in
Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach and the courts' analyses of the protected
status of As Nasty As They Wanna Be. This section identifies the problems
of the Skyywalker court's obscenity analysis, as well as Atlantic Beach's
brief acknowledgement of the protected status of 2 Live Crew's per-
formance. The discussion includes the Skyywalker's and Atlantic Beach's
confirmation of the significance of prior restraint procedural require-
ments. The section's analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes
highlights the vulnerability of controversial expression. Such vulnera-
bility underscores the importance of the prior restraint doctrine as a
stalwart check on free speech abridgments.
Section IV ultimately recognizes the possible flaws in the prior re-
straint doctrine and the need for promptness in the imposition of proce-
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965) (challenging the constitutionality of the
State of Maryland motion picture censorship statute).
24. See Manin Scordato, Distinction Without A Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 34 (1989) (criticizing the prior restraint doctrine for
a lack of coherence and constitutional relevance). See generally Kabakow, supra note 17
which chides the "protection of speech" by use of procedural requirements which are in-
herent in the prior restraint doctrine.
25. 960 F.2d 134 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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dural safeguards. The Article concludes with comments delineating the
importance of the prior restraint doctrine as a primary, if not solitary,
mechanism which may prevent unwarranted restrictions on Constitu-
tionally protected musical expression.
II. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
A. Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of Expression.
The Constitution of the United States provides, inter alia, "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'2 6 The
freedom of speech or expression comprises the bulwark of individual
rights granted under the Constitution. 27 Central to the freedoms pro-
tected by the Constitution, the freedom of speech is the "indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."
'28
As a basic canon of federal common law relevant to the First
Amendment, speech generally enjoys significant protection from sup-
pression. 29 Because of the importance of the right to free expression,
even unpopular ideas and expressions are typically accorded Constitu-
tional protection."0 Music, including popular musical forms such as
"rap," constitutes expression that is afforded First Amendment protec-
tion from unwarranted suppression.3 1 Individuals do not, however, en-
joy absolute rights to express any and all ideas in any context. In
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,3 2 the Supreme Court noted that free-
dom of speech is not absolute and does not provide an "unlimited li-
cense to talk."' 33 The Supreme Court further stated in Konigsberg that
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
27. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (acknowledging that the free-
dom of speech represents an individual right which is superior to others); see also Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, CJ., dissenting) (referring to the freedom of
speech having a "preferred position"), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (characterizing the
importance of free speech rights to other Constitutionally protected rights), rev'd on other
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
29. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (regarding an ordinance
preventing pickets near schools); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964) (noting, inter alia, the "actual malice" requirement for defamation); Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952) (stating that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no state shall abridge the freedom of speech by state action).
See generally Clark, supra note 17, at 1505.
30. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that the Government could
not suppress an offensive idea or position); Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116 (prohibiting commu-
nity suppression of unpopular views).
31. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 597 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(acknowledging that music is presumptively protected under the Constitution), rev'd on
other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (stating that the First Amendment protects musi-
cal expression).
32. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
33. Id. at 49-50.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
regulations related to speech are not presumptively repugnant to the
Constitution if such laws are substantiated by a sufficiently valid govern-
mental interest.
3 4
Because the right to free expression is not absolute, the Court rec-
ognizes that protected speech, i.e., speech which does not present a
"clear and present danger,"3 5 nor constitutes "fighting words" which
incite lawless actions,3 6 nor is obscene,3 7 can be subject to reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions within a public forum.3 8 To prevent
abusive intrusions upon free speech, governmental regulations must be
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government in-
terest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. 9
Content-based restrictions on protected speech are generally unconsti-
tutional.40 Consequently, governmental authorities may only prescribe
narrowly defined time, place and manner restrictions for such protected
speech.
4 1
B. Unprotected Speech: "Clear and Present Danger" and "Fighting Words."
Certain forms of expression are not afforded Constitutional protec-
tion. Legislators may prevent the expression of ideas that are "used in
[certain circumstances] and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils .... "42
34. Id. at 51. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 376 (1927), (Brandeis and
Holmes,J.J., concurring) (indicating that an individual's right to free speech was not abso-
lute; in some contexts, governmental interests may be superior to an individual's right to
speak freely), rev'd on other grounds, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. See infra notes 39-40.
36. See infra notes 41-43.
37. See infra notes 44-57.
38. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (noting the
limited power of the Government to control speech on public property such as streets and
parks).
39. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
40. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 659 (1984) (striking down statutes which
prohibit reproducing photographs of government currency); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980) (finding a statute which prohibited picketing of residences except for peaceful pick-
eting of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute to be invalid, content-based
restriction); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a content-
based ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school). But see Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 597 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 687, 715-16 (1931) (stating that obscene speech may be limited by the govern-
ment), rev'd on other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
41. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980)
(stating that the Public Service Commission's restriction on the utility company's actions
to express its view regarding nuclear energy in customers' billing notices was unconstitu-
tional since the restriction was not a valid time, place and manner limitation); Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating a township's ordi-
nance which prohibited the posting of "For Sale" signs in an effort to stem "white flight"
from an integrated neighborhood); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (a Virginia statute which forbade the adver-
tising of prescription drug prices exceeded the bounds of constitutional time, place, and
manner restrictions); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98 (1972) (striking
down a city ordinance which prohibits most picketing within a 150 foot radius of a school).
42. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (speech which thwarted the war
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Such unprotected speech, including speech likely to incite or produce
imminent dangers or lawless action, may be prohibited by the Govern-
ment.43 Other expressions which may not present a "clear and present
danger" yet do not enjoy First Amendment protection include "fighting
words" or speech "which by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury or
tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'4 4 Such speech, the
Court has ruled, is of little social value and the right to free expression
was "outweighed by the interest of order and morality."' 45 Nonetheless,
in opinions subsequent to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court has seemingly distanced itself from its original proscription
against fighting words.
4 6
C. First Amendment Protection Does Not Extend To Obscenity.
In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court not only designated so-called
"fighting words" as unprotected speech, but also noted in dicta that
"lewd and obscene" speech fell within the "well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."'4 7 This find-
ing ultimately led the Court to its decision in Roth v. United States.4 8
In Roth, the Court quoted the Chaplinsky dicta and found that ob-
scenity was not Constitutionally protected speech. 49 The Court defined
obscenity as that which "deals with sex in a manner appealing to pruri-
ent interest." 50 To differentiate obscenity from sex depicted in art or
literature, the Court emphasized that obscene speech is that which "to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." 51 This standard became the Court's guide to determine
effort did not constitute protected speech); see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919).
43. Courts have also categorized such unprotected speech or association as that which
presents a "clear and present danger." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(Ku Klux Klan burning of crosses); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
(membership in an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by
force or violence); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (presenting the renowned example of yelling
"fire" in a crowded theater as speech which would likely produce or incite imminent dan-
ger), subsequently overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). See generally Michael
A. Coletti, Note, First Amendment Implications Of Rock Lyric Censorship, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 421,
439-43 (1967) (concerning the regulation or classification of rock music lyrics).
44. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
45. Id.
46. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131 (1974) (overturning a convic-
tion for uttering, "you goddamn motherfucking police"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
107 (1973) (holding that the statement, "[wle'll take the fucking street later .... ," was
protected speech); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (overturning a conviction
for saying, "[y]ou son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 16 (1971) (overturning a conviction for breach of the peace for wearing a jacket which
displayed the phrase, "Fuck the Draft").
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)
(noting that obscene speech, like group libel, was not protected under the Constitution).
48. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
49. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id. at 489.
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whether certain expression constituted obscene and, therefore, unpro-
tected speech.
5 2
Affirming the Roth finding that obscene speech is unprotected, the
Supreme Court established the definitive test for obscenity in Miller v.
California.53 The test for obscene speech in Miller requires:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value.
5 4
Subsequent to its decision in Miller, the Court clarified the components
of the test. The first two components, which note that obscene speech
must be "patently offensive" and "appeal to prurient interests," must be
judged in terms of "contemporary community standards" 55 and not by
national criteria. 56 Further, the Court has noted that only "patently of-
fensive, 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating
state law" can be prohibited. 5 7 Obscenity does not include items which
arouse normal sexual desires.
58
Notwithstanding criticisms by justices in subsequent cases, 59 the
Miller test continues to be the guideline used to determine whether cer-
tain forms of expression are obscene. Each component of the Miller test
must be satisfied in order to classify a work as obscene.6 0 Consequently,
speech which is found to be obscene, in accordance with the Miller test,
is not constitutionally protected.
6
52. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1966) (certain publications
were obscene since they commercially exploited erotica solely for the sake of prurient
appeal).
53. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. The Court in Miller specifically noted that community standards, as deter-
mined by the jury, must be used to adjudge the offensiveness and prurient appeal of ques-
tioned expression, id. at 26, 30; see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977).
56. A "national standards" test had been adopted in a plurality opinion by the Court
injacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
57. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
58. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
59. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 95, 100 (1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (noting the
vagueness of the obscenity test and further stating "in the absence of distribution to
juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress
sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.", id. at 113).
60. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 136 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Pent-
house Int'l., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363 (5th Cir. 1980)).
61. The Court has modified the Miller test for obscenity in cases involving the protec-
tion of minors; see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute that
proscribed material which appealed to the prurient interests of minors); Butler v. Michi-
gan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (invalidating a statute that makes it a criminal offense to make
available materials which have a detrimental effect on minors).
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D. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint - Protection From Preemptive Suppression
of Questionable Expression.
Until speech or expression is ruled obscene, it must be accorded a
degree of protection from censorship or limitation. This simple require-
ment represents a significant precept of the prior restraint doctrine. 62
Even speech, which on its face is offensive and lewd, falls within the pro-
tective sphere of the doctrine. 6 3 Governmental authorities, therefore,
cannot summarily limit such questionable expression.
The case of Freedman v. Maryland64 noted the government's obliga-
tion to secure ajudicial determination of the unprotected status of alleg-
edly obscene material. Freedman delineates the minimum procedural
safeguards that prior restraints must provide in order to satisfy Consti-
tutional scrutiny: (1) the governmental authority seeking to limit the
speech or expression must initiate prompt judicial proceedings and
prove that the expression is unprotected; (2) any limitations or restraints
placed upon the expression prior to this judicial proceeding can be im-
posed for a brief period and only to maintain the "status quo;" and (3)
the governmental authority must guarantee prompt and expedient judi-
cial action.
65
Prior restraints generally take the form of licensing or permit re-
quirements, taxes, registrations, advanced publication or submission of
materials or matters for dissemination and judicial injunctions. 6 6 The
discretion of public officials who subject speech or expression to scru-
tiny has been held to produce "censoring effects" and often chills
speech before the speech is uttered. Such prior restraint has been con-
sidered repugnant to the First Amendment right to free speech. 67
62. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (cit-
ing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (reaffirming that minimal procedural
safeguards must be followed in order for a prior restraint to be deemed permissible), rev'd
on other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992); see South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (noting that the standard
of obscenity "whatever it may have been, was not implemented by the board under a sys-
tem with the appropriate and necessary procedural safeguards"); Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980).
63. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 598 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05
(1973) (the "common thread" of the law is that where the state has removed from public
distribution arguably protected speech, the state has imposed prior restraint), rev'd on other
grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502, 513 (1966).
64. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
65. Id. at 59; see Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. at 317; McKinney v. Alabama, 424
U.S. 669, 674 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559-60.
66. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
67. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 552; see also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (finding that a city ordinance which prohibits public demonstra-
tions without a permit is unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958) (stating that an ordinance which requires that individuals
obtain a permit to solicit members for organizations which require the payment of dues is
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94
(1951) (stating that an ordinance which gives the government the discretion to control
citizens' speech on religious matters is an invalid prior restraint); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451-52 (1938) (finding that an ordinance which prohibits the distribution of literature
without a permit is "invalid on its face"). In each of these cases, petitioners asked the
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In addition to concerns relevant to censorship, prior restraints
often involve licensing or regulatory schemes which have dubious,
vague or unacceptable standards governing the suppression of speech.6 8
The absence of such standards provides governmental officials with a
significant degree of discretion in the decision of whether speech or ex-
pression will be permitted at all.69 Indeed, the Supreme Court in South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. stated that the "Court has felt obliged to condemn
systems in which the exercise of such authority was not bound by precise
and clear standards ... the danger of censorship and of abridgement of
our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials
have unbridled discretion over a forum's use."
70
Another concern evolving from the concept of prior restraint is the
delay caused by licensing or regulatory schemes. Courts have recog-
nized that various forms of speech are valuable due to the urgency and
immediacy of the idea expressed. Consequently, any delay in the pres-
entation of these ideas can destroy the value, meaning and impact of this
speech. 7 1 The delay or denial of such speech impairs the First Amend-
ment rights of the speaker and the audience. Ultimately, the community
as a whole loses.
72
Given the problems related to unfettered discretion placed in public
officials, the detriment attributable to delay and the other difficulties as-
sociated with censorship, issues of prior restraint generally include one
or more of the following factors: (1) possible dissemination or distribu-
tion of speech or expression which may be controversial because of its
content, form or manner of presentation;73 (2) application to a public
courts to provide requisite relief from "prior restraints" where public officials had forbid-
den the petitioners' use of public places to express their ideas. The officials had the power
to deny the use of a forum in advance of the actual expression.
68. Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 41 D.R.I. 1990); see
infra notes 92, 94, 105, 118, and 122; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965)
(indicating that the unbridled discretion of Baton Rouge authorities to prohibit parades or
street meetings is an invalid prior restraint); Irish Subcomm. v. R.I. Heritage Comm'n, 646
F. Supp. 347, 359 (D.R.I. 1986) (finding that a rule prohibiting political paraphernalia
display is violative of the First Amendment). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrurnONAL LAW, § 12-34, 1039 (2d ed. 1988); Scordato, supra note 24 at 8-9.
69. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553.
70. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553.
71. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 562).
72. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (stating that appellants' continued defense of their Louisiana prosecution under
laws which restrict "communist activities" would impair First Amendment freedoms due to
delay); see also Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964) (strik-
ing down a Kansas statute which permits the seizure and destruction of allegedly obscene
material); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 736-38 (1961) (finding the
lack of safeguards and, therefore, adverse effects due to the unconstitutional Missouri pro-
cedures relevant to search and seizure of allegedly obscene materials).
73. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (the expression in dispute
was a rock concert); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 546 (the controversial expression
consisted of the proposed performance of the musical production Hair); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (the expression comprised motion pictures); Atlantic Beach
Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990) (the expression consisted of a 2
Live Crew "rap" music concert); Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 581 (the expression involved
"2 Live Crew's" album, As Nasty As They Wanna Be).
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official for use of a public forum to express ideas or for the sponsorship
of expressive activity at an establishment;74 (3) public officials' discre-
tion to grant or withhold permission for the distribution of controversial
expression via a license, permit or other such devise based upon the
content of the expression; 75 (4) approval of the application before the
expression is allowed;76 (5) approval of the application is "ad hoc,"
with an appraisal of facts, exercise ofjudgment, ind the formation of an
opinion by the public official and without judicial intervention; 7 7 and
(6) absent judicial determination of the protected status of the expres-
sion, judgment of the public official would prevent distribution or per-
formance of the contemplated expression. 78 Generally, prompt judicial
review would be required.79 The presence of these elements, either sin-
gularly or collectively, triggers the applicability of the prior restraint
doctrine. Under Freedman, the governmental official or "censor" gener-
ally bears the burden to prove the compelling need for such limitation.
In the more recent case of FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas,s" Justices O'Connor,
Stevens and Kennedy indicated in a concurring opinion that the govern-
ment should not bear the burden of going to court to deny a license for
a sexually oriented business.81 This decision notwithstanding, the pro-
cedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine set forth in Freedman
remain compulsory.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: FOUR PRINCIPAL CASES INVOLVING
CONTROVERSIAL EXPRESSION.
The legal dilemma of the rap music group 2 Live Crew provides an
excellent factual and legal reference for the discussion of the viability of
the prior restraint doctrine. While some legal theorists have focused on
whether 2 Live Crew's album, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, merited Consti-
tutional protection, 82 the courts' decisions in Skyywalker v. Navarro 83, At-
lantic Beach v. Morenzoni8 4 and Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro 8 5 present
74. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 781; see also Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546; Freedman,
380 U.S. 51; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38; Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. 578; infra note 123.
75. See infra notes 94, 122, and 128.
76. See infra notes 94, 122, and 128.
77. See infra notes 122, 123, and 128.
78. See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 554-55; see also infra note 122.
79. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560.
80. 493 U.S. 215 (1990)..
81. Id. at 230. In FW/PBS, Inc., the Court, in a divided decision, invalidated the city's
licensing ordinance which required sexually oriented businesses to obtain approval from
the health and fire departments and the building inspectorprior to the issuance of a license.
The ordinance also failed to provide for prompt judicial review.
82. See generally Clark, supra note 17.
83. 739 F. Supp. 578, 600-01 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that an exparte application to a
state judge for an order of probable cause and an order finding that there was probable
cause to believe As Nasty As They Wanna Be was obscene were insufficient procedures to
meet the minimum due process requirements of prior restraint), rev'd on other grounds, Luke
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. Fla. 1992).
84. 749 F. Supp. 38, 42-43 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that a town ordinance allowing
revocation of an entertainment license "for cause shown" was an unconstitutional use of
prior restraint because the ordinance did not contain narrow, objective and definite stan-
dards to guide the licensing authority).
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textbook illustrations of the importance of the doctrine in the conflict
between freedom to express controversial ideas and governmental con-
trol of such expression. While the decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatres,
Inc.8 6 addresses nude dancing, the context of conduct and its poten-
tially close association with the performance of musical expression un-
derscores the ultimate importance of the prior restraint doctrine.
A. Skyywalker v. Navarro - Issues of Protected Speech and Prior Restraint.
In 1989, Skyywalker Records, Inc. released an album entitled, As
Nasty As They Wanna Be, recorded by 2 Live Crew.8 7 As Nasty As They
Wanna Be (Nasty) allegedly contained sexually explicit lyrics, punctuated
with crude and vulgar language.
8 8
In early 1990, residents of South Florida registered complaints with
the Broward County Sheriff's office regarding Nasty. Thereafter, the
sheriff's office investigated the content and distribution of Nasty.8 9 Dep-
uty Sheriff Mark Wichner bought a cassette tape recording of Nasty from
a retail music store in Broward County. Deputy Wichner obtained the
tape from an open rack accessible to anyone.
90
After listening to the recording of Nasty, Deputy Wichner prepared
an affidavit that included a description of the facts relevant to the tape's
retrieval. On February 28, 1990, Deputy Wichner submitted the affida-
vit, a transcription of six of the eighteen songs on Nasty and the actual
tape of the album to the Broward County Circuit Court for a determina-
tion of whether Nasty was legally obscene.9 1
After consideration of the affidavit and other submissions, including
information relevant to the accessibility of Nasty to the public, the circuit
court judge found the recording obscene pursuant to section 847.011 of
the Florida statutes and relevant case law. 92 Thejudge entered an order
to this effect.
93
The Broward County Sheriff's office then disseminated copies of
85. 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992).
86. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
87. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582. 2 Live Crew is a "rap" music group whose mem-
bers include Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, David Hobbs, and Chris Wongwon. Id. Luther
Campbell functions as president, secretary, sole director and shareholder of Skyywalker
Records, Inc. which is a corporation based in Miami, Florida. Id.
88. Nasty contains such songs as: Put Her in the Buck, D..K Almighty, Dirty Nursery Rhymes,
and Bad A..B. .. H, all of which contain explicit lyrics.
89. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582-83.
90. Id. at 583.
91. Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.07-.09 (West 1976) (generally concerned with the pro-
motion of obscene materials); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.08 (Supp. 1992) (requires probable
cause hearings when an indictment, information or affidavit is filed under §§ 847.07-.09;
permits the State attorney to apply to the court for an order to the defendant, his agent,
bailee, etc. to produce the materials for determination, and; allows a court to hold the
material for further disposition after an appropriate hearing). In the case of Skyywalker,
Deputy Wichner applied for a determination of obscenity from the court. The govern-
ment however did not adhere to the statutorily mandated procedures for such a determi-
nation. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
92. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; see infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
93. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603.
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the judge's order to retail businesses that might have sold the album.
To avoid overaggression, the sheriff's office issued warnings in lieu of
arrests to the stores regarding the distribution of Nasty. Subsequently,
officials of the Sheriff's office visited twenty-three retail establishments
including the store where Deputy Wichner bought a copy of the Nasty
cassette. During these visits, the officials wore their uniforms and dis-
played their badges to the proprietors. The officials presented a copy of
the order of the circuit court judge, his badge, and a warning that fur-
ther sales of Nasty "would result in arrest and that if convicted, the pen-
alty for selling to a minor was a felony, and a misdemeanor if sold to an
adult."' 94 Subsequently, all retail establishments in Broward County, re-
gardless of their policy of labelling the recording or restricting sales to
minors, discontinued sales of Nasty. The stores instituted this ban,
notwithstanding the insert in Nasty's packaging stating, "WARNING:
EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED." 95
On March 16, 1990, Skyywalker Records (Skyywalker) filed suit in
the United States District Court under section 1983, Title 42 of the
United States Code.9 6 Skyywalker also sought declaration of their rights
and injunctive relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
9 7
Thereafter, Sheriff Navarro filed an in rem action in the Broward County
Circuit Court in an attempt to obtain a judicial determination that Nasty
was obscene.
98
Prior to a discussion of whether the sheriff's acts to discourage the
sale of Nasty in local retail stores comprised an illegal prior restraint, the
Skyywalker court performed an exhaustive determination of whether
Nasty was Constitutionally protected speech. The court, without a jury,
offered a detailed analysis of Nasty under the prevailing laws relevant to
obscenity. 9 9 Acknowledging that this right is not absolute,1 0 0 the court
ultimately held that obscene material enjoys no Constitutional protec-
tion. 10 ' Focusing on provisions of the Florida statutes relevant to ob-
scenity, 10 2 the court noted that the legislature's definition of obscenity
closely parallels that of the Supreme Court in Miller. 10 3 Recognizing the
94. Id. at 583.
95. Id. 2 Live Crew released As Clean As They Wanna Be subsequent to Nasty which
some establishments continued to sell. As Clean As They Wanna Be includes the identical
instrumental music contained in Nasty but replaced the explicitly sexual lyrics with less
graphic language. Id at 582.
96. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (provides federal, statutory relief for the wrongful
deprivation by state officials of federal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and other federal laws).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582.
98. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 583.
99. Id. at 584-96.
100. Id. at 584 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
101. Id. at 584 (citing Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115;
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
20 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72
(1942)).
102. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 585.
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001(7) (Supp. 1992) (defining obscenity in words which
virtually mirror those in Miller.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
criminal nature associated with obscene material, the court also ob-
served the wide prohibitions against obscenity including sale, distribu-
tion and production.
1 0 4
The Skyywalker court performed an exhaustive and comprehensive
analysis of Nasty under the Miller guidelines for obscenity. 10 5 In its de-
termination, the court found: (a) the "relevant community" whose stan-
dards would be used to evaluate Nasty would encompass Palm Beach,
Broward and Dade Counties; 10 6 (b) the "average person," by whose
standards Nasty would have to be judged, tends to be more tolerant of
obscene speech than individuals in other parts of Florida, yet the "aver-
age person's" tolerance would not be unbridled; 10 7 (c) Nasty's lyrics
have the "tendency to excite lustful thoughts" 108 and, therefore, appeal
to prurient interest; 109 (d) Nasty's graphic and frequent portrayal of sex-
ual conduct establishes the recording as "patently offensive," as evalu-
'Obscene' means the status of material which: (a) The average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) Depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct as specifically defined herein; and (c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.);
see also, Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (delineating the basic "guidelines" for the trier of fact in the
determination of obscenity).
104. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 585 (references portions of the Florida statutes which
criminalize certain uses of obscene material: § 847.07 (transporting obscene material),
§ 847.011 (1)(a) (making the distribution, sale, or production of obscene material a crime),
§ 847.011(2) (criminalizing the possession of obscene material), § § 847.012, -.0125 (out-
lawing the distribution and display of obscene materials to minors), §§ 847.013, -.0133, -
.0 135 (prohibiting exposure to minors of obscene materials), and 847.0145 (prohibiting
the buying or selling of minors)). See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.07, 847.01l(1)(a), 847.012-
.015 (West Supp. 1992).
105. See generally Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 587-96.
106. Id. at 587-88 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30). Before applying the "contemporary
community standards" requirement, the court examined the geographic and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of Palm Beach, Broward and Dade Counties to conclude that those
three areas comprised the "relevant community." Id. at 588. The court pointed to such
factors as common geography, common transportation, shared access to radio and televi-
sion stations and print media and similar composition of rural and urban areas. The opin-
ion noted the area's racial, religious, gender and class diversity. The court emphasized
that the determination of the relevant community remained a judicial rather than legisla-
tive function. Id. at 587 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977)).
107. Id. at 588-89. The court admitted difficulty in the assessment of the "average
person" standard. Nonetheless, the court recognized that this standard comprised a legal
notion which must be taken from the "aggregation or average of everyone's attitudes in
the area including persons with differing degrees of tolerance." Id. at 589 (citing Pinkus v.
United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-302 (1978)). The court commented specifically that the
evaluation of Nasty constituted an "application of the law to the facts based upon the trier
of fact's personal knowledge of community standards." Id. at 590. Consequently, the
court concluded that its assessment of Nasty did not constitute the personal opinion of the
judge, but a reflection of an average person of the relevant area.
108. Id. at 591 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957), overruled by
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
109. Id. at 591-92. In reaching the conclusion that Nasty appeals to prurient interest,
the court closely examined the lyrics of the album. The court noted that the frequent and
graphic references to human genitalia and various bodily functions produced the prurient
appeal and served only to evoke "dirty" thoughts. Id. at 591. The court also made specific
reference to §§ 847.001(2) and 847.001(11) of the Florida statutes which depict the "sex-
ual conduct" inherent in obscene materials. Id. While the court acknowledged "2 Live
Crew's" commercial motive, it opined that this motive served to promote lustful thoughts.
Id. at 592.
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ated under "contemporary community standards;" 1 10 and (e) pursuant
to an objective, reasonable person's standard, Nasty has no social
value. " I The court ultimately concluded that, by both a preponderance
of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence, Nasty was "legally"
obscene under Florida law.'
12
Subsequent to a determination that Nasty was obscene, the court
addressed the issue of whether the sheriff's actions to discourage sales
of Nasty constituted an illegal prior restraint. 1l 3 Acknowledging that the
"line between free speech and obscenity is so subtle, that the law im-
poses a presumption that all utterances are Constitutionally protected
until there is ajudicial decision to the contrary,"" 14 the court recognized
that any suppression of even obscene materials must comport with es-
tablished procedures." 5 The court further noted that music constitutes
a mode of expression within the context of free speech and is, therefore,
entitled to protection as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 116
Noting that proper procedures must be followed prior to the
seizure of "arguably protected" material, the court recognized that the
removal of any such material in contravention of procedure constitutes a
prior restraint.1 17 Applying the federal common law rules relevant to
prior restraint to the actions of the sheriff, the court concluded that: (a)
the state judge's "probable cause" order stating that Nasty was obscene
did not comport with statutory or common law procedure and had "no
legal effect;""18 (b) the sheriff's actions constituted a seizure of pre-
sumptively protected material; 1 19 (c) the sheriff's ex parte application
to the state judge for the probable cause order and the state court
110. Id. at 592 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22
(1971)). The court relied on sexual references and the frequency with which those refer-
ences were given to conclude that Nasty .was patently offensive. Id. at 592. The court
specifically highlighted the use of "dirty words," and the music's intrusion on "unwilling"
listeners. Id. at 593. Similar to the reasoning in its finding that Nasty appeals to prurient
interest, the court noted that 2 Live Crew's commercial motive may have validity, but is
not accorded great weight in determining if the work is patently offensive. Id. at 593. C.f.
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966) (noting that the court can consider
the manner in which the material was distributed and promoted to determine if the work
appeals to the prurient interest).
111. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 593-96 (citing Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01
(1987)). Utilizing the Miller guidelines, the court concluded that Nasty lacked any literary,
artistic, political or scientific value. Id. at 593-96. The court noted that Nasty's primary
thrust is its lyrics which have no socially valuable content. Id. at 595. The court rejected
arguments that Nasty embodied cultural significance. Id. at 594. Nasty taken as a. whole
portrays graphic sexual references with no social value. Id. at 595-96.
112. Id. at 596.
113. Id. The Skyywalker court presents a classic discussion of the relevant law of prior
restraint.
114. Id. at 597 (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989); Heller
v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973)).
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id. at 598 (citing the rule as stated in Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05
(1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513 (1966)).
118. Id. at 598, 600.
119. Id. at 598-99.
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judge's issuance of the order were insufficient to guard against the dan-
gers of unconstitutional prior restraint.
120
Although ruling that Nasty was obscene, the court found that the
sheriff's actions aimed to discourage the sale of Nasty constituted an ille-
gal prior restraint which violated 2 Live Crew's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.' 2 1 The court specifically noted, however, that the
sheriff could give advice to anyone suspected of violating the state's ob-
scenity laws and could "vigorously" enforce these criminal laws.
12 2
As an arguable consequence, significant legal actions ensued after
the court's ruling in Skyywalker. Although a subsequent proceeding in
the same court regarding legal costs and fees due the respective par-
ties,1 2 3 the authorities of Broward County unsuccessfully brought crimi-
nal charges against the members of 2 Live Crew for the performance
and distribution of Nasty.124 Moreover, the Broward County authorities
successfully prosecuted a record store owner who sold copies of Nasty in
his establishment.
125
B. The Aftermath of Skyywalker v. Navarro: Atlantic Beach v.
Morenzoni - Governmental Prior Restraint.
With its ruling that Nasty is obscene under Florida statutory law,
126
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in-
tensified the debate concerning freedom of controversial musical ex-
pression and governmental regulation of such expression. Undoubtedly
this controversy haunted the band in engagements following the ruling
in Skyywalker; 12 7 therefore, when a club owner in Misquamicut, Rhode
Island, sought to sponsor a 2 Live Crew concert in the fall of 1990, it
came as no surprise that the local government attempted to thwart the
event.
Atlantic Beach v. Morenzoni 12 8 involved a privately owned and oper-
120. Id. at 600. The court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (delineating that the governmental official
must obtain judicial review prior to the suppression or seizure of an allegedly unprotected
work; that the burden of proof regarding the unprotected nature of the material in ques-
tion lies with the governmental official; that suppression before such review can be insti-
tuted for a brief period of time in order to preserve the status quo; that judicial review
must be prompt).
121. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
124. See id.; Clark, supra note 17, at 1504 n.203. It is significant to note that an impor-
tant element of proof in the prosecution's case against 2 Live Crew in these criminal pro-
ceedings was an audio tape of the group's live performance of Nasty. Reports of the case
indicate that the lyrics in performance were largely incomprehensible. A jury found the
group not guilty of violating Florida's obscenity laws.
125. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1503; Man Convicted in 2 Live Crew Sale Closes Up Store,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at 10 (record store owner forced to close his business due to
financial difficulties).
126. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
127. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1503 n.202.
128. 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990).
[Vol. 70:1
CAN THE BAND PLAY ON?
ated club in Misquamicut, Rhode Island, called the "Windjammer." 129
The Windjammer regularly booked concerts and dances for the adults
of the general public.130 Pursuant to its published ordinances, the local
town council granted the club owners a liquor and entertainment li-
cense.' 3 ' Following the Florida court's decision in Skyywalker, I3 2 the
owners of the Windjammer contracted with 2 Live Crew for a concert
engagement. The contract required the band to perform at the club on
October 6, 1990.133
Due to 2 Live Crew's considerable publicity and ignominy for
shocking and allegedly obscene lyrical content, the town council di-
rected one of the club's owners, MJ. Murphy, to appear at a public hear-
ing before the council to address the upcoming performance of 2 Live
Crew. 134 During the public hearing, council members stated apprehen-
sion concerning the themes conveyed in 2 Live Crew's music. The
council's apprehension focused on the basic moral sordidness of this
music and its "contribution to 'America's slide into the sewer.' "1135
Moreover, the members of the council expressed concern about
public safety, given the possible large number of persons who would
attend the concert and the boisterousness of the crowd.13 6 The council
concluded that the question regarding obscenity would be referred to
the Rhode Island Attorney General. Additionally, the council noted that
it would consider the revocation of the Windjammer's liquor and en-
tertainment licenses. The owners and manager of the Windjammer
thereafter requested written notice of the statutes, regulations and ordi-
nances governing such action by the council.'
3 7
The council president wrote a letter to owners of the Windjammer
and stated that a show cause hearing regarding the possible revocation
of the club's liquor and entertainment license would take place on Sep-
tember 24, 1990. The letter also detailed the apprehensions and con-
129. Id. at 39.
130. Id.
131. The Town of Westerly's ordinance governing the issuance of an entertainment
license includes the following:
§ 17-84. Shows, motion pictures, performances, dances, balls - License required
approval.
No person shall maintain, operate or conduct any show, motion picture, theatrical
performance, or other similar exhibition inside a building or structure designed,
constructed and equipped for such purpose unless such person shall have a li-
cense issued by the Town Council, and approved by the Chief of Police, the
Building Official, and Zoning Inspector; and no person shall maintain, operate or
conduct any dance or ball unless such person shall have a license issued by the
Town Clerk after approval of the Chief of Police.
Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 40 n.3.
132. Note that the controversy involving the owners of the Windjammer occurred sub-
sequent to the court's ruling on legal costs and fees in Skyywalker Records, Inc. v.
Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d
134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
133. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 39.
134. Id.
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cerns which the council had relevant to the upcoming concert. These
"concerns" included the following: (1) the adequacy of parking facilities,
special police and additional parking attendants to be provided at [the]
facility on October 6, 1990, pursuant to Section 17-43(g) Westerly Code
of Ordinances; (2) the adequacy of the club's ability to protect public
places from the incursions of others as currently prohibited by Section
19-7(a)(2) Westerly Code of Ordinances and Section 17 -43(g) Westerly
Code of Ordinances; (3) expected public safety problems regarding the
unprotected shore of the Atlantic Ocean on Atlantic Beach on October
6, 1990, Section 17-27, Westerly Code of Ordinances; (4) the club's
ability to provide an adequate number of sanitary facilities outside of the
establishment, on October 6, 1990, Section 17-43(e), Westerly Code of
Ordinances; (5) the club's ability to afford adequate avenues for fire exit
from the facility on October 6, 1990; (6) the club's ability to monitor
and control the expected 1,500 patrons, both inside and outside of the
establishment on October 6, 1990, Section 17-43(g) and Section 19-8k
of the Westerly Code of Ordinances, and applicable Fire Codes; (7) the
impact of the club's proposed entertainment of October 6, 1990 on the
ability of the Westerly Police Department to maintain its normal opera-
tions, and simultaneously maintain adequate protection and manpower
for the anticipated number of persons to attend this function. 138 As au-
thority for a show cause hearing, the council president's letter also cited
Rhode Island General Laws 5-22-2 and the Westerly Code of Ordi-
nances Section 17-87. These laws governed actions required to grant or
revoke licenses.
139
On September 19, 1990, the owners of the Windjammer filed a mo-
tion with the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the town council
from holding the show cause hearing relevant to the revocation of the
138. Id. at 40 n.l.
139. The laws cited in the Council President's letter included a Rhode Island statutory
provision and a Westerly town ordinance. The state statute included the following
language:
City and Town Licenses for Exhibitions.
Town and city councils may grant a license, for a term not exceeding one (1) year,
under such restrictions and regulations as they shall think proper, to the owner of
any house, room or hall in the town, for the purpose of permitting exhibitions,
therein, which license shall be revocable at the pleasure of the town or city council.
Id. at 40 n.2 (citing R.I.G.L. 5-22-2) (emphasis added). The two Westerly town ordinances
relevant to the issuance and revocation of an entertainment license stated the following:
§ 17-84. Shows, motion pictures, performances, dances, balls - License required approval.
No person shall maintain, operate or conduct any show, motion picture, theatrical
performance, or other similar exhibition inside a building or structure designed,
constructed and equipped for such purpose unless such person shall have a li-
cense issued by the Town Council, and approved by the Chief of Police, the
Building Official, and Zoning Inspector; and no person shall maintain, operate or
conduct any dance or ball unless such person shall have a license issued by the
Town Clerk after approval of the Chief of Police.
§ 17-87. Same - Revocation of License.
Any license granted under Section 17-84 and 17-88 [outside entertainment] may
be revoked by the Town Council after public hearing for cause shown.
Id. at 40 n.3 (emphasis added).
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club's entertainment license.1 40 Specifically, the club owners sought to
restrain the council from accomplishing the following actions: (1) revo-
cation of the club's entertainment license; (2) prohibition of the 2 Live
Crew concert; and (3) imposition of any special requirements on the
club's owners relevant to the forthcoming 2 Live Crew concert.141
In its decision, the district court found that the parties' controversy
primarily involved a First Amendment "facial" challenge to Westerly's
licensing ordinances. 14 2 After considering several preliminary is-
sues, 14 3 the court delineated findings regarding the merits of the pre-
liminary injunction. In consideration of the merits of the preliminary
injunction, the court noted the requirements that the club owners must
satisfy in order to prevail. 144 Within the context of the requirement that
the club owners demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the
court noted the council's burden to overcome the mandates associated
with prior restraint.
The court noted that the town council's decision to review the ef-
fects of the concert before the concert took place constituted prior re-
straint. 14 5 The court observed that any "system of prior restraints"
bears a substantial presumption that such a system is Constitutionally
invalid. 14 6 Any licensing scheme involving prior restraint must contain
140. Id. at 39.
141. Id..
142. Id. The parties to the action and the court agreed to treat the club owner's motion
as an application for a preliminary injunction. Id. Accordingly, the Council's show cause
hearing was continued pending the Court's ruling on the application for injunctive relief.
Id.
143. Id. at 40-4 1. Preliminary issues included the question of the court's jurisdiction
over the controversy. Citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939), the court noted
that jurisdiction had been properly asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and that 28
U.S.C. secs. 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 1883 provided the requisite jurisdiction for the
court to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 40-41.
The court also addressed the Town Council's assertion that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy. Id. at 41. Essentially, the
Council opined that the case was not actionable since the club owners' license had not
been reviewed and revoked. Id. The court, however, rejected this position since the club
owners made a facial challenge to the town ordinance due to a lack of standards. Id.
The court noted that where a licensing statute vests "unbridled discretion in a govern-
ment official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity," the individual affected by
the law may challenge it facially without first applying for, and being denied, the license.
Id. at 41 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988);
Venuti v. Riordan, 521 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (D. Mass. 1981)). The court stated defini-
tively that the 2 Live Crew concert was protected under the First Amendment. Id at 41
(citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)).
144. To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court noted that the club
owners must demonstrate four essential qualifications:
1. Likelihood of success on the merits; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
2. Likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm if such relief is not granted;
Id. at 42.
3. The injury to be sustained by the club owners outweighs any harm occa-
sioned by the grant of injunctive relief; Id. and
4. The public interest will not be adversely affected by the grant of the injunc-
tion. Id. at 41 (citing LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 642 (1st Cir. 1983)).
145. Id. at 41 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554-55
(1975)). The court definitively asserted that the First Amendment of the Constitution pro-
tects "2 Live Crew's" performance. Id (citing Ward, 491 U.S at 790).
146. Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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"narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing author-
ity" in order to withstand Constitutional scrutiny.147 In granting the
preliminary injunction, the court ultimately concluded that the town of
Westerly's administrative actions constituted an impermissible prior
restraint.
14 8
C. Skyywalker v. Navarro on Appeal: Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro.
Ultimately, the members of 2 Live Crew appealed the Shyywalker
court's decision that Nasty was obscene. 14 9 The court of appeals primar-
ily examined the government's problem of proof in the establishment of
a musical work as obscene.
150
Subsequent to acknowledging the Miller test for obscenity,' 5 ' the
appellate court recognized two significant problems with the govern-
ment's case. First, the Sheriff of Broward County failed to present any
evidence in support of the obscenity charge other than a tape of Nasty.
Conversely, the members of 2 Live Crew presented four expert wit-
nesses who attested to Nasty's artistic value or lack of prurient inter-
est. 15 2 The sheriff's only proof was a cassette recording of a concert
performance of Nasty. As a result, the court of appeals concluded that
the sheriff failed to prove that Nasty lacked artistic value.'
l5
Second, the presiding judge in Skyywalker relied on his own exper-
tise to determine the community standards and to adjudge the artistic
value of Nasty. 15 4 Acknowledging the difficulty of reviewing "value
judgments on appeal,"' 155 the court of appeals noted that the record
failed to substantiate the judge's expertise in artistic or literary matters
to satisfy the last component of the Miller test.' 56 The appellate court
further opined that the lower court judge could not determine Nasty's
artistic value by merely listening to the work. 15 7 Consequently, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the sheriff did not meet his burden of
proof, even by a preponderance of the evidence. 15 8 Based on the find-
ing regarding the lower court's obscenity ruling, the court of appeals did
not comment upon the Skyywalker court's prior restraint analysis. 159
147. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)); see supra
text accompanying notes 68, 73, and 74.
148. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42-43.
149. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135 (1992) (noting that this case com-
prised the first instance where a federal court of appeals was asked to determine whether a
musical work, containing both instrumental music and lyrics, is obscene under Miller
standards).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 136.
152. Id. at 136-37.
153. Id. at 138.
154. Id. at 137.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 138.
157. Id. at 139. The court also noted that the government need not present expert
testimony to determine whether Nasty was obscene. Id. at 137. (citing Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
158. Id. at 136, 138-39.
159. See Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 134.
[Vol. 70:1
CAN THE BAND PLAY ON?
D. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Limitations On Controversial Expression.
An additional consideration regarding the efficacy of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the preservation of free musical expression is the im-
pact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. 160 Barnes addressed two Indiana establishments that provide, inter
alia, adult entertainment including nude dancing. An Indiana public in-
decency statute 16 1 requires that dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-
string" during performances.1
6 2
The two establishments which host totally nude dancers sought an
injunction in the United States District Court to prevent the enforce-
ment of the Indiana statute.16 3 The distict court originally granted the
injunction stating that the statute was facially overbroad.1 4 The court
of appeals reversed and remanded the case, stating that previous litiga-
tion prevented a challenge of the statute based upon a claim that the law
was overbroad. 165 Subsequently, the district court denied the injunc-
tion, opining that the nude dancing performed in the establishments did
not constitute "expressive activity" protected by the Constitution.'
66
On its second review of the case, the court of appeals overturned the
district court's decision noting that the First Amendment does protect
nude dancing as expressive conduct.
167
In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court overturned the decision of the court of appeals and as-
serted the Constitutionality of the Indiana statute which generally pros-
cribes public nudity. 16 8 The Court further stated that the nude dancing
"of the kind involved here" comprises expressive conduct which is de-
serving of "marginal[]" First Amendment protection.' 69
In determining the extent of Constitutional protection that should
be afforded to nude dancing, the Supreme Court recognized that limita-
tions on this type of expressive activity constituted a valid "time, place,
or manner" restriction.17 0 The Court then adopted the "time, place, or
160. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
161. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
162. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
163. Id at 2459.
164. Id.
165. Id (citing Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 288-90 (7th Cir. 1986)).
166. Id. (citing Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F.Supp. 414, 419
(N.D.Ind. 1988)).
167. Id (citing Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989)).
168. Id. at 2460.
169. Id In reaching its conclusion that nude dancing merits only marginal constitu-
tional protection, the Supreme Court relied substantially on its opinion in Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (stating that "customary 'barroom' type of nude danc-
ing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression"); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (stating that nude dancing may be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection "under some circumstances"), and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 66 (1981) (stating that nude dancing "is not without" constitutional protection from
"official regulation").
170. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
The Supreme Court also noted that valid "time, place, and manner" restrictions are evalu-
ated for speech that takes place on public property which is found to be a "public forum"
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manner" test set forth in United States v. O'Brien,171 and noted that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" are combined, a "sufficiently important"
governmental interest would justify incidental intrusions on First
Amendment protected activities such as "speech."
1 7 2
Using the four-part test enunciated in O'Brien, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Indiana public indecency statute, which serves to
protect substantial governmental interests in preserving order and mo-
rality, is sustainable notwithstanding any incidental intrusions on some
expressive activity. 173 Specifically, the Court noted that: (1) the State of
Indiana has the constitutional power to regulate public indecency;
1 74
(2) Indiana's public indecency statute furthers an "important or substan-
tial" governmental interest in preserving "societal order and moral-
ity;' 75 (3) the government's interest in protecting order and morality
does not relate to the suppression of erotic messages conveyed by such
activity; 176 and (4) the statute, which incidentally restricts otherwise
free speech, is narrowly tailored to further the governmental interest.
1 77
as noted in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1991), and Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Id.
171. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (refusing to provide constitutional protection to an individ-
ual's "symbolic speech," which consisted of burning his draft card to protest the United
States's conflict in Vietnam).
172. Id. (citing Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77)).
173. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2462. The Court noted the historic origins of the proscriptions against pub-
lic nudity and the proliferation of similar statutes throughout the United States. Id. The
Court further observed that the protection of public health, safety and morals constitutes a
traditional police power of the state. Id. at 2461-62.
176. Id. at 2462. The Court recognized that the nude dancing involved presents
"speech" in the form of an erotic message. Id. at 2463. The court emphasized that the
State of Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-string" does not
prevent this message; it merely makes the message less graphic. Id.
177. Id. at 2463. Justice Scalia concurred in the plurality opinion, stating that laws
proscribing conduct not directly related to expression should not be subjected to custom-
ary First Amendment scrutiny. Id- Consequently, such laws should be upheld because
they have a rational basis related to moral opposition to public nudity. Id. at 2468. Justice
Souter also concurred, further opining that the governmental interest is substantial and
that the Indiana statute furthers that interest, irrespective of any proof of harmful effects
resulting from such activity. Id. at 2469-71. Souter relied substantially upon the Court's
decision in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Barnes, I11 S. Ct. at
2469-71.
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented. White
noted that the non-obscene, nude dancing in this case is protected by the First Amend-
ment, and opined that the Indiana statute reaches a substantial amount of protected ex-
pressive activity in furthering "societal order and morality." Id. at 2473. He stated that
the statute should be subject to "the most exacting scrutiny" given the impact on free
expression. Id. at 2474 (citing Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) and Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1980)). White further noted the requirement that content-based
restrictions must be drawn narrowly to further a compelling state interest. Id. (citing
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Notwithstanding any question concerning the
level of the government's interest, he felt that the statute was not narrowly drawn. Id. at
2475. White concluded that the Indiana law basically criminalizes nude dancing. Id. at
2476.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE SUBSTANTIATION OF THE PRIOR RESTRAINT
DOCTRINE AS A GUARD AGAINST THE PREMATURE
RESTRICTION OF CONTROVERSIAL EXPRESSION.
Although courts may exhibit a willingness to scrutinize controver-
sial musical expression, the Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach decisions sub-
stantiate the power, and overall importance, of the procedural
requirements of the prior restraint doctrine. As a result, these require-
ments comprise a powerful shield against the premature and potentially
unlawful restriction of controversial expression.
The courts' opinions in Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach note that gov-
ernment authorities' actions to prevent the dissemination of controver-
sial musical forms constitute impermissible prior restraints which violate
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 178 Both cases contain sig-
nificant similarities and dissimilarities in the manner in which the courts
arrived at their decisions. 179 These distinctions demonstrate the signifi-
cance of the prior restraint doctrine in any attempt to restrict musical
expression. Although Barnes relates to expressive conduct, the relatively
close nexus between dancing and controversial musical expression ele-
vates the importance of the prior restraint doctrine as applied to musical
expression in a "live" context.
A. Skyywalker and Its Demise: Controversial Music as Unprotected
Expression - A Difficult Finding Which Highlights The Significance
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine.
The court in Skyywalker presented an extensive explanation of its
conclusion that Nasty is obscene pursuant to the Florida statute. Be-
cause obscene material enjoys no Constitutional protection, the
Skyywalker court, prior to Luke Records, Inc., theoretically paved the way
for the unabashed regulation of 2 Live Crew's album. The Florida stat-
utes governing obscenity provide ample legislative authority to prohibit
the dissemination of material found to be obscene.' 8 0
As the court in Luke Records, Inc. documents, there remain significant
factors which substantially minimize the impact of the court's ruling.
First, there are notable arguments opposing the correctness and legiti-
macy of the court's obscenity analysis as applied to Nasty. 18 1 Courts
more often apply the Miller standard in obscenity cases involving picto-
rial pornography as opposed to cases involving musical expression.' 8 2
Given the inherent artistic nature of music, it is difficult to find any musi-
178. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 600; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
181. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1514-21.
182. People v. Sclafani, 520 N.E.2d 409,414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("[M]agazines contain
pictures of... masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, intercourse, homosexuality or lesbian-
ism.... [P]ictures focus almost exclusively on... genitals ... and the sparse text describes
the events taking place"); Van Sant v. State, 523 N.E.2d 229, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988);
State v. Von Wilds, 362 S.E.2d 605, 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). These cases involve the
display of various forms of sexual activity.
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cal composition that is totally void of literary, artistic, political or social
value. 18 3 In fact, the court of appeals in Luke Records, Inc. stated in dicta
that: ".... [W]e tend to agree with appellants' contention that because
music possesses inherent artistic value, no work of music alone may be
declared obscene .... 184 Moreover, the court in Skyywalker, in empha-
sizing the proof problem in obscenity cases involving music, indicated
that the court's decision in such matters "is not based upon the under-
signed judge's personal opinion as to the obscenity of the work, but is an
application of the law to the facts based upon the trier of fact's personal
knowledge of community standards."' 8 5 The government's burden to
prove each prong of the Miller test presents a formidable obstacle in the
determination of a musical work as obscene.
The Skyywalker court recognized the seriousness, and perhaps the
complexity, of ruling that a musical composition is obscene. The court
specifically stated that its finding of obscenity is limited to 2 Live Crew's
album, Nasty, and not to the group and its performances. As the court
observed, "it is again important to note what this case is not about.
Neither the 'Rap' or 'Hip-Hop' musical genres are on trial. The narrow
issue before this court is whether the recording entitled As Nasty As They
Wanna Be is legally obscene."' 8 6 This holding shows the court's desire
to limit its decision to a specific finding on 2 Live Crew's musical
expression. 187
As illustrated in Skyywalker, courts tend to adopt a cautious ap-
proach to any prior limitations or restraints placed upon musical expres-
sion until a formal designation of its unprotected status has been issued
by the courts. This caution appears to stem from a recognition of the
importance of First Amendment freedoms. The Skyywalker court noted,
"music is clearly a form of expression within the scope of the free speech
guaranty and thereby entitled to the presumption of constitutionality as
a form of 'liberty' protected under the Fourteenth Amendment."' 188 As
in the case of Skyywalker, courts recognize the fine distinction between
obscenity and protected speech.' 8 9 As a result, there should be no
summary limitations placed upon speech to ensure the protected status
of expression.
The concept of "arguably" or "conceivably" protected speech, as
noted in Skyywalker, constitutes a significant concept in the area of con-
183. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1519 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) and noting
the improbability that any music could fail to satisfy that part of the Miller obscenity test
requiring that a work lack artistic value).
184. Luke Records, Inc. 960 F.2d at 135.
185. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 590.
186. Id. at 594.
187. Id. The court specifically stated: "The narrow issue before this court is whether
the recording entitled As Nasty As They Wanna Be is legally obscene. This is also not a case
about whether the group 2 Live Crew or any of its other music is obscene." Id.
188. Id. at 597.
189. Id. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("It is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are
formidable.").
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troversial musical expression. It provides that works, even those with
blatant references to sexual activity, cannot be summarily censored.19 0
Authorities must obtain a formal, judicial ruling that the work is legally
obscene.19 ' In spite of the existence of obscenity statutes, courts must
perform an extensive Miller analysis on such "arguable or conceivably"
protected speech.1 9 2 Thereafter, this analysis must demonstrate that
the musical expression in question is obscene under the Miller stan-
dard.' 93 Only after this detailed analysis is complete can the govern-
mental authority suppress such musical expression prior to
performance.1
9 4
In the abstract, the Skyywalker decision may serve to chill musical
expression. This view notes the court's novel finding that a musical
composition is obscene under Miller standards represents an encroach-
ment upon the artistic freedoms preserved by the First Amendment.1
9 5
Although Skyywalker was ultimately reversed, the court's willingness to
probe the content and merit of musical expression may signal a new
willingness in the judiciary to analyze controversial musical
expression. 196
Conversely, notwithstanding its reversal in Luke Records, Inc.,
Skyywalker could be viewed as an affirmation of the importance of free
speech and measures required to suppress even questionable expres-
sion. As noted above, Skyywalker affirms the requirement that musical
expression, regardless of its controversial nature, must be ruled obscene
or unprotected before its dissemination may be limited.' 9 7 This re-
quirement represents a strong affirmation of the procedural require-
ments under the prior restraint doctrine. Furthermore, the proof
required to substantiate a Miller analysis also minimizes the possibility
that a musical composition would be found obscene. 19 8 This burden of
proof appears to be a significant obstacle in establishing a musical work
as obscene. Consequently, Skyywalker should not constitute a "slippery
slope" which will lead to further limitations on speech.' 99
B. Atlantic Beach and Controversial Music as Protected Expression - A Clear
Finding.
Unlike Skyywalker, the court in Atlantic Beach assumed a much less
controversial view of the question of protection. While the Skyywalker
court explored the unprotected status of 2 Live Crew's album Nasty





195. See supra note 17 at 1481-85 & 1523-31.
196. See infra text accompanying note 205.
197. See supra text accompanying note 190.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 150-59 & 187-88.
199. Subsequent to Skyywalker, there have been no additional cases that have found
musical expression to be obscene and, thus, constitutionally unprotected.
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under prevailing obscenity laws in Florida,200 the court in Atlantic Beach
provided a straightforward finding that 2 Live Crew's performance en-
joys First Amendment protection. 20 1 The court relied completely upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,20 2 holding
that "[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected
under the First Amendment. ' 20 3 Consequently, governmental authori-
ties seeking to restrict dissemination of protected speech must conform
to the requirements of the prior restraint doctrine which proscribes limi-
tations on protected speech except under limited circumstances.
20 4
Unlike Skyywalker, the court in Atlantic Beach utilized a different ap-
proach to the protected speech issue. The court in Skyywalker appeared
willing to delve extensively into the content of the 2 Live Crew's musical
expression pursuant to the Miller obscenity standards. The Atlantic Beach
court, however, took a seemingly detached approach to the question.
The court's summarial acceptance of the protected status of 2 Live
Crew's performance may signal an unwillingness on the court's part to
explore the content of the group's music. Such inaction may also serve
to illustrate the federal courts' difficulty in deciding whether popular
musical forms are legally obscene.
20 5
Through their findings and discussion of the protected nature of
the musical expression involved in the cases, both Skyywalker and Atlantic
Beach illustrate the continued applicability and viability of the prior re-
straint doctrine. When speech is protected, as found by the court in
Atlantic Beach, it cannot be subject to prior restraints except under nar-
rowly defined circumstances. Unless musical expression is found consti-
tutionally unprotected, such speech must be accorded provisional
protection until its unprotected status is confirmed by the court. As the
court's decision in Skyywalker establishes, judicial confirmation of the
protected status of speech constitutes a significant element of the prior
restraint doctrine.
C. The Prior Restraint Doctrine and Its Relation to Controversial Expression.
Subsequent to their respective discussions of the protected nature
of 2 Live Crew's musical expressions, the courts in both Skyywalker and
Atlantic Beach examined the applicability of the prior restraint doc-
trine.20 6 In each case, the courts employed the federal common law ap-
plicable to the doctrine.
In the case of Skyywalker, the court's utilization of the prior restraint
200. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
201. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.R.I. 1990). The court discusses the pro-
tected nature of 2 Live Crew's performance in the context of the issue involving the club
owner's facial challenge to the town's ordinance. Id. See supra text accompanying note
142.
202. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
203. Id. at 790. See also Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48 & 62-65.
205. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1515-20. See also infra text accompanying note 215.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 113-122.
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doctrine focused on the lack of adherence to procedures that guarantee
that protected speech has not been censored. 20 7 The court emphasized
the requirement that the sheriff in Broward County adhere to the proce-
dural due process requirements in the regulation of "arguably or con-
ceivably" protected musical expression such as Nasty.
208
In effect, the Skyywalker court used its previously defined concept of
"arguably or conceivably" protected speech as a precursor to its prior
restraint analysis. The court noted that Nasty could not be seized or cen-
sored unless the precise requirements of due process were followed.20 9
In addition to recognizing the "fine line" between obscene and pro-
tected musical expression, the court also noted that, "music is clearly a
form of expression within the scope of the free speech guaranty and
thereby entitled to the presumption of constitutionality as a form of 'lib-
erty' protected under the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 10 Consequently,
regardless of the overtly explicit nature of the musical expression, such
''arguably or conceivably" protected speech cannot be suppressed or
seized without the invocation of formal judicial processes. 2 1 1 This af-
firms the importance of the procedural safeguards inherent in the prior
restraint doctrine.
The court definitively concluded that the prior restraint in
Skyywalker was unconstitutional. Because of the sheriff's failure to insti-
tute formal judicial actions,2 12 the prior restraint was neither imposed
207. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 597-98.
208. In effect, the Skyywalker court focused its discussion relevant to the prior restraint
doctrine on factor number 6 noted supra note 78 and accompanying text. See Skyywalker,
739 F. Supp. at 600-01 (emphasizing that there must be a judicial finding that Nasty is
obscene under Florida statutes prior to any seizure or limitation placed upon the distribu-
tion of such musical expression).
209. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 600-01.
210. Id. at 597 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (noting that
the musical "Hair" as theater is a form of speech);Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952) (finding that the motion picture film is a form of speech)).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 63 & 117, and infra note 215. The court found
that the Broward County Sheriff's dissemination of the probable cause order to retail
stores, together with the warning that continued sales of Nasty may be criminally actiona-
ble, remained tantamount to a "seizure" of Nasty. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 598. The
court recognized that "seizure" did not require an actual physical transfer of the album.
Id. As in this case, the distribution of the probable cause order, together with the warning,
constituted a "constructive" seizure and was, therefore, subject to due process require-
ments. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the opinions ex-
pressed in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (administrative
commission's "blacklist" of publications sent with warnings of the commission's power to
recommend prosecution deemed an impermissible prior restraint), Penthouse Interna-
tional, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931
(1980) (Solicitor General's use of various media forms, visits to retail establishments and
warrantless arrests to stop the sale of sexually explicit publications without priorjudicial
proceedings deemed an impermissible prior restraint), and Council for Periodical Distribu-
tors Association v. Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
827 F.2d 1483 (11 th Cir. 1987) (district attorney warned specific retailer that continued
sale of questionable material would warrant "institution" of criminal proceedings, and
"strongly suggested" that other retailers refrain from selling such materials to avoid
arrest). Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 599.
212. The failure to institute formal judicial proceedings to determine the unprotected
nature of Nasty remains enigmatic in light of the Florida statute's clear language regarding
the need for probable cause hearings. Section 847.08 of the Florida code states:
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for a brief period of time nor imposed to preserve the status quo. Thus,
2 Live Crew did not receive any guarantee or assurances that a prompt
judicial hearing would occur.
2 13
In contrast to the examination of the prior restraint in Skyywalker,
the court's analysis of the Westerly Town Council's attempt at limiting
or restraining the performance of 2 Live Crew in the Atlantic Beach case
remains straightforward and more summary in scope.2 14 Unlike
Skyywalker, the Atlantic Beach court focused on the quality of the stan-
dards which govern the attempted prior restraint. 21 5 Since the Atlantic
Beach court summarily concluded that 2 Live Crew's concert perform-
ance constituted protected speech,2 16 the court would obviously be
more predisposed to address the adequacy of standards applicable to
Whenever an indictment, information, or affidavit is filed under the provisions of
§§ 847.07-847.09, the state attorney or his duly appointed assistant may apply to
the court for the issuance of an order directing the defendant or his principal
agent or bailee or other like person to produce the allegedly obscene materials at
a time and place so designated by the court for the purpose of determining
whether there is probable cause to believe said material is obscene. After hearing
the parties on the issue, if court determines probable cause exists, it may order
the material held by the clerk of the court pending further order of the court.
This section shall not be construed to prohibit the seizure of obscene materials by
any other lawful means.
Further, §§ 847.011, .012, .013 refer specifically to the need forjudicial action in the insti-
tution of sanction under the Florida obscenity law.
213. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 601-03. The Skyywalker court also compared the sher-
iff's actions to those of the Postmaster General in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971),
where a nonjudicial officer had total discretion to initiate judicial proceedings after the
suppression of the "arguably" obscene materials. Id. at 601. In Blount the Postmaster
could intercept suspected obscene mail and hold it for an indefinite time period without
any mandatory requirement invoking judicial review. Id. The Skyywalker court stressed
that the mere guarantee or assurance of a prompt judicial determination was not sufficient.
Id. at 603. The court held that where the government intends to seize large quantites of
presumptively protected materials, due process requires an adversarial hearing before any
seizures are made. Id. (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. at
929 (1989); Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. 717, 735-36
(1961); Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
214. Note the brevity of the Atlantic Beach court's opinion regarding the constitutional-
ity of the Town Council's prior restraint. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-43. Compara-
bly, the Skyywalker court's analysis of the sheriff's prior restraint of Nasty contains a
significantly greater degree of analysis and discussion. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603.
This distinction is compelling since Atlantic Beach focuses primarily on the attempted prior
restraint by the town council, while Skyywalker centers predominately on the unprotected
nature of the musical expression under prevailing obscenity laws. Atlantic Beach, 749 F.
Supp. at 41-43; Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603.
215. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41.
216. Id. In 1978 the State of Rhode Island codified detailed prohibitions against ob-
scenity. 1978 R.I. PuB. LAws 11-31-1 et seq. 11-31-1 ("Circulation of obscene publications
and shows") proscribes the promotion of obscene material through criminal sanctions.
The section adopts the Miller definition of obscenity. Id. Other sections of Chapter 31
include § 11-31-2 ("Forfeiture of obscene publications"), § 11-31-8 ("Entry of premises
by sheriff or deputies"), § 11-31-10 ("Sale or exhibition to minors of indecent publica-
tions, pictures, or articles"), § 11-31-12 ("Penalty for making receipt of obscene publica-
tions a condition to delivery of other publications"), and § 11-31-13 ("Injunctive
proceedings by attorney general"). However, in 1979, the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land struck down the statutory provisions because the laws "fail[ed] to meet the Miller
blueprint" and were "constitutionally overbroad." D &J Enterprises, Inc. v. Michaelson,
401 A.2d 440, 446 (R.I. 1979). Given the lack of a legal statutory predicate, the United
States District Court in Rhode Island may not have found it prudent to evaluate the musi-
cal content of 2 Live Crew's repertoire to determine the music's protected status. This
[Vol. 70:1
CAN THE BAND PLAY ON?
the prior restraint involved. 2 17 The court essentially adopted the fed-
eral common law relevant to the attempted restraints placed upon pro-
tected speech. 2 18 Consequently, the town's prior restraint of 2 Live
Crew's performance must be based upon laws which have "narrow, ob-
jective and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."
219
The court in Atlantic Beach noted that the Town Council of Westerly
had a legitimate interest in regulating establishments such as the Wind-
jammer.220 The court stated the federal common law rule that "time,
place and manner restrictions on expressive activity are permissible, but
even then the regulations must be 'narrowly and precisely tailored to
their legitmate objectives'. '2 2 1 The court ultimately concluded that
Westerly's ordinances were not sufficiently specific to constitute valid
time, place and manner restrictions. 22 2 Although the Atlantic Beach
court's discussion of the town's ordinances in terms of valid "time, place
and manner" restrictions constitutes dicta, its holding remains quite
summary in explanation.
The Atlantic Beach court failed to discuss the forum question in any
substantive detail. 22 3 This omission on the court's part may have re-
sulted from the assumption that the Windjammer did not fit the defini-
tion of a public forum. 224 The court's exclusion of the public forum
discussion may also be attributed to the view that the classification of the
forum involved remains less determinative than the contemplated re-
strictions on the speech in question. 22 5 While the court acknowledged
the government's interest in regulating entertainment establishments
such as the Windjammer, it completely rejected the town council's regu-
latory attempts. Without applying the analysis relevant to valid time,
place and manner restrictions, 22 6 the court simply stated, "[t]he West-
erly licensing ordinances do not even approach the necessary level of
specificity constitutionally mandated."
227
lack of statutory guidelines may also explain the court's seeming unwillingness to evaluate
the content of the band's material.
217. Because there remained no issue regarding the protected status of the musical
expression involved, the Atlantic Beach court followed federal case precedent relevant to
the constitutionality of prior restraints in light of the presence of definitive standards. See
supra text accompanying note 65.
218. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-2.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
220. Id. at 42.
221. Id. (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969); Toward a
Gayer Bicentennial Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 417 F. Supp.
632, 638 (D.R.I. 1976)).
222. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42.
223. Id.
224. The Windjammer Club in Atlantic Beach constitutes a private institution which op-
erated as an entertainment facility. Id. at 39. Yet, the fact that the Windjammer Club
constitutes a private establishment does not insulate it from possible restrictions. See
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 (Court notes that it has applied time, place, and manner restric-
tions on "non-public" fora).
225. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-24 (2d ed. 1988).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 41, 170, 171, & 222.
227. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42. Given the fact that the contemplated 2 Live
Crew performance at the Windjammer Club constituted protected speech, the restrictions
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Ultimately, the Atlantic Beach court concluded its prior restraint anal-
ysis in a discussion of the "chilling effect" that the town's actions would
have upon the free expression of others. 22 8 Unlike its discussion of
time, place and manner restrictions, the court provided a more substan-
tive explanation of the chilling effects of threatening to revoke the club
owners' entertainment license. Basically, the court adopted the com-
monly held view that such actions effectively discourage individuals or
establishments from engaging in similar protected expression. 2 29 In ef-
fect, the town council's actions would inflict "irreparable harm."
23 0
The Atlantic Beach court's discussion of the potential chilling effects
resulting from the town's threatened prosecution serves to solidify the
court's prior restraint analysis. Central to the concept of a chilling effect
is the desire to prevent the free flow of protected speech.23 ' Given the
fact that the court finds 2 Live Crew's performance protected, 23 2 any
threat of adverse action takes on greater significance. The chance of a
chilling effect resulting from governmental action would be more evi-
dent. This factor contrasts cases involving "unprotected speech such as
obscenity, libel or expression presenting a 'clear and present dan-
ger'."2 3  Such unprotected speech may be subjected to "threatened"
governmental sanction due to the very nature of the speech and the po-
tential harm of such expression.
2 34
The attempted prior restraint in Atlantic Beach poses an interesting
contrast to the prior restraint attempted in Skyywalker. The Skyywalker
case involved detailed statutory prescriptions relevant to attempted
prior restraints of obscene expression. 23 5 In Atlantic Beach, the court
manifested in the Westerly Town's ordinances lacked the requisite specificity required of
valid time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. Cf Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S.
41 (1986) (Washington, D.C., city ordinance limiting the proximity of adult movie theaters
to certain zoned areas valid time, place, and manner restriction).
228. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42.
229. Id. at 42 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
277-79 (1964) (fear of prosecution for libel could have a chilling effect upon journalists
who may refrain from publishing controversial material); Clark, supra note 17, 1523-25,
n.370-86 (citing Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment. Unraveling the "Chil-
ling Effect", 58 N.Y. U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978)).
230. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42. The Court concluded its prior restraint analysis
with a discussion entitled "Balancing the Harms and Interests." Id. As an element of the
law relevant to preliminary injunctions, the court found that the club owners' first amend-
ment right to free expression outweighed any assumed interest of the town to protect the
public interest or to preserve the integrity of the licensing system. Id.
231. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964). See also Schauer, supra note 229, at 693.
232. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp at 41 (court unequivocally states that 2 Live Crew's
performance is protected by the first amendment).
233. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (no absolute
constitutional protection for vulgar, offensive or shocking content); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (observing the unprotected status of obscene speech); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (discussing conduct directed to inciting imminent
lawless action); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (noting that defamatory speech is not protected by
the Constitution); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (stating that "fight-
ing words," by their utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace).
234. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 65 & 113.
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noted that the Town of Westerly had few definitive and explicit stan-
dards which supported the imposition of a prior restraint on protected
musical expression. 23 6 Further, the governmental authority in
Skyywalker failed to follow legally sustainable standards regarding the
regulation of the unprotected musical album. 23 7 The Town of Westerly,
however, attempted to restrain 2 Live Crew's performance pursuant to
ordinances that were woefully inadequate.
23 8
In spite of their distinctions, both Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach serve
to support the basic thesis that the prior restraint doctrine remains a
formidable obstacle to the attempted limitations placed upon musical
expression. 23 9 Both cases confirm that the prior restraint doctrine's ad-
herence to basic due process tenets remains a significant legal tool to
ensure freedom of musical expression.
240
D. Barnes Demonstrates the Importance of the Prior Restraint Doctrine.
At first glance, the Barnes decision could be viewed as inapplicable
to Constitutional issues involving musical expression. The Court fo-
cused its analysis on expressive activity involving nude dancing. Such
activity can more likely be seen as conduct in lieu of speech which the
Court appeared to provide greater protection.24 1 Since musical expres-
sion more closely embodies "speech" instead of "nonspeech," 242 Barnes
may be inapplicable to such expression. Furthermore, the Court's find-
ing that the government's interest in protecting order and morality justi-
fied incidental impacts on protected expression may be confined to
nudity in public.
24 3
The Barnes decision, however, could have a significant impact on the
236. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
238. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
239. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42. See also
supra text accompanying note 214.
240. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42. See also
Oklahoma Publishing. Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (pretrial order
prohibiting news media from disseminating name or picture of boy, subject of a juvenile
proceeding, unconstitutional); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (court
order barring news media from publishing facts strongly implicating defendant in murder
case unconstitutional prior restraint); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (per curiam) (striking down court order barring publication of "classified" gov-
ernment document for failure of government to rebut "heavy presumption" against valid-
ity of prior restraint); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
(temporary injunction stopping individual from distributing leaflets concerning "panic
peddling" of real estate agent an unconstitutional prior restraint). See also Scordato, supra
note 24, at 5-6.
241. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991). The court emphasized the lower protection
afforded "nonspeech" or conduct. Id. Compare id. at 2463-67, where Justice Scalia em-
phasizes that conduct merits no First Amendment application. See also supra note 67 (de-
lineating cases noting the heavy presumption against prior restraints of speech).
242. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 361, 376-77
(1968)).
243. The Court appears to place great weight on the history of public indecency. stat-
utes which "reflect the moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among stran-
gers in public places." Id. at 2461. The Court also notes that a large number of states
have such statutes. Id.
19921
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permissible restrictions placed upon controversial musical expression.
The Court appeared more willing to grant greater latitude and leniency
to governmental authorities in implementing content-based regulations
of expressive conduct where the governmental interest is "signifi-
cant. '"244 Notwithstanding the categorization of the governmental in-
terest involved, Barnes demonstrates the Court's present tendency to
evaluate the content of the expression.
24 5
Irrespective of questions regarding the importance of terminology,
it appears significant that the Court requires the government to have a
"substantial" rather than "compelling" interest where the regulation is
clearly content-based. 24 6 The Court's rationale could be particularly
applicable to musical performances containing objectionable conduct as
well as speech.
24 7
Barnes indicates that a significant or "sufficient" governmental inter-
est may excuse any tangential limitations placed upon protected
speech.248 Relying solely upon the Court's opinion in United States v.
O'Brien,249 the Court opined that governmental interests in regulating
"nonspeech" such as expressive conduct would justify any incidental in-
trusions upon protected "speech. '2 50 The Court thus found that the
State of Indiana's goal to eliminate public nudity excused any restric-
tions placed upon protected "speech" or messages conveyed in the
dance.
25 1
For controversial musical acts such as 2 Live Crew or even other
less controversial artists, this substantiation by the Court poses an in-
triguing dilemma. While the Court's ruling may not infringe upon the
musical compositions of these artists, it may limit the live communica-
tion of these works if they are performed in a manner which impinges
upon "sufficiently important" governmental interests. Such interests
may include performance of the musical composition in violation of
state or local laws proscribing public nudity25 2 or projection of sound
244. Id. at 2462-63.
245. Id. at 2460. The court notes specifically that the type of nude dancing performed
in the plaintiffs' establishment is deserving of marginal constitutional protection. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 174-76. See also Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472
(dissent).
247. The factor could be illustrated in controversial musical performances such as
"Hair" which include nudity. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546 (1975); see
also supra text accompanying notes 123 & 126-34. This problem concerning the combina-
tion of conduct, i.e., dance or movement, and musical expression may also surface with the
staging of the long-running Broadway musical "Ohl Calcutta!," a risque musical that in-
cludes frontal nudity. See also infra note 261.
248. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77) ("symbolic speech"
or "expressive conduct" not entitled to full constitutional protection). The Court quotes
from O'Brien: "[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.
249. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2463.
252. Id. at 2456.
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volume.2 53 The communication of these works could be effectively lim-
ited if the performance contravenes sufficient governmental interests.
2 54
The Court's willingness to relegate conduct to a lesser threshold of
Constitutional protection may, at the very least, subject the performance
of controversial music forms to extreme scrutiny if not limitation. While
limitations imposed by governmental interests must be "content-neu-
tral," 25 5 governmental entities may be able to limit the message of the
music by sanctioning the "conduct" manifested in performance.
Barnes clearly established a lesser Constitutional standard for "non-
speech" or expressive conduct. 25 6 This holding of the Court may be
considered significant, and perhaps somewhat contradictory, in light of
the Court's precedent upholding First Amendment protection for vari-
ous forms of symbolic or "nonspeech." 2 57 Nonetheless, this lower
threshold for expressive conduct creates a compelling question for mu-
sical expression that is performed. As the Court recognized, an impor-
tant governmental interest in limiting expressive conduct or
"nonspeech" may justify incidental encroachments upon constitution-
ally protected speech.2 58 While the Barnes holding noted its application
253. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1989). In Ward the Court
noted that the City of New York's requirement that sound for a group's live performance
must be controlled by city personnel bespeaks the city's "substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from unwelcome noise." Id (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984): "[G]overnment 'ha[s] a substantial interrest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.' "). It also found support in Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1987) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)):
"This interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect " 'the well-
being, tranquility, and privacy of the home.' ."
254. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63. In past cases, the Supreme Court upheld content-
based limitations on speech where a significant governmental interest was present. See
supra note 233. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (allowing the federal
government to prohibit partisan political speeches on military installation); Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) (plurality opinion) (finding that city transit
system that rents commercial advertising space on its vehicles did not have to accept parti-
san advertisements). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (statutes proscribing
flag burning unconstitutional if flag burning comprises part of political protest).
255. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
256. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63.
257. The Supreme Court has recognized that a number of forms of expressive conduct
warrant First Amendment Protection. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990)
(allowing an individual to burn the American flag to protest various aspects of the United
States's domestic and foreign policy);Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (statutes proscribing flag burn-
ing unconstitutional where flag-burning comprises part of political protest); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (hanging of inverted American flag with
peace symbols from window protected); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969)
(peaceful demonstrations by African Americans for school desegregation protected);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black
arm bands by students protesting American involvement in the Vietnam conflict pro-
tected); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (upholding constitutional protection for
silent sit-in by African Americans demonstrating against a racially-segregated library);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (permitting Jehovah
Witness children to refuse to salute the American flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931) (displaying red flag as symbol of opposition to government constitutes pro-
tected expression). The court's protection of such "nonspeech" has also led to the protec-
tion of potential offensive or inflammatory conduct. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
258. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
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to expressive conduct, the Court's allowance for incidental abridgement
of protected speech creates a compelling situation for the performance
of controversial musical expression or other forms of speech that are
performed.
The most telling observation in the Court's "incidental abridge-
ment" rule is the effect on the performance of controversial speech. As
noted, the Court has dealt with the performance of the controversial
musical production of "Hair" in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.259
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. criticized the governmental authorities' fail-
ure to adhere to procedural safeguards preventing unwarranted prior
restraint.2 60 However, given the present holding in Barnes regarding
"incidental abridgement," the Court may scrutinize and limit the ex-
pression of controversial performances such as "Hair." This issue may
surface in the immediate future given the attempt to stage the contro-
versial musical, "Oh! Calcutta! ", in the very same Chattanooga, Tennes-
see theatre where "Hair" originally came under attack. 26 1 The Court's
findings in Barnes may have significant ramifications upon the perform-
ance of controversial musical acts including certain musicals and groups
such as 2 Live Crew.
More significant may be a signal of the Court's willingness to probe
and interpret the content of expression to determine the degree of in-
trusion on expressive activity.2 6 2 The Court seems willing to allow re-
strictions which not only sanction unprotected speech such as nudity,
but also protected expression, i.e., nude dancing, which is "in the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment." 26 3 If such latitude is justifiable,
musical expression that includes controversial conduct may also be af-
fected. Consequently, references to the government's interest to pre-
vent an "evil" embodied in a limited extent in otherwise protected
expression may be considered scanty reasoning substantiating restric-
tions which proscribe a "significant amount of protected expressive
activity."1264
If the post-Barnes era ushers in more detailed scrutiny of controver-
sial musical expression, the basic tenor of the prior restraint doctrine
259. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
260. Id. at 562 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974);Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)).
261. "Oh! Calcutta!" is a long-running musical which includes scenes with frontal
nudity. Testimony Begins in "Oh! Calcutta! " Case, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, A5. Despite
strong criticism, a Chattanooga, Tennessee promoter has sought to present the risque
musical at the Tivoli Theater, the very same venue where "Hair" created a controversy in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. Id. See also Jack Broom & Anne Koch, Applause from Foes of Nude
Dancing Local Activists Cheer Supreme Court Ruling, SArLE TIMEs, June 22, 1991, Al.
262. Note the Court's observance that "the requirement that the dancers don pasties
and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply
makes the message slightly less graphic" demonstrates the Court's willingness to interpret
the impact of governmental restrictions on the message intended to be conveyed. Barnes,
111 S.Ct. at 2463.
263. Id. at 2460.
264. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting)
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will remain an obstacle to restrictions on protected speech. Judicial de-
termination of the protected nature of the musical expression will still
be required, with the courts exercising the detailed analysis required to
establish that such expression is unprotected.2 65 While the prior re-
straint doctrine may have problems relating to its definition and scope,
it remains a necessary tool to ensure that protected musical activity is
unrestricted.
E. Prior Restraint Doctrine - A Guardian With Possible Flaws.
Although Skywalker and Atlantic Beach affirm the importance of the
prior restraint doctrine, challenges remain to the continued viability of
the doctrine. 26 6 One criticism of the prior restraint doctrine focuses on
the lack of a substantive distinction between true "prior restraints" and
laws which impose sanctions on the speaker after making the speech.
26 7
Given the diverse instances where the Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine, this criticism appears valid.26 8 This criticism also observes
that prior restraint laws present no more of a chilling effect than laws
imposing sanctions after the expression was uttered.
26 9
While the basic definition of prior restraint is significantly broad,
270
the doctrine remains an important and imposing impediment to the sup-
pression or limitation of musical expression. There appears to be little
ambiguity concerning attempts to prevent the sale of a controversial mu-
sical composition 27 1 or the discretionary limitations placed upon a pro-
posed musical performance.
2 72
While both prior restraint and subsequent sanction laws impose
chilling effects, prior restraint laws have the greater potential for delay-
ing expression. Delay of expression imposed by the prior restraint laws
265. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
266. Scordato, supra note 24, at 8-9, nn.37-42.
267. In his article, Professor Scordato specifically states:
The fundamental problem with the contemporary doctrine of prior restraint is
that the distinction upon which the doctrine rests-the distinction between prior
restraints and subsequent sanctions-lacks sufficient substance to support a cate-
gorical legal rule. The distinction . . . fails to provide a means of identifying a
category of potentially speech-suppressive government activities that is in any
way meaningful for first amendment purposes. As a result, the prior restraint
doctrine lacks the reliability and predictability of application necessary to support
constitutionally protected speech. It is, in effect, a distinction without a
difference.
Id. at 8.
268. For cases where courts have utilized the prior restraint doctrine in a variety of
contexts see Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. 578, Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638, and Atlantic Beach,
749 F. Supp. 38. See also Scordato, supra note 24, at 6-7; supra text accompanying notes 25-
34.
269. Scordato, supra note 24, at 16. See also Kabakow, supra note 17, at 681 (where the
author criticizes the holding in Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newtown Township, 699 F.Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa.
1988), since a lack of procedural safeguards was the sole basis for the court's invalidation
of a town's obscenity ordinance).
270. Prior restraints are generally defined as governmental limitations placed upon ex-
pression before utterance. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 55 n.2 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
271. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 597-600.
272. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 40.
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constitutes a significant impact on the effect or meaning of the commu-
nication. This can be particularly true in cases involving popular music,
where popularity of the musical compositions and the groups that per-
form the music may fluctuate dramatically over short periods. Skyywalker
recognizes the critical impact of delay imposed by prior restraints:
Many forms of speech are of value because of the urgency and
immediacy of the idea expressed. Even if a censor ultimately
allows publication, significant delay in the decision-making pro-
cess can destroy the fleeting value of the speech... If speech is
delayed or denied, the rights of both the speaker and his audi-
ence are impaired and society is the ultimate "loser."
2 73
Consequently, the prior restraint doctrine remains a vital tool to protect
against the imposition of arbitrary decisions in the attempted suppres-
sion of musical expression.
274
F. Effectiveness of Prior Restraint Safeguards: Emphasis on Promptness of
Judicial Review.
The controversy surrounding 2 Live Crew and the ultimate federal
decisions discussed above accentuate the importance of time as a key
element in the effectiveness of the prior restraint doctrine. It appears
critical that the procedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine
attach at the first instance of governmental action regarding the musical
expression. The promptness of the government in obtaining a judicial
determination of the protected status of a musical work can be essential
in minimizing the chilling effects of unlawful suppression.
As noted in Section II, D of this article, the value of expression
often relates to the immediacy of the expression. 2 75 Any delay in the
dissemination of such speech not only alters the effect of the message,
but also discourages the speaker of the message.2 76 Such delay is likely
to have an adverse effect on musicians in the performance of musical
works. As a result, the procedural requirements of the prior restraint
doctrine must attach at the instant that governmental action is contem-
plated. 277 This notion of promptness in the adherence to procedural
requirements constitutes perhaps the most important mechanism in the
prevention of musical censorship.
273. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 562; Dom-
browski, 380 U.S. at 479, 486 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717,
736 (1961); Quantity of Copies of Books, v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964)). See also
Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38.
274. In spite of the criticism concerning the prior restraint doctrine, Professor Scor-
dato also acknowledges the benefits of the prior restraint doctrine in invalidating laws
whose restrictions are overbroad and impinge upon protected speech. See Scordato, supra
note 24, at 16.
275. See supra text accompanying note 71.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 71 & 72.
277. See Freedman, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). This concept of promptness also relates to
the judicial decision regarding the protected status of the expression in question.
Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603 (citing Teitel Films Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968);
Fort Wayne Books Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1963); Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. 205, 210-
11 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1961); Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
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A criticism of the prior restraint doctrine as delineated by case law
to date must be the lack of a definitive explanation as to when a judicial
determination must be sought on the protected status of speech. The
mere statement that the governmental entity seek "prompt" judicial ac-
tion does not effectively provide for an immediate determination. In or-
der to prevent the unwarranted suppression of musical expression, the
procedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine must attach at
the first instance of governmental action.
In Skyywalker, Deputy Wichner's initial preview of Nasty and his sub-
mission of an affidavit to the lower court should have triggered the for-
mal procedures for review. 27 8 Such governmental scrutiny regarding
Nasty merits immediate judicial review to prevent unlawful suppression.
While the court in Skyywalker noted this concept of promptness, 2 79 it
failed to emphasize the importance of the prompt institution ofjudicial
action.28 0 Moreover, the Florida statutes that codify the procedural re-
quirements inherent in the prior restraint doctrine must be amended to
ensure that these procedures are invoked at the first instance of govern-
mental action.28 1 Regardless of possible debates concerning what con-
stitutes "governmental action," the requirement that judicial review
occur promptly remains essential to the effectiveness of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the prevention of unlawful censorship of musical
expression.
28 2
278. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
279. Shyywalker 739 F. Supp. at 603.
280. Itt at 600 (where the court noted only that the sheriff's actions were "insuffi-
cient," failing to comment on the importance of securing prompt judicial review.).
281. Consequently, Florida Code § 847.08, which prescribes the requirement ofjudi-
cial review for questionable expression, can be amended as follows (changes in brackets [
1):
[As soon as] an indictment, information, or affidavit is filed [by any state or local
governmental official] under the provisions of §§ 847.07-847.09, the state attor-
ney or his duly appointed assistant [shall promptly] apply to the court for the
issuance of an order directing the defendant or his principal agent or bailee or
other like person to produce the allegedly obscene materials at a time and place
so designated by the court for the purpose of determining whether there is prob-
able cause to believe said material is obscene. After hearing the parties on the
issue, if the court determines probable cause exists, it may[, subject to a prompt
and speedy proceeding,] order the material held by the clerk of the court pend-
ing further order of the court.
See supra note 211 for the complete original text of § 847.08 of the Florida Code.
282. The question of "governmental action" comprises a compelling question as a trig-
ger for the invocation of procedural safeguards. The controversy surrounding the rap
artist, Ice-T, and his song, Cop Killer, presents an absorbing question as to whether "official
governmental action" has occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 3 & 11. Advocates
for the artist could argue that the public comments, particularly those by Fraternal Order
of Police members who indicate that the song incites violence against police, effectively
"seizes" Cop Killer without a judicial determination as to its protected status. The record
company's withdrawal of the song from the artist's album underscores the argument that
the work has been seized. This argument also begs the question as to whether the state-
ments by those individuals constitute official governmental actions, particularly if such
statements are made in their capacities as private citizens. It is interesting to note that Eric
Clapton's 1974 hit song, I Shot the Sheriff, which contains lyrics describing violence against
a law enforcement official, did not garner the criticism leveled against Ice-T's song, Cop
Killer.
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V. CONCLUSION
The prior restraint doctrine remains a viable and formidable me-
dium in the preservation of unrestricted musical expression. Under the
doctrine, governmental authorities that seek to limit controversial forms
of musical expression must comport with the doctrine's stringent re-
quirements, including the judicial determination of the protected nature
of expression. These requirements also mandate the existence of nar-
row, objective and precise standards for limitations on such expression.
Skyywalker and Barnes bespeak a new proclivity of the judiciary to
engage in a more probative review of the content of expressive activity.
Moreover, courts have indicated a willingness to lessen the degree of
governmental interest required to substantiate content-based restric-
tions on certain types of expressive activities. These factors do not,
however, diminish the importance, relevance or impact of the prior re-
straint doctrine. Regardless of the perceived objectionable nature of the
work, the doctrine mandates a threshold review and finding of a musical
expression's lack of constitutional protection prior to the imposition of
any restrictions. Notwithstanding its flexible definition, the prior re-
straint doctrine remains a primary legal tool that prevents the unfet-
tered, and perhaps unwarranted, censorship of musical expression.
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In 1960, two years after Alaska became a state, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower created the Arctic National Wildlife Range in northeastern
Alaska to protect the unique wildlife, wilderness and recreational value
of the area.1 Twenty years later, the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) elevated the status of the Range to
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and expanded its size from 8.9
million acres to approximately 19 million acres. 2 The purposes of
ANWR are fourfold: to conserve the populations and habitats of the
diverse range of species utilizing the plain; to ensure that the United
States fulfills its obligations under various fish and wildlife protection
treaties; to provide for the continuing subsistence uses of the refuge;
and to protect the supply and quality of water in the refuge. 3
When ANILCA was enacted, little was known about this remote
area.4 A 1979 Senate Report stated that:
[t]he Committee was particularly concerned with the ANWR.
In hearings and in markup, conflicting and uncertain informa-
tion was presented to the committee about the extent of oil and
gas resources on the Range and the effect development and
production of those resources would have on the wildlife in-
habiting the Range and the Range itself .... The Committee
was determined that a decision as to the development of the
Range be made only with adequate information and the full
participation of the Congress. 5
To ensure access to information needed to decide whether to allow de-
velopment of the ANWR, Congress ordered the Secretary of the Interior
to prepare a "comprehensive and continuing inventory and assessment"
of the ANWR coastal plain's fish and wildlife resources and to perform
an analysis of the impacts on these resources of oil and gas exploration,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law
School; M.B.A., Harvard Business School; A.B., Harvard College; with special thanks to
Kim Reeves and Elizabeth Bourbon.
1. Public Land Order No. 2214, 25 Fed. Reg. 12,598 (1960); Alaska Statehood Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
2. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, §§ 302-
303, 94 Stat. 2371, 2385-93 (1980). In addition to establishing ANWR, ANILCA also cre-
ated or expanded fifteen other wildlife refuges in Alaska.
3. Id. § 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980). See generally CRS REPORT FOR CON-
GRESS, THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: MAJOR OIL DEVELOPMENT OR WILDERNESS
34 (Feb. 25, 1988) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
4. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 241 (1979).
5. Id.
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development and production. Additionally, the Secretary was to ensure
that exploratory activities within the coastal plain would be conducted
so as to avoid significant adverse effects on the fish and wildlife and
other ANWR resources. 6 The future of ANWR's development thus de-
pends heavily on the resolution of factual questions about the environ-
mental, subsistence and mineral resource characteristics of the coastal
plain.
ANILCA provides the legal structure that will determine whether
ANWR will be protected from the damaging encroachment of oil and
gas development and whether ANWR will remain an unblemished re-
serve for native peoples who presently coexist with large numbers of
resident and migratory species. To analyze the desirability of develop-
ment, a three-part process is utilized. First, findings of fact concerning
the impact of such development in ANWR upon the environment and
the indigenous cultures are to be derived from a report compiled by the
Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 1002 of ANILCA (1002 Re-
port). This 1002 Report is to consist of a baseline biological study of
ANWR, an Environmental Impact Statement regarding non-drilling ex-
ploration and a recommendation by the Secretary of the Interior. Next,
Congress must determine the viability of oil and gas development based
upon the findings of fact in the 1002 Report. Finally, after consideration
of all of the above, Congress may grant the Secretary of the Interior
leasing authority to begin exploration and development.
ANILCA, however, adds the additional requirement that any use of
the reserve must be compatible with the purposes for which the area was
established. This additional safeguard creates another obstacle in the
path of oil exploration before drilling activities can begin. Title VIII of
ANILCA also contains an independent barrier to oil and gas develop-
ment. Section 810 of the Act requires that proposals for the use of Alas-
kan public lands must minimize any adverse impact upon the
subsistence use of that land. Under section 810, the Secretary of the
Interior is responsible for evaluating the impact of development on sub-
sistence use and protecting such use from adverse effects.
The task of developing the required factual record rests upon the
Secretary of the Interior, and because that record will be the primary
source of information upon which Congress will rely to decide whether
to allow development, the Secretary wields significant power. The shap-
ing of the factual record will perhaps be the most important aspect of
the legal process that will determine the future character of ANWR.
Controversies over the results of the various required studies will be
subject only to limited and deferential scrutiny in the courts. 7 The role
of the Secretary in the legal process, therefore, is paramount. At pres-
ent, Congress awaits the Secretary's report.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1988); see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 881-83 (D.D.C. 1991). The 1002 Report is
prepared as a management tool for Congress for its own purposes and is not subject to
judicial review. Id. at 882.
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Oil and gas development proponents and opponents alike are mo-
bilizing. The context of the ANWR controversy can only be fully appre-
ciated by recognizing the stark contrast between the goals of the two
groups colliding in the development debate. The parties involved in the
process vary from indigenous peoples and environmentalists to oil com-
panies and state and federal governments. This spectrum of adversa-
ries, however, is overshadowed by the overwhelming dimension of the
subject of the debate: the 9 million acres of ecologically sensitive terri-
tory which rest atop perhaps 30 billion barrels of oil and 65 trillion cubic
feet of gas.8
The struggle to determine ANWR's fate is a battle of extremes. In
no other environmental debate are the stakes so high for so many differ-
ent constituents. From the perspective of governmental entities and oil
companies, the refuge represents millions of dollars in revenues and the
chance to revitalize the domestic oil industry. For state and local gov-
ernments and some native groups, leasing ANWR for development will
replace the jobs and income from Prudhoe Bay and North Slope devel-
opment upon which these groups have come to rely. Development may
also be the only means to preserve the Transnational Alaska Pipeline
that has brought jobs and tax revenues which pay for essential services.
To the Department of the Interior, development will mean both an im-
portant revenue boost and a political victory. For environmentalists,
this is the ultimate battle to preserve a vast virgin wilderness. Finally,
for the Gwich'in Athabascan, 9 the resolution of the controversy may well
mark the end of an entire culture.
This article explores the empirical, legal and political processes that
will determine the fate of ANWR. Part II of this article provides back-
ground information about ANWR in general: the ecology of the re-
serve, its inhabitants and the possibility of oil and gas reserves. Part III
undertakes an analysis of the components in the factual record-the
1002 Report, the Environmental Impact Statement, the Compatible Use
requirement and the section 810 analysis-and the role of the Secretary
of the Interior in the production of that record. Congress must use this
factual record to determine whether leasing of ANWR falls within the
guidelines established by ANILCA. Finally, Part IV concludes that the
statutory scheme designed to protect ANWR is faulty because it is essen-
tially under the full control of the Secretary of the Interior who will not
likely recommend that Congress simply redesignate ANWR as statutory
wilderness to protect it from development.
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE, ALASKA,
COASTAL PLAIN RESOURCE ASSESSMENT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND FINAL LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 75
(1987) [hereinafter IMPACT STATEMENT].
9. The Gwich'in Athabascan are a native Indian tribe, who pursue the traditional
subsistence lifestyle of their ancestors and are dependent on hunting and fishing for food.
They live in settlements along the Alaska-Canada border, including a settlement within the
ANWR. Susan Reed, Shadow Over an Ancient Land, PEOPLE, Sept. 18, 1989, at 50.
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II. BACKGROUND
The coastal plain, the most controversial territory in the refuge, lies
in the northern part of the refuge, 250 miles above the Arctic Circle.
This plain encompasses 1.55 million acres over an area measuring ap-
proximately 100 miles long and sixteen to thirty-four miles wide. Pris-
tine, fragile tundra characterizes the coastal plain.' 0 Almost all of the
area is wetlands" with only a few freestanding lakes. No streams or
rivers traverse the plain.
Throughout most of the year, the coastal plain landscape is cold
and desolate. Ten percent of the area is glaciated and lies under a thick
layer of permafrost. 12 Winter temperatures average only four degrees
below zero. 13 From mid-May to July every year, however, the coastal
plain becomes what has been described as the "American Serengeti.''
14
Mild summer temperatures and a bountiful food supply bring a uniquely
diverse range of wildlife to the plain. Species attracted to the coastal
plain include polar bears, grizzly bears, musk oxen, Dall sheep, wolves,
wolverines, snow geese, peregrine falcons and numerous other bird spe-
cies, some of which migrate from as far as Africa, Australia and
Antarctica. 15
One of the species which relies on the coastal plain's summer
habitat is the Porcupine caribou herd. The herd is presently 180,000
strong, making it the sixth largest herd in North America. 16 The coastal
plain provides critical summer habitat for the caribou during and after
calving, supplying a quiet source of food and relief from insects and
predators at this critical period in the herd's annual cycle. 17 The Porcu-
pine herd has consistently returned to the coastal plain to calve every
year, and their migration has been documented since 1972, when stud-
ies of the herd commenced. 18
The ANWR controversy has focused a significant amount of atten-
tion on the Porcupine caribou herd for several reasons. Such herds are
the subject of special statutory recognition in their own right; Congress
has found that "the barren-ground caribou are a migratory species de-
serving study and special protections, and the Western Arctic and the
10. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 13. Ninety-nine percent of the section 1002
lands, or 1.5 million acres, are classified as wetlands. Free water is limited; only a few large
lakes exist. Id.
11. Id.
12. The permafrost is 800-1000 feet thick under most of the coastal plain. IMPACT
STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 11.
13. Patrick Lee, Alaska Oil Refuels an Old Debate, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1991, at Al.
14. G. Schaller, American Serengeti, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 54.
15. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 301(a)(3),
94 Stat. 2371 (1980); Lee, supra note 13, at A12.
16. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 21.
17. Id. at 25; Lee, supra note 13, at A12. Caribou cows in particular require rest and
relief during the postcalving season when the combined stresses of winter, pregnancy,
migration, birth, lactation, hair molt, antler growth and insect harassment tax the animals'
energy reserves. Id.
18. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 25. Migrating caribou and the postcalving
caribou aggregation offer an extraordinary spectacle. Id. at 46.
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Porcupine herds are of national and international significance."1 9 This
heightened level of statutory protection and the effects of development-
related disturbances, on caribou migration have prompted a great deal of
debate.
The caribou are also significant because they comprise the founda-
tion of the subsistence economy of the Gwich'in Athabascan, one of the
few remaining native groups in North America still engaged in a sub-
sistence economy. Subsistence has also received special statutory pro-
tection,20 and because the. Gwich'in's subsistence economy depends
directly on the well-being of the Porcupine herd, the caribou's fate
under any mineral development scheme has dual significance.
The Gwich'in Athabascan tribe occupies an area approximately 125
miles south of the coastal plain, concentrated in small settlements at
Arctic Village and Old Crow.2 1 Due to the remoteness of the area, the
Gwich'in rely on a subsistence economy for up to 80% of their food
supply.2 2 Subsistence is defined in ANILCA as:
customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of
wild, renewable resources for direct personal or family con-
sumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools or transporta-
tion; for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of
inedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken for per-
sonal or family consumption; for barter, or sharing for personal
or family consumption; and for customary trade.
2 3
The cornerstone of the Gwich'in's subsistence economy is the Porcupine
caribou herd,24 and their annual harvest ranges from 200 to as many as
1000 caribou. 25 During certain seasons, three and sometimes four
meals a day consist of caribou. 26 The meat is shared with families
throughout the community, given as gifts or bartered for salmon.
27
Caribou skins are used to make clothing, winter mukluks, slippers and
purses, and the bones are used for tools.
28
The significance of the caribou to the Gwich'in's subsistence is not
merely economic-the caribou form the basis of a complex cultural
19. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 306(a),
94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
20. See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
21. The Gwich'in town of Arctic Village is located within ANWR and has a population
of 120. Reed, supra note 9, at 50.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II at 76 (1978).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (1988).
24. The caribou are particularly important in towns such as Arctic Village which have
no salmon and only a few moose, sheep, birds and fish. Robert A. Childers, The Gwich'in:
A Nation in Peril, 6 ENrrL. FORUM 14, 16 (1989).
25. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 25, 40. The Inupiat Eskimos from the village
of Kaktovik also harvest between 25 to 75 caribou each year, but they rely primarily on seal
and bowhead whales for their food supply. E. Linden, A Tale of Two Villages, TME, Apr. 17,
1989, at 62.
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structure. 29 The Gwich'in's subsistence culture is rooted in 10,000
years of tradition. 30 In the tightly organized societal structure of subsis-
tence every member of the community plays a vital role in the mutual
survival of the group. The Gwich'in fear that if their chief survival re-
source disappears, the entire social structure will erode. Many members
of the tiny communities will be forced to leave to seek jobs in the cities
or the oil fields, and those that remain will be forced to go on welfare.
3 1
Even though development may offer jobs, many Gwich'in feel the bene-
fits of a cash economy are dubious; as one chief observed, "Here you
don't see drugs and alcohol, or suicide and murder. Here people walk
around proud that we have our land."
'32
If development takes place, the Gwich'in stand to lose everything.
Unlike the Kaktovic Inupiat Eskimo group, the Gwich'in refused to par-
ticipate in a 1971 land settlement that would have given them an interest
in subsurface development. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of
1971 (ANCSA) 3 3 extinguished native aboriginal rights to land in Alaska
in exchange for a cash settlement of $963 million and fee title to 44
million acres of land.3 4 The settlement created village and regional cor-
porations, giving each native in the various regions 100 shares of stock
in the appropriate regional corporation and providing that these shares
were inalienable until 1991.35 Subsurface rights to land included in the
settlement were vested in the Regional Corporations, while the Village
Corporations controlled the surface estate.3 6 If the Gwich'in had
elected to accept this settlement, they might at least have enjoyed reve-
nues from leasing. As it is, the Gwich'in retain aboriginal rights to 1.8
million acres in and near ANWR, and if development proceeds, the
Gwich'in stand to lose the basis of their economy and cultural life.
The issue of development has divided the native communities.
3 7
Some groups stand to benefit directly from development. For instance,
the Kaktovic Inupiat Corporation holds subsurface rights to 92,000
acres in the coastal plain, and the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
holds subsurface rights outside the plain.3 8 In addition to royalties,
some natives will benefit from the creation ofjobs-an increasingly im-
29. ANILCA states that subsistence is "essential" to the natives' "cultural existence."
16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1988).
30. Reed, supra note 9, at 49.
31. Id. at 48; Linden, supra note 25, at 62.
32. Linden, supra note 25, at 62.
33. Pub. L. No. 92-203,85 Star. 688 (1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1988
& Supp. 1992)).
34. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1605 (1988). ANCSA was enacted in response to a dispute
between the newly recognized State of Alaska, which had begun to select tracts of land for
state ownership, and natives who claimed aboriginal title to much of the land selected by
the state. ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 114 (1976).
35. This restriction was amended in 1987 to provide that shareholders in the corpora-
tions may decide when to eliminate the restrictions on alienation. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c
(Supp. 11 1990).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(0 (1988).
37. Patrick Lee, Some Native Peoples See Dividends, Others See Disaster in Oil Drilling, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at A12.
38. Id.
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portant concern as the Prudhoe Bay field dissipates. Some members of
these communities, however, sympathize with the Gwich'in's claim of
the right to continue a subsistence existence. The Inupiat, similarly, de-
pend heavily on harvesting whales and seals and are concerned about
what development in the coastal plain may portend for offshore
drilling.
3 9
The paradox presented by this visually barren plain is that, in addi-
tion to its tremendous biological and subsistence values, the coastal
plain may have significant petroleum resource potential as well. Situ-
ated between the Prudhoe Bay oil field to the west and Canadian
Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta region to the east, ANWR may be part of
the North Slope oil province; it is touted as the most promising onshore
exploration target in the United States.
40
The probability of locating oil reserves and the extent of those
reserves in ANWR are major topics of debate. According to the 1987
1002 Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Interior, there is a 19%o
chance of finding economically recoverable oil within the coastal plain.
4 1
This 1002 Report suggests a mean estimate of 3.2 billion barrels of re-
coverable oil, with economically recoverable reserves ranging from 0.6
billion barrels to 9.2 billion barrels-about the same amount as in
Prudhoe Bay.4 2 The report predicts a 95% chance that the coastal plain
contains more than 4.8 billion barrels of oil and 11.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas and a 5%o chance that the area contains 29.4 billion barrels of oil
and 64.5 trillion cubic feet of gas.4 3 These 1987 estimates reflect a high
probability of finding economically recoverable oil given the relatively
small exploration area (1.55 million acres) and the high costs of con-
ducting operations in the Arctic.
An April, 1991, document by the Bureau of Land Management re-
vised and increased the 1987 figures.4 4 The report claims there is a
39. Id.
40. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 177.
41. Id. at 177. For reasons discussed in more depth, see infra discussion at pp. 608-09,
the conclusions drawn by the Secretary are currently being challenged under the National
Environmental Policy Act as not supported by the record and as being arbitrary and capri-
cious. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 111, NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum]. The author of this paper is not technically qualified to comment
on the reliability of these figures but offers them to suggest the dimensions of the debate.
42. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 178. This figure has been challenged by
NRDC on the grounds that the economic recoverability figure is based on 1984 prices that
are far higher than those prevailing since the mid-1980s. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 41, at 90.
43. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 75.
44. Bureau of Land Management, Dep't of the Interior, Overview of the 1991 Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge Recoverable Petroleum Resource Update (Apr. 8, 1991) [herein-
after BLM 1991 Overview]. The figures contained in this document have been criticized
on the grounds that the sources and bases of this information have not been revealed, and
thus the document is little more than a conclusory prediction. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884.
After the figures in this document were cited to Congress in a number of hearings, a court
ordered the Department of the Interior to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Study in conjunction with this newly released information, and thus this information may
be subject to change. Id. at 891.
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46% marginal probability of finding economically recoverable oil and
increases the mean resource estimate from 3.23 to 3.57 billion barrels of
oil,4 5 as contrasted with the 1002 Report estimate of a 5%o chance of
recovering at least 8.8 billion barrels of oil.4 6 Furthermore, the report
raises the number of prospective drilling sites from ten to thirty.
4 7 If
these figures are accurate, ANWR would become the second largest oil
field ever developed in the United States.
The validity of both the 1991 and the 1987 figures, however, has
been called into question. 48 The 1991 estimate in particular has been
challenged. 4 9 The Department of the Interior has only recently been
ordered to circulate the report for public comment and has not revealed
the source of information upon which it relied in formulating the esti-
mates. 50 Due to statutory restrictions on drilling activities,5 1 only one
test well has been drilled, and the results of this drilling have remained
highly confidential.
52
Environmental activists, in contrast, have vowed to "draw a line in
the tundra" to prevent development in the coastal plain.53 Although
the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and the Wilderness So-
ciety have taken an especially visible role in the debate, the battle to
defeat development has attracted the support of a vast number of envi-
ronmental organizations. Citing the overall pattern of environmental
damage in Alaskan oil fields 54 as well as notable disasters like the Exxon
Valdez oil spill at Prince William Sound, environmentalists scoff at the
notion that oil development can be conducted without destroying the
coastal plain habitat. The environmental community views the contro-
versy as a struggle to save the last great wilderness. The prevailing view
is that if ANWR is not immune from development, nothing is sacred.
To environmentalists, the battle also represents an opportunity for the
nation to make a fundamental policy choice in favor of the environment
by making a commitment to renewable sources of energy instead of ex-
ploiting mineral resources at the expense of the environment.
In addition to questioning the estimates of recoverable oil, environ-
mentalists have suggested that, even if the estimates of recoverable oil
prove correct, this amount is only enough to supply the country's needs
for 200 days and will not reduce the nation's dependence on oil im-
ports.5 5 Nevertheless, these criticisms have done little to dampen the
45. BLM 1991 Overview, supra note 44, at 1.
46. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 886, citing IMPACT STATEMENT.
47. ANWR Plays Key Role in Interior Budget; Outer Continental Shelf Sales Uncertain, 21
ENV'T REP. 1797 (Feb. 8, 1991) [hereinafter ANWR Plays Key Role].
48. See generally Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884-91.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 891-92.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d) (1988).
52. Chevron drilled a test well in 1985 on ANWR land adjacent to the coast, which is
controlled by the Kaktovic Inupiat Corporation. Lee, supra note 13, at A1O.
53. Paul Rauber, Last Refuge, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1992 at 38 (quoting from statement of
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.)).
54. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 116-24; Lee, supra note 13, at A1O-1 1.
55. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 89-94; Lee, supra note 13, at A10.
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enthusiasm of the proponents of oil development. ANWR will continue
to be portrayed as the last great oil field as well as the last great wilder-
ness. To date, neither side can claim absolute victory. It might be said
that the environmentalists are prevailing at the moment because, so far,
the ANWR has not been opened for drilling activities. On the other
hand, the oil companies and governmental entities are anxiously await-
ing any opportunity to change the status quo.
Pressure for oil and gas discovery must be understood in the con-
text of declining reserves in Prudhoe Bay and the limited lifespan of the
Transnational Alaska Pipeline. Prudhoe Bay's reserves have declined
significantly over the past decade,5 6 and the continued viability of the
Transnational Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS) is at stake. The pipeline
was originally designed to last until the year 2007, but corrosion has
eaten away at the pipeline more rapidly than predicted.5 7 As a conse-
quence, the pipeline is becoming increasingly expensive to maintain.
Due to the rising costs and declining reserves in Prudhoe Bay, operation
of the TAPS will become cost-prohibitive by 2009 unless other reserves
become available. 58 The Secretary of the Interior urges that the need to
transport ANWR oil alone can keep the pipeline open for decades-long
enough to produce a billion barrels of North Slope oil that otherwise
would not be economically feasible to produce.59
The State of Alaska and the federal government stand to gain a
great deal from opening ANWR for development. First, the economic
stimulation produced by ANWR development represents political cur-
rency. The Secretary of the Interior claims that ANWR production can
generate over $150 billion in taxes and other revenues. 60 These tax rev-
enues would enable Alaska to provide better health and educational
services in areas that typically have very few public facilities. Addition-
ally, the Secretary postulates that ANWR revenues would reduce the
trade deficit by $200 billion and create 700,000 jobs nationwide.6 1 The
Secretary of the Interior also has a direct budgetary stake in the develop-
ment of ANWR and is already relying heavily on projected ANWR leas-
ing revenues. 6 2 Confident that ANWR leasing would be approved, the
Secretary assumed in his fiscal 1992 budget that the Department would
receive $1.9 billion in revenue from ANWR leasing.
63
Division of leasing revenues is at the heart of a bitter controversy
that may have contributed to Congress's refusal to approve leasing in
1991. Under the Alaska Statehood Act of 1959, Alaska claims 90%o of
any oil revenues from the refuge with the remaining 10% going to the
56. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 177-78.
57. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 16 n.19.
58. Federal Estimates of ANWR Potential Pessimistic, Geologist Tells Subcommittee, 22 ENV'T
REP. 660 (July 19, 1991).
59. Manuel Lujan, A Mandate to Balance Protection with the Use of Our Riches, ROLL CALL,
Nov. 18, 1991, at Policy Briefing No. 33, 1991 Natural Resources.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. ANIVR Plays Key Role, supra note 47, at 1797.
63. Id.
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Department of the Interior.6 However, the Secretary of the Interior
has tried various ways of evading the state's 90% share. In July of 1987,
the Secretary conducted secret negotiations with several native corpora-
tions in other refuges for the purpose of diverting the 90% royalties to
the native corporations. 6 5 Ordered by the Reagan Administration to
drop this plan, the Secretary next tried a more direct approach. In the
unveiling of Bush's 1991 energy plan, the Secretary proposed that the
Administration should keep 100% of the revenues, contending that
ANWR is a federal refuge. 66 More recently, a 50-50 split has been pro-
posed, but the issue remains unresolved.6 7 Until the revenue share is-
sue is settled, proponents of development are less likely to mount an
effective coalition to open the refuge.
Nevertheless, both proponents and opponents of ANWR oil and
gas development will continue to mount significant pressure upon the
State of Alaska, the Department of the Interior and Congress. These
campaigns are, to a large extent, determined by the designated process
through which Congress must determine whether ANWR should be
opened for development.
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE AND ANWR DEVELOPMENT
The legal structure established to protect ANWR's environmental
and subsistence resources is, perhaps, critically flawed. Within the
structure, the Secretary of the Interior maintains tremendous power to
shape the course of events by molding a fact record that supports devel-
opment. First, the Secretary can exert significant influence on Con-
gress's decision to grant leasing authority. The factual record could
serve as a vehicle to convince Congress that oil and gas development
will not significantly impair the environmental and subsistence values
the refuge was designed to protect and that the coastal plain's potential
mineral resources justify any disturbance to these values.
68
If Congress ultimately approves leasing, however, other statutory
requirements may bar development 6 9 -but again, the strength of these
barriers will be determined by the Secretary's success in shaping the fac-
tual record. The question whether development is compatible with the
refuge's environmental and subsistence purposes probably will be deter-
mined largely by the factual findings in the 1002 Report, the leasing
Environmental Impact Statement and the subsistence study. By taking
full advantage of courts' limited level of scrutiny under the arbitrary and
64. Alaska Statehood Act, supra note 1; see generally Lisa J. Booth, Comment, Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge: A Crown Jewel in Jeopardy, 9 PUB. LAND L. REV. 105 (1988).
65. See Booth, supra note 64, at 121-23.
66. Alaska Governor Stunned by White House Plan, Will Fight for Share of ANWR Oil and Gas
Revenue, 21 ENV'T REP. 1986 (Mar. 8, 1991).
67. Id.
68. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 63-103. It should be noted, however,
that not all senators meekly accept the fact record put together by employees of the execu-
tive branch. See generally CRS REPORT, supra note 3, which is an example of the type of
factfinding commissioned by Congress.
69. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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capricious standard, 70 the Secretary has great leeway to mold a fact rec-
ord that will further his political agenda with Congress and insulate his
later decisions from judicial inquiry.
The legal structure which determines the course of events in ANWR
is provided in ANILCA. At present, development in ANWR is prohib-
ited unless Congress grants leasing authority to the Secretary of the In-
terior.7 1 ANILCA defers congressional debate on this issue pending the
preparation of several informational studies by the Secretary, including
the comprehensive 1002 Report regarding the coastal plain and its envi-
ronmental and resource values.7 2 Should Congress decide to extend
leasing authority, the Secretary will be required to complete an Environ-
mental Impact Study on the impacts of leasing.73 In addition, section
810 of ANILCA requires the Secretary to evaluate the impact of oil and
gas operations on the coastal plain, on subsistence and to minimize any
adverse impacts. 74 Finally, under both ANILCA and the National Wild-
life Refuge Act, the Secretary may not permit uses of the refuge that are
inconsistent with the refuge's major purposes.
75
A. Section 1002 Report
Section 1002 of ANILCA requires the Secretary to compile several
informational analyses of ANWR's coastal plain. The first two, a base-
line biological study and an Environmental Impact Statement related to
non-drilling exploration guidelines for the range, have been completed
without challenge.
7 6
The third informational assessment of the coastal plain, in contrast,
has proved extremely controversial. Section 1002(h) solicits the Secre-
tary's recommendations concerning development activity in the coastal
70. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 881-83 (D.D.C. 1991). The 1002 Report is not
subject to judicial review because existing guidelines are vague and insufficient for judicial
use in evaluating compliance with the statute. Id. at 883.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (1988).
72. Id. § 3142(h). See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 3149 (1988). An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a detailed
written statement prepared by the responsible official, in this case the Secretary of the
Interior, for "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). In Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (9th
Cir. 1986), the Secretary of the Interior was required to prepare a separate Legislative EIS
(LEIS) in conjunction with the Section 1002 Report.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1988). It is not completely clear from the statute when this
report is to be prepared, and several groups have mounted a strong argument that this
subsistence study should be completed before Congress makes any decision concerning
leasing. See discussion pp. 64-66. However, the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit has
held that this subsistence study is not required until congressional approval has been ob-
tained. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 884.
75. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980); National Wildlife Refuge System Administration
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee (1988).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988) (baseline study); 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (exploration
guidelines) (1985). For the baseline study, the Secretary is directed to:
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plain. 77 The 1002 Report serves to identify potential oil and gas pro-
duction areas and estimate the potential volume at stake; describe the
fish and wildlife in the coastal plain and their habitat, evaluating the ad-
verse effects of further exploration activities; describe how any oil and
gas produced in the coastal plain could be transported to processing
facilities; and evaluate the national need for new domestic sources of oil
and gas.78 The 1002 Report should conclude with the Secretary's rec-
ommendations concerning whether further exploration and develop-
ment should be permitted, as well as an identification of additional legal
authority needed to avoid or minimize harm to wildlife and habitat from
these activities. 79 Notwithstanding Congress's recent refusal to confer
leasing authority, this Report can be expected to play an important role
in future congressional debate.
8 0
1. The Environmental Impact Study
The 1002 Report has been a target of litigation from the outset.
Shortly after the Fish and Wildlife Service completed an initial version
of the report in 1983, a coalition of environmental groups challenged its
failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).8 1 In response to this law-
suit, the Secretary decided to prepare such a statement; however, he in-
tended to submit the document directly to Congress without prior
circulation of a draft for public comment, in accordance with the abbre-
viated procedures available for a Legislative Environmental Impact
Study (LEIS).8 2 The Trustees for Alaska court held that the 1002 Report
was a legislative study process, and subject to the full range of proce-
dural requirements applicable to an Environmental Impact Statement,
including notice and comment procedures. 83 In accordance with the
(A) assess the size, range, and distribution of the populations of the fish and
wildlife;
(B) determine the extent, location and carrying capacity of habitats of the fish
and wildlife;
(C) assess the impacts of human activities and natural processes on the fish
and wildlife and their habitats;
(D) analyze the potential impacts of oil and gas exploration, development,
and production on such wildlife and habitats; and
(E) analyze the potential effects of such activities on the culture and lifestyle
(including subsistence) of affected Native and other people.
16 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988). The EIS for exploration activities was completed in 1983, and
the final report of the baseline study was published in 1986. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 873.
77. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(h) (1985).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Booth, supra note 64, at 121-23.
81. Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1986). The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a, requires the prepara-
tion of an EIS before any major federal action significantly affecting the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
82. Trustees for Alaska, 806 F.2d at 1383 (construing 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1991)).
83. Id Ordinarily, an EIS must be circulated in draft form for public comment before
a final draft is completed. Exceptional procedures exist for an LEIS, which may be submit-
ted to Congress at the same time it is released to the public. However, the Trusteesfor
Alaska court held that the 1002 Report/LEIS represented a study process required by Con-
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court's ruling, the Secretary circulated a draft LEIS for public comment
and finally submitted the section 1002 Report and LEIS to Congress as a
single, integrated document in May of 1987. The substantive adequacy
of this final 1002 Report/LEIS is currently being challenged under
NEPA.
8 4
A new chapter in the saga of the 1002 Report was opened in April
of 1991, when the Bureau of Land Management produced a report re-
vising the likelihood of oil discovery in the coastal plain. This document
prompted the plaintiffs challenging the existing 1002 Report/LEIS to
claim that this information significantly revised the information relied
upon in the original LEIS, and should be released as a supplemental
LEIS (SEIS).8 5 After holding that the 1002 Report/LEIS is subject to
NEPA's supplementation requirements, the court found that the revised
estimates present significant new information that would affect the anal-
ysis of environmental impacts.86 Accordingly, the court ordered the
Secretary to release the 1991 Overview as an SEIS on an expedited ba-
sis.8 7 Another round of commenting and litigation is expected in con-
nection with this SEIS.
2. Substantive Adequacy
The substantive adequacy of the 1002 Report and LEIS has been
sharply criticized and is currently under attack.8 8 Underlying the nu-
merous specific complaints about the 1002 Report is the accusation that
the Secretary is cynically manipulating the Report to support his prede-
termined opinion that ANWR should be opened for leasing activity, thus
thwarting Congress's intention in section 1002(h) to seek an objective
source of data.8 9 Because the NRDC court has held that the report's
compliance with section 1002(h) is nonjusticiable due to a lack of man-
ageable standards for review,9 0 the remaining legal question concerns
the adequacy of the LEIS under NEPA.
Although the full range of allegations exceeds the scope of this pa-
per, a brief summary of criticisms is in order. One category of criticisms
concerns the factual adequacy of the Secretary's assessment. NEPA reg-
gress, which is an exception to the LEIS exception and is not eligible for abbreviated com-
menting procedures. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4 (1991); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1506.8,
1506.8(b)(2)(ii) (1991).
84. NRDC v. Lujan, Nos. 89-2345, 89-2393 (D.D.C. ordered July 22, 1991). A
number of other issues were resolved in the previous action, including issues of standing
and procedural compliance with NEPA. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 891 (D.D.C.
1991).
85. NEPA requires the preparation of an SEIS whenever there are significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the pro-
posed action or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1991).
86. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 888. The court pointed out that environmental impacts
were not addressed in the 1991 Overview and apparently were not considered at all. Id.
87. Id. at 891-92. The court declined to order the release of nonconfidential data
relied upon in preparing the 1991 Overview, noting that this claim was not ripe because a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal was pending. Id. at 890.
88. Booth, supra note 64, at 119-26; NRDC v. Lujan, Nos. 89-2345, 89-2393.
89. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 1, 4, 6.
90. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 883.
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ulations require that an EIS show how a proposed action will or will not
meet the requirements of applicable environmental laws and policies,
such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and any other applicable
laws. 9 1 In this instance, environmentalists argue that the LEIS seriously
underestimates the severity of impacts within the coastal plain by giving
cursory treatment to issues such as hazardous waste disposal and waste-
water contamination. 9 2 Moreover, environmentalists argue that the Sec-
retary fails to discuss several types of impacts, such as air pollution.
9 3
Another serious shortcoming is the LEIS's failure to explore the cumu-
lative impacts of development. 9 4 For example, although the LEIS char-
acterizes oil spills as "an inevitable consequence" of development 95 and
acknowledges that these spills can seriously harm vegetation, it does not
explore the consequences of oil spills for species such as polar bears and
migratory fish. Instead, it flatly states that the cumulative effects of oil
spills are not significant.9 6
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the 1002 Report/LEIS is that
the Secretary's summary and recommendation contradicts the analysis
in the body of the document. The most egregious example is the con-
trast between the treatment of impacts to the Porcupine caribou herd in
the body of the document and the description of this analysis in the
recommendation. The body of the document acknowledges that the
Porcupine herd will experience "major effects" as a consequence of de-
velopment in the coastal plain. 97 This discussion stresses that the calv-
ing period spent in the coastal plain habitat is essential to the herd's
productivity and surmises that disruption of this traditional habitat can
be expected to diminish the herd's population.9" This portion of the
Report dismisses the notion that the development at Prudhoe Bay repre-
sents an analogous environmental success story, pointing out that the
population of this herd has lately begun to decline, and concedes that
this development has, in fact, interfered with the Central Arctic caribou
herd's movements. 99
The Secretary's recommendation and summary disregards this anal-
ysis. In his recommendation, the Secretary offers the disingenuous dis-
claimer that major effects are not necessarily adverse.' 0 0 This
91. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(d) (1991).
92. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 38.
93. Id. The EPA has also criticized the Secretary's failure to address air quality im-
pacts in the 1002 Report. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 54.
94. NEPA requires a comprehensive analysis of cumulative environmental impacts.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1991), construed in KIeppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
95. Numerous large (over 10,000 gallons) spills of crude oil, gasoline and diesel fuel
have occurred throughout the operation of Prudhoe Bay; in 1985 alone, over 82,000 gal-
lons were spilled. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 115, cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
supra note 41, at 28.
96. Id.
97. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 123.
98. Id. at 24-25, 123-24.
99. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 118-24, cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra
note 41, at 7.
100. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 187.
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recommendation deflects attention from the qualitative importance of
the time spent in the calving grounds by emphasizing its relatively brief
duration of six to eight weeks. 10 ' In the conclusion to the Report, the
Secretary claims that development and environmental values can coex-
ist, pointing obliquely to the "success at Prudhoe Bay and elsewhere"
without stating his basis for characterizing the Prudhoe Bay develop-
ments as successful.'
0 2
As NRDC alleges in its brief of the case, these statements may mis-
lead those readers who forego reading the entire 200-plus page docu-
ment in favor of skimming the summary and conclusions, and thus may
constitute a politically shrewd-if deceptive-strategy.' 0 3 However, it is
unclear whether this tactic will pass muster with a reviewing court, which
may go beyond the conclusory statements to examine the factual sup-
port in the body of the document. Although courts are reluctant to in-
quire closely into subjective agency decisionmaking under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review for agency action, reviewing courts
generally do require citation of some factual support for agency
decision. 1
04
Even if the plaintiffs prevail to some extent in the current lawsuit
and in possible future litigation concerning the SEIS, victory at this level
alone cannot prevent development in ANWR. The practical result of
challenges to the informational analyses prepared by the Secretary will
be to delay a congressional decision or, at most, to force the Secretary to
acknowledge more extensive environmental harm. An EIS, as well as an
LEIS or an SEIS, serves the purpose of putting knowledge of environ-
mental impacts before a decisionmaker and gives governmental entities
as much information as possible about environmental consequences, but
it has no force in and of itself to require the decisionmaker to change a
recommendation or decision.' 0 5 Moreover, since the adequacy of the
Secretary's recommendation under ANILCA section 1002(h) has been
ruled nonjusticiable, 10 6 the Secretary cannot be required to change his
recommendation of immediate full leasing on the basis of findings of
adverse environmental consequences.10 7 The litigation, however, may
pressure the Secretary to compromise, perhaps by adopting an alterna-
tive such as restricted leasing or further exploration, and may create
enough publicity to discredit the Secretary's objectivity in claiming that
oil and gas development will not destroy the coastal plain.
101. Il at 187.
102. l at 187. NRDC points out evidence of environmental disaster related to the
Prudhoe Bay development. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 123-24.
103. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 95.
104. NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 889 (D.D.C. 1991).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1988).
106. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 883.
107. Note that NEPA compels a full and fair disclosure of alternatives, but does not
compel the agency's substantive choice. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1988).
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION OF LEASING AUTHORITY
Once a final 1002 Report and LEIS have been submitted, Congress
can decide to delegate leasing authority to the Secretary; however, leas-
ing and production of oil and gas within ANWR are specifically prohib-
ited until authorized by an act of Congress. 10 8 To the Secretary's
dismay, this authority was denied in the National Energy Security Act of
1992 as a political tradeoff for Congress's declining to impose Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on the automotive indus-
try.10 9 Environmentalists welcomed this news, although it represented
something less than a victory.
Although the Persian Gulf War created a resurgence of interest in
the need for domestic oil, several factors combined in 1991 to weaken
the pro-development coalition-the dispute between the Department of
the Interior (DOI) and the State of Alaska over royalty shares, 1 10 the
Public Utility Commission controversy and the current political fashion-
ability of environmentalism, to name a few. The issue of ANWR devel-
opment may, however, be reopened when these factors are not present,
and when Congress is able to open the refuge without fear of an effec-
tive public outcry.
If Congress is more sympathetic to ANWR development in the fu-
ture, it is still unclear whether it will favor the Secretary's recommenda-
tion of immediate full leasing or whether it will select one of the more
moderate alternatives considered by the Secretary in the 1002 Re-
port.' 11 One option is to drill a number of test wells, and postpone
further decision pending the results of the drilling.' 1 2 Limited leasing is
another alternative which could minimize the impact of drilling and pro-
duction activity on the Porcupine caribou herd by excluding the herd's
core calving area from exploration and production.
31
3
108. 16 U.S.C. § 3143 (1988).
109. Barbara Rosewicz, Energy Measure Clears Congress, Is Sent to Bush, WALL ST.J., Oct. 9,
1992, at A3; Paul Rauber, Last Refuge, SIERRA, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 37.
110. Alaska Governor Stunned by White House Plan, Will Fight for Share of ANWR Oil and Gas
Revenue, 21 ENV'T REP. 1986 (Mar. 8, 1991); see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
111. Discussion of alternative actions is required by ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3142(h)
(1988) and by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). In addition to the development-ori-
ented alternatives discussed below, two non-development options were addressed in the
Impact Statement. One possibility is to designate part or all of ANWR as a national wil-
derness area, which would permanently insulate the refuge from development. The Secre-
tary also rejected this possibility, claiming ANWR's value is not unique due to the amount
of designated wilderness in Alaska and Canada. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 189-
90. Another option, which was the choice temporarily made by Congress in 1992, is to
take no action. The Secretary rejected this approach in the Impact Statement, pointing
out that it could take ten to fifteen years to bring ANWR into production, and claiming
that national security needs make any delays imprudent. Id. at 190.
112. The Secretary rejected the notion of drilling four test wells on the theory that oil
companies require financial incentives to invest in exploration. The Secretary also cited
the political debacle of the federal exploration program in Alaska's National Petroleum
Reserve. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 101, 191. Chevron has drilled an exploratory
well on the ASRC/KIC Native lands in the refuge, but the results have not been made
public. Id.
113. Id. at 191. This alternative would exclude approximately 242,000 acres from pro-
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If Congress eventually grants DOI permission to lease, the Secre-
tary's right to exercise that authority is not automatic. Two barriers to
development will remain: a subsistence analysis and the requirement
that all uses of the refuge must be compatible with its major purpose.1 14
At that point, however, the Secretary will have the advantages of mo-
mentum and investment of resources.
A. Compatible Use Requirement
If Congress extends leasing authority to the Secretary under one of
the above alternatives, a significant obstacle to leasing remains: opening
the coastal plain to full leasing may violate the "compatible use" test
found in ANILCA and the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act
(Refuge Act). 1 5 The Refuge Act authorized the Secretary to "permit
the use of any area within the System for any purpose including, but not
limited to, hunting, fishing, public recreation and accommodations, and
access whenever the Secretary determines that such uses are compatible
with the major purposes for which such areas were established."' " 6
Similarly, ANILCA provides that "the Secretary may not permit any use,
or grant easements for any purpose ... unless such use is compatible
with the purposes of the refuge."
'1 17
The statutory purposes of ANWR are clearly articulated:
(i) To conserve populations and habitats in their natural diver-
sity including, but not limited to, the Porcupine caribou herd
(including participation in coordinated ecological studies and
management of this herd and the Western Arctic caribou herd),
polar bears, grizzly bears, musk oxen, Dall sheep, wolves,
wolverines, snow geese, peregrine falcons and other migratory
birds, and Arctic char and grayling;
(ii) To fulfill the international treaty obligations of the United
States with respect to fish and wildlife and their habitats;
(iii) To provide, in a manner consistent with the purposes set
forth in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), the opportunity for contin-
ued subsistence uses by local residents; and
(iv) To ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and in a
manner consistent with the purposes set forth in paragraph (i),
water quality and necessary water quantity within the refuge." 18
Conspicuously absent from this list is the exploitation of mineral
resources. Although several ANILCA provisions reflect congressional
awareness of the possible existence of oil reserves at the time ANILCA
duction. The Secretary rejected this option, citing estimates that this restriction would
lower the recoverable oil resource by 2576. Id
114. 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1988); Id. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). An EIS is also required for each
specific lease, Id. § 3149, but these are unlikely to pose obstacles to development.
115. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980); National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668e (1988).
116. Refuge Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(1)(A) (1988).
117. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, § 304(B),
94 Stat. 2371, 2393 (1980).
118. Id. See generally CRS Report, supra note 3.
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was enacted,I 1 9 Congress declined to include the development of these
minerals among the purposes of the refuge. A critical question exists
concerning the meaning of compatibility. Neither the Refuge Act nor
ANILCA supplies a statutory definition. It is possible, however, that a
definition might be borrowed from the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971.120 According to this statute, "compatibility" means that
the proposed uses must not "materially impair the values for which the
refuge was established."'
12 1
Assuming that compatibility will be defined in terms of material im-
pairment in the context of ANWR, it becomes clear why it is important
to the Secretary to craft a record supporting the notion that develop-
ment in the coastal plain will not harm environmental and subsistence
values. Although arguing that the benefits of development will justify
resulting environmental harms might suffice to win a political victory by
convincing Congress to open the refuge, this argument has no bearing
on the compatible use requirement. Under the arbitrary and capricious
standard for judicial review of agency action, the Secretary simply must
show that development will not violate ANILCA's compatible use re-
quirement by providing some factual basis for arguing that exploration
and development will not materially impair the environmental and sub-
sistence purposes of the refuge. 122 The battle over the adequacy of the
1002 Report/LEIS thus assumes another dimension: in addition to per-
suading Congress to open ANWR to full leasing, the Secretary also is
attempting to provide some basis for his eventual conclusion that devel-
opment is compatible with ANWR's major statutory purposes.
Based on the existing 1002 Report, it is apparent that the Secretary
has not yet indicated that development is compatible with these pur-
poses. For example, the 1002 Report does not show that development
will not materially impair water supply and quality. 12 3 The Secretary
acknowledges in the 1002 Report that 99% of the ANWR environment
is wetlands.' 24 The Secretary, however, never estimates the amount of
water that will be required for or polluted by development. 12 5 Instead,
the Secretary simply states, in a conclusory fashion, that development
will not impair water quality or quantity in the coastal plain, providing
119. E.g., the exploration guidelines, 16 U.S.C. § 3142(d) (1988), and the request that
the Secretary address the impacts of oil and gas development in the Impact Statement. 16
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(d) (1988).
120. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988).
121. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.4-6(b) (1991). See National Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 606 F.
Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984), in which the court stated that only activities "compatible"
with the major purposes of a Refuge are permitted under these laws and regulations. Id. at
837. The court held that the Secretary's determination that a support base located within
the refuge in question would be compatible with the environmental protection purposes of
the refuge was contrary to the underlying record. Id. at 846.
122. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487,
§ 303(2)(B), 94 Stat. 2371, 2390 (1980).
123. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 39-45.
124. IMPAcT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 13.
125. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 41 (estimating the amount of water
needed for an average well and discussing the water pollution associated with oil wells).
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no factual support whatsoever for this statement. 126 Even under the re-
strained scope of inquiry under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
judicial review, it is unlikely that a mere conclusory statement will consti-
tute a showing that ANILCA's purpose of water protection will not be
materially impaired.
Notwithstanding claims that the current 1002 Report underesti-
mates the environmental impacts of development, it can be argued that
the existing 1002 Report positively demonstrates that development is
not compatible with the purposes of the refuge. The Secretary's analysis
of impacts on the Porcupine caribou herd and on subsistence provides
an illustration. The Secretary acknowledges that successful oil develop-
ment and production will have significant and long-lasting impacts.'
2 7
These include major effects on the area's limited natural fresh-water
sources, noise generation from aircraft and drilling operations and im-
paired visual appearance caused by drilling and production opera-
tions. 128 Mining gravel for use in operations may cause melting of
permafrost, destruction of tundra, erosion and stream pollution.' 2 9 Ac-
cidental spills of crude oil and refined petroleum products, an "inevita-
ble consequence" of oil field- development, 130 are expected to occur in
the coastal plain, with possible severe decreases in vegetation as a result.
Likewise, the 1002 Report acknowledges that this disruption of the
coastal plain habitat will produce "major effects" on the Porcupine cari-
bou herd.' 13  The Report defines "major effects" as "widespread, long-
term change in habitat availability or quality [that] would likely modify
natural abundance or distribution of species."1 3 2 Although the Report
denies that an appreciable population decline is anticipated,' 3 3 it
predicts that a change in the herd's distribution is to be expected.13 4
126. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 198; Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at
43.
127. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 115. The Secretary claims that unsuccessful
exploration will produce only short-term, minor impacts on the coastal plain. Id.
128. Id. at 113-14. Since 99% of the coastal plain is wetlands, dedicating the vast
amounts of water required for oil and gas development activities to industrial uses will
have a major effect. Noise generated by aircraft operations, drilling operations and traffic
at work sites would be major. The visual effects of such activities would be a major, long-
term consequence of full leasing as well. Id
129. "Moderate effects" would be caused by removing gravel from natural sites to con-
struction areas, resulting in changes to topography in these areas. Localized removal or
destruction of tundra vegetation would result from constructing gravel drilling and equip-
ment pads, gravel roads and gravel mines. Thermokarsting (caused by melting of ground
ice and settling or caving of the ground surface so that pits, depressions and small ponds
result) of tundra is expected. Permafrost may melt under burrow sites and under vegeta-
tion disturbed by other development activities, resulting in sloughing, erosion and stream
pollution lasting well beyond the life of the project. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at
111-13.
130. Id. at 115. Throughout the operation of Prudhoe Bay, there have been very large
spills of over 10,000 gallons of crude oil, gasoline and diesel fuel. Id.
131. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 123.
132. Id. at 107.
133. This contention is hotly contested by NRDC, which argues that new information
regarding the caribou affected by activity in the Prudhoe Bay area calls this conclusion into
serious doubt. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 41, at 124.
134. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 124.
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Any significant change in the migration pattern, redistribution or popu-
lation of the Porcupine herd could be expected to have significant ad-
verse impacts on the subsistence lifestyle of the Gwich'in Indians of
Arctic Village, who annually harvest caribou for subsistence uses.13 5
These changes also may affect the United States's compliance with inter-
national treaties concerning the caribou.'
36
Thus, based on the existing 1002 Report alone, it can be argued
that development will significantly impair three of the major purposes of
the refuge-protection of the Porcupine herd, subsistence use and com-
pliance with international treaties-and therefore fails the compatible
use test.
B. Section 810 Analysis
An independent barrier to oil and gas development in ANWR's
coastal plain is found in Title VIII of ANILCA, which protects subsis-
tence uses of public lands in Alaska by requiring that other uses of the
lands have the least possible adverse impact on subsistence.' 3 7 Section
810(a) of ANILCA requires that whenever a federal agency proposes to
"withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise permit the use, occupancy, or
disposition of [Alaskan] public lands," the head of that agency must first
evaluate the effect of the proposed use and identify alternatives that
would reduce or eliminate the proposed use of the public lands needed
for subsistence.13 8 If this evaluation indicates that the proposed use
would significantly restrict subsistence uses, the Secretary must provide
notice to appropriate state and local agencies and hold local hearings in
the areas to be affected. 139 Before the use can be carried out, the
agency must determine that a significant restriction of subsistence uses
is necessary, that a minimal amount of public lands will be used and that
reasonable steps are taken to minimize adverse impacts upon subsis-
tence uses.' 40 If an EIS is required for leasing, it must include these
subsistence findings.
14 1
The section 810 analysis is part of ANILCA's strong policy prefer-
ence in favor of subsistence. Protection of subsistence lifestyles is iden-
tified as one of the primary purposes of ANILCA.14 2 Section 802 states:
135. Id. at 40.
136. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 66.
137. 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1988).
138. Id § 3120.
139. Id. §§ 3120(a), (a)(1), (a)(2).
140. Id. § 3120. The pertinent language reads:
In determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise permit the use,
occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any provision of law authorizing
such actions, the head of the Federal agency, having primary jurisdiction over
such lands or his designee shall evaluate the effect of such use, occupancy, or
disposition on subsistence uses and needs, the availability of other lands for the
purposes sought to be achieved, and other alternatives which would reduce or
eliminate the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands needed for subsis-
tence purposes.
Id.
141. Id. §§ 3120(b) (1988); NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870, 883 (D.D.C. 1991).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1988).
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It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that-(1) con-
sistent with sound management principles, and the conserva-
tion of healthy populations of fish and wildlife, the utilization of
the public lands in Alaska is to cause the least adverse impact
possible on rural residents who depend upon subsistence uses
of the resources of such lands; consistent with management of
fish and wildlife in accordance with recognized scientific princi-
ples and the purposes for each unit established, designated, or
expanded by or pursuant to titles II through VII of the Act, the
purpose of this subchapter is to provide the opportunity for
rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to do so. 143
This preference is based on a congressional recognition that "the con-
tinuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses by rural residents of
Alaska... is essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cul-
tural existence and to non-Native physical, economic, traditional, and
social existence."'
44
Despite the strong enunciation of a policy in favor of protecting
subsistence, in reality, section 810 offers only weak protection against oil
and gas development which threatens the subsistence of the Gwich'in.
First, the subsistence analysis will not be conducted until after Congress
has made its initial decision whether to grant leasing authority to the
Secretary. Section 810 states that the subsistence evaluation is required
"[i]n determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise per-
mit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any provi-
sion of law authorizing such actions .... ,, 14 5 In NRDC v. Lujan,146 the
D.C. District Court found that NRDC's claim based on the 1002 Report/
LEIS's failure to include the section 810 subsistence evaluation was pre-
mature because leasing authority has not yet been authorized by
Congress. 147
This holding considerably weakens the role that subsistence issues
will play in the congressional deliberation of extending leasing author-
ity. Although effects of development on subsistence are addressed in
the baseline study of the coastal plain, alternatives that would minimize
these impacts are not discussed. 148 Thus, without an adequate discus-
sion of alternative development strategies that could reduce impacts on
subsistence, Congress must decide whether to permit leasing as well as
restrictions to impose on this authority. Once congressional leasing au-
thority has been granted, it may be too late for the subsistence analysis
to play a decisive role. At that point, political momentum will likely
render Congress less willing to subsequently revoke or limit the Sec-
143. Id. § 3112. Arguably, section 802 is part of a subchapter largely oriented toward
protecting subsistence resources from taking by non-subsistence uses such as hunting and
fishing, for example, section 804 speaks in terms of restricting other consumptive uses
when necessary to ensure adequate subsistence resources. Id. § 3114. However, the pol-
icy statement favoring subsistence is not restricted to consumptive uses. Id. § 3112(2).
144. Id. § 3111(1).
145. Id. § 3120.
146. 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991).
147. Id. at 884.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(E) (1988).
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retary's leasing authority based on the results of the subsistence
evaluation.
Similarly, if substantial investments are made by developers based
on congressional approval of leasing, a reviewing court will be reluctant
to enjoin development activities based on section 810. For instance, in
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,149 the Supreme Court reversed
an injunction against offshore exploration activities based on the Secre-
tary's failure to conduct a section 810(a) subsistence analysis, citing the
fact that oil developers had already made considerable investment in ex-
ploratory activities, which would be lost if exploration was enjoined.' 5 0
It is questionable whether a challenge under section 810 could re-
sult in a prohibition of development activities in the refuge. Unlike the
compatible use requirement, section 810 does not compel the Secretary
to forego development that would interfere with subsistence uses; it
merely requires the Secretary to evaluate the effects of development in
order to decide whether significant restrictions on subsistence are to be
expected. Depending on the Secretary's success in the forum of the
1002 Report, he may be able to provide himself with an arguable basis
for finding no significant restrictions on subsistence. Even if the Secre-
tary does find significant restriction of subsistence and elects to conduct
hearings, section 810 probably does not pose a serious barrier to devel-
opment. The Secretary must find that such a significant restriction is
"necessary," but presumably, the proposed authorized use justifies re-
strictions of subsistence under section 810.151 Second, although the
Secretary must ensure that the restriction will involve a minimal amount
of public lands and that the impacts will be minimized, 15 2 it does not
provide that the proposed use will be prohibited if the Secretary finds
that restrictions on subsistence uses cannot be minimized.'
53
C. Lease-by-Lease Analysis
The Secretary must determine on a lease-by-lease basis whether
each lease is consistent with the major purposes of the refuge.
154 If
NEPA is applicable, he must prepare an EIS for each leasing decision,
including the section 810 subsistence evaluation. 55 Presumably, these
subsequent leasing decisions would be subject to challenge under the
arbitrary and capricious standard because in each case, the Secretary
must state his reasons for the decision and explain why the reasons for
leasing would be compatible or incompatible with the purposes of the
149. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
150. Id. at 544.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1988).
152. Id. § 3120(a)(3).
153. See supra notes 115-36. However, a finding of significant adverse effects in the
subsistence evaluation may be used to show that the proposed development is not compat-
ible with the major purposes of the refuge. Id.
154. 16 U.S.C. § 3149(b) (1988).
155. Id.
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refuge.1 56 But again, the Secretary could cite the 1002 Report in his
own support when defending any challenged leasing decision, which les-
sens the chance that a court would find his actions arbitrary and
capricious.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Recent Legislative Developments
ANWR has been the subject of passionate debate in the halls of
Congress during the last few years. 157 The Bush Administration, the
Department of the Interior, the State of Alaska and big oil companies
have attempted to convince Congress that ANWR should be opened for
drilling activity. 15 8 The Johnston-Wallop energy bill, which contained
such a provision, was prevented from reaching the floor of the Senate by
a filibuster on November 1, 1991; this effectively killed the bill. 159 The
filibuster was made up of a coalition of senators representing very di-
verse interests--environmentalists, public utility companies and auto-
mobile manufacturers-who compromised on controversial issues in
order to defeat the bill.' 60 The automobile manufacturers worked with
the environmentalists to further their own agenda and ensure that the
CAFE standards, a provision placed in the bill to mandate higher auto-
mobile efficiency, would be killed.' 6 1 The National Energy Security Act
(NESA), presently winding its way through the halls of Congress, no
longer poses an immediate danger to ANWR because its sponsors real-
ize that adding a provision for drilling in ANWR would be the Act's
death warrant.1 62 In an attempt to emphasize his views on the subject,
President Bush has threatened to veto the NESA if it does not provide
for the commencement of drilling in ANWR or, alternatively, threatened
to attach a similar provision to another bill which might make it more
difficult for environmentalists to line up allies.
16 3
B. Wilderness Area Designation
The National Energy Security Act of 1991 represents a victory for
ANWR defenders, but only a temporary one. Given our nation's reluc-
tance to wean itself from oil dependence, the current faltering domestic
economy and the oil industry's political staying power, it is unlikely that
pressure to develop ANWR's reserves will cease. The only alternative to
keeping ANWR constantly on the national agenda is to provide stronger
legislative barriers to mineral development.
156. Id.
157. See generally CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE:
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION SINCE THE 99TH CONGRESS (Apr. 5, 1991).




162. Supra note 53.
163. OIL & GAS J., supra note 158, at 17.
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One way to secure more permanent protection is to upgrade
ANWR's status from national wildlife refuge to national wilderness area.
Generally, commercial enterprise and permanent roads are prohibited
in these areas.1 64 Temporary roads, mechanical transport and aircraft
landings are prohibited as well, except as necessary to administer the
area for the purposes of the Act-which do not include mineral develop-
ment.165 The extent of protection may depend on how the coastal plain
is added to the national wilderness preservation system. If the plain is
designated a national forest, data-gathering to determine mineral values
will be not only permitted, but required.1 6 6 Designation as a national
wildlife area, however, will preclude oil and gas exploration or
development.
Redesignation may not immunize ANWR from development per-
manently, but it will mean that greater pro-development momentum
would be needed to revoke wilderness designation. If the coastal plain
is characterized as national forest and thus made subject to mineral ex-
ploration, and such exploration confirms the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's enthusiastic predictions about the quantity of oil reserves,
publication of these data could fuel developers' efforts to revoke the wil-
derness area designation. Nevertheless, commercial mineral develop-
ment will not be permissible as long as the plain remains in the system.
ANILCA requires the Secretary of the Interior to consider whether
ANWR is suitable for wilderness preservation.1 67 The Secretary re-
jected this option in the 1002 Report, arguing that he was persuaded
that wilderness "designation is not necessary to protect the 1002 area
environment and is not in the best interest of the Nation."'
68
Opponents of redesignation may argue that ANWR's coastal plain
does not meet the threshold requirements for national wilderness area
status. No serious allegation can be made that the coastal plain does not
fulfill the Act's definition of wilderness as "an area where the earth and
its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain." 169 However, opponents may protest that
adding ANWR's coastal plain to the wilderness preservation system is
164. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1988).
165. Id. § 1131 (1988).
166. Id. § 1133(d)(2). However, these activities must be carried out in a manner con-
sistent with the preservation of the wilderness environment. Id.
167. Id. § 3144. The largest part of ANWR is already designated as a wilderness area.
The only part of the refuge which is still open to question regarding wilderness designa-
tion is the coastal plain area or the 1002 area. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at ix-x.
168. IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 189-90.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 113 1(c) (1988). The definition further states that wilderness is "an
area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, with-
out permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as
to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnotice-
able; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of
recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain
ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value." Id.
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inconsistent with the purposes of the National Wilderness Preservation
System Act. Since a great deal of Alaskan territory is already protected
by various wilderness designations, it might be argued that the Act's
purposes of preserving some land in pristine condition have already
been fulfilled by existing wilderness in Alaska and that the ANWR
coastal plain designation is thus superfluous. In addition, some critics
have suggested that, notwithstanding the area's biological value, the
plain lacks the spectacular vistas that should inspire the most stringent
protection.
These attacks on ANWR's suitability as a national wilderness area
bear very little weight. First of all, the Act does not quantify how much
wilderness is needed to adequately protect the public interest in pre-
served lands. Second, the argument that enough wilderness has been
preserved in Alaska is ludicrous since ANWR is widely recognized as the
last pristine wilderness remaining in the United States, and thus it is
precisely the type of land the Act seeks to protect. Finally, the area's
recreational value in terms of spectacular scenery is irrelevant; the pur-
pose of wilderness area protection is not to safeguard areas with particu-
lar unique characteristics, but to provide the public with unaltered
wilderness areas.
170
Upgrading ANWR's designation has attracted some congressional
support. On October 17, 1991, a twelve to four majority of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee approved legislation pro-
posed by Senator William Roth (R-Del.) adding the coastal plain to the
National Wilderness Preservation System, 17 1 but the bill has not been
voted on by the entire Senate. Proponents of the bill optimistically pre-
dict strong support from the same legislators who voted to exclude the
authorization to lease ANWR from the 1991 National Energy Security
Act. However, any measure providing permanent sanctity for the area,
as opposed to a temporary reprieve, is likely to face far stronger opposi-
tion. Under the current administration, such a measure would almost
certainly be vetoed. Thus, although redesignation as a national wilder-
ness area is an extremely potent defensive weapon, it may be an issue
better reserved for a different administration. Alternatively, the specter
of a vigorous redesignation campaign might be used to gain leverage in
negotiating for other protection measures.
In creating ANWR, Congress resolved to protect the last and great-
est wilderness in North America. Unfortunately, the statutory scheme,
which was designed to ensure that development will not be conducted at
the expense of the environmental and subsistence values, is dependent
on the production of a "factual finding" that is essentially under the full
control of the Secretary of the Interior. Taking full advantage of the
wide berth given agency discretion under the arbitrary and capricious
standard ofjudicial review, the Secretary can custom-build a factual rec-
170. McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965).
171. S. 39, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); Senators Pledge Filibuster on Energy Bill to Block
Arctic Refuge Drilling Provisions, 22 ENV'T REP. 1618 (Oct. 25, 1991).
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ord to support his foregone conclusion in favor of development, thus
frustrating the requirement that uses of the refuge must be compatible
with the major purposes for which it was designed. If neither Congress
nor the courts intercede, the Secretary of the Interior can pillage the last
true wilderness and destroy the foundation of the last subsistence econ-
omy in the United States.
The only permanent protection for ANWR's coastal plain is legisla-
tive. To settle the question permanently, Congress should redesignate
ANWR as statutory wilderness.
NEXUS: THE NEXT TEST OF RICO's TEXT
MELISSA HARRISON*
The United States Supreme Court will decide this term whether the
phrase "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of the enterprise's affairs" in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) requires proof that the defendant managed or
operated the enterprise.' The circuit courts of appeal disagree over the
meaning of "conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise."
The Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits require that one have ac-
tual participation in the management or operation of the enterprise
before RICO liability can attach,2 and the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in an Eighth Circuit case which applied the same test.
3
The other circuits have adopted various formulations, but all are less
restrictive than the manage or operate test. Reves v. Ernst & Young
4 will
be the latest of numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has inter-
preted this important statute.
Although the authors of a leading RICO treatise have characterized
the meaning of "conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise"
as the "primary intellectual problem posed by the language of section
1962(c)," 5 the issue has received little scholarly attention.6 The prob-
* Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law; J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 1984. The author is a former Assistant United States Attorney and in that capacity
prosecuted RICO and other white collar crime cases.
I wish to thank Bari Burke, Dean Martin Burke, Steven Bahls, Larry Elison, Michael
Goldsmith, Donald J. Hall, Tom Huff and Nikki Kowalski, who reviewed drafts and gave
me useful comments and suggestions. I especially wish to thank G. Robert Blakey and
Carl Tobias, without whose assistance and knowledge this article would not have existed.
The errors and omissions which remain are mine. Charlotte Wilmerton provided invalua-
ble technical assistance and CynthiaJones was a tireless research assistant. Finally, I thank
Peter Larson. This article is for him.
1. It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
2. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 n.10 (1982) aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361,
1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauf-
feurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132 (1989), rev'd en banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
3. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
4. Ild
5. DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO S-34-35 (1987).
6. There is only one student note solely on the issue of nexus. See Note, The RICO
Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible"Linkage, 83 MICH. L. REV. 571 (1984) [hereinafter Nexus Note].
The Smith and Reed treatise has a section on the subject, see supra note 5, at § 5.04. See also
Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165,
228 (1980)(section on nexus).
Most recent RICO scholarships have involved the question of whether the pattern
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lem is commonly referred to as the "nexus" question.7 This article will
ask and propose an answer to the question which the Supreme Court
will confront: What nexus or connection between the enterprise and the
pattern of racketeering activity is necessary? Employing the statutory
language, another way to frame the question is: What does it mean to
conduct or participate in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity?
This article will first demonstrate that the manage or operate test
adopted by the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits is too limiting.
Moreover, adoption of the manage or operate test would eviscerate the
requirement is vague. See G. Robert Blakey, Is "Pattern" Void for Vagueness?, 5 CIVIL RICO
REPORT 6, Dec. 12, 1989; G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God - Is This the
End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L..REv. 851 (1990) [hereinafter RICO Myths]; Michael Goldsmith,
RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971
(1988); Robert D. Luskin, Behold, the Day ofJudgment: Is the RICO Pattern Requirement Voidfor
Vagueness?, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 779 (1990); Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO
Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691 (1990);Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy -Is
This the End of RICO?"-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO
"Pattern, " 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990); David W. Gartenstein &Joseph F. War-
ganz, Note, RICO's "Pattern'" Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM L. REV. 489 (1990).
Most of this scholarly commentary followed Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring opinion in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), intimating that the Court
might find the pattern component of RICO vague if squarely faced with the issue. Id. at
256. This has not yet happened.
Pattern of racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988), as requiring
"at least two acts of racketeering activity, [racketeering activity being defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 196 1(l) (1988)] one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
Scholars have also attended to the enterprise concept. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV.
291 (1983); Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 646 (1989).
Enterprise is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988), as including "any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individ-
uals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Issues which have arisen from the
enterprise concept include whether the enterprise must be distinct from the pattern,
whether the person and the enterprise must be distinct, and whether the enterprise can be
wholly illegitimate.
7. The word "nexus" has been used in other RICO contexts which are beyond the
scope of this article. This article does not attempt to discuss "nexus" as it relates to: 1)
the connection between the racketeering activity and organized crime, commonly referred
to as the "organized crime nexus" or 2) the connection between the racketeering acts and
interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) (requiring that the enterprise be en-
gaged in, or that its activities affect, interstate commerce).
Nexus, as it is used in this article, has also been confused with the terms "employed by
or associated with" in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
This article is not about whether one is "employed by or associated with the enter-
prise." It is about whether one conducts or participates in the conduct of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The confusion between these concepts is clear-
est when discussing whether outsiders can participate in the conduct of an enterprise. See,




RICO statute, especially in the criminal area. That test would permit
prosecutors to convict only actors at the highest level in a criminal or-
ganization and would exclude "foot soldiers" who carry out the direc-
tions of those above them in the hierarchy. Experience has shown that
"criminal actions far below the level of senior management can yield
significant profits to wrongdoers and thwart the attainment of the enter-
prise's legitimate goals." Congress aimed the statute at enterprise
criminality, not just the "big fish." 9
The manage or operate test would severely hamper both govern-
ment prosecution of white collar crime and private civil actions to re-
cover damages resulting from such crime. The need for both criminal
and civil RICO is compelling in the aftermath of the savings and loan
scandal and the collapse of the Bank of Commerce and Credit Interna-
tional. The manage or operate test would restrict those who could be
prosecuted to senior management in the enterprise itself and exclude
many who might have played significant roles in the fraudulent activity,
such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, but who are outside the en-
terprise. Prosecutors' ability to use RICO to prosecute economic crime
would be sharply circumscribed.
Part I of this article provides a brief background of RICO. Part II
describes and criticizes the principal tests for nexus between the racke-
teering acts and the enterprise. Part II specifically analyzes Arthur Young
& Co. v. Reves, 10 the Eighth Circuit case in which the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari, and Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639,11 the District of Columbia Circuit Court case which
most thoroughly articulates the manage or operate test. Part III finds
that the manage or operate test has no support in RICO's text or legisla-
tive history. Part IV explores the detrimental implications of adopting
the manage or operate test. Part V analyzes RICO jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Part VI suggests that the Court apply traditional princi-
ples of statutory construction and reject the manage or operate test.
Part VI also proposes an ordinary meaning approach to nexus that
would better effectuate the purposes of the RICO statute.
PART I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RICO
RICO is one of the most controversial statutes that Congress ever
enacted. It was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.12 Use of RICO was infrequent until the mid-1970s. Controversy
8. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Driv-
ers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd en banc,
913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991) [hereinafterAmicus Curiae
Briejl.
9. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978) (cited in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 80 n.24 (1989)). See also
Bauerschmidt, supra note 6, at 1108.
10. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsub non, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S.
Ct. 1159 (1992).
11. 883 F.2d 132.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
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began in the criminal arena when prosecutors applied the statute in ac-
tions against white collar criminals instead of solely to traditional "Ma-
fia-type" organized crime. Civil RICO has engendered controversy ever
since it began to be used by the private bar in about 1975.13
The origins of RICO and its intended scope are a matter of dispute.
Gerard Lynch concludes that Congress intended RICO principally as a
tool for attacking the specific problem of infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness by organized crime. 14 G. Robert Blakey, RICO's principal drafter,
disagrees. He asserts that RICO was intended to deal with the infiltra-
tion of legitimate business by organized crime, but it was also intended
to encompass the much broader goal of dealing with all forms of "enter-
prise criminality." 15 Despite his views of RICO's origins, Lynch believes
that, over the years, judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of
RICO and that Congress approved this expansion when it reviewed
RICO in 1984 and did nothing to limit this broad judicial
interpretation. 1
6
For more than two decades, critics have vilified RICO, while propo-
nents have showered it with praise. RICO's critics have characterized it
as "the Monster that mauled Wall Street"' 7 and "the Monster that Ate
Jurisprudence."'18 Its supporters have described it as "the single most
effective device for prosecuting systematic, organized criminal
activity."'9
Congress has steadfastly repelled vigorous attempts to repeal or
eviscerate RICO. The Supreme Court correspondingly has refused to
read the statute narrowly as its opponents have advocated. Nonetheless,
in the 1989 case of H.. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,20 Justice
Antonin Scalia, joined by three other justices, wrote a concurring opin-
ion suggesting that the statute was void for vagueness. 2 1 The defend-
13. See RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 857 (containing an excellent discussion of the
controversy surrounding RICO at page 857, n.14.)
14. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 662 (1987) (an influential article offering one of the most complete discussions
of RICO.)
15. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 866. See also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 254-80 (1982);
Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 774 (1988).
16. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 769, 773-74 (1990).
17. L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1050 (1990). Mr. Crovitz is an assistant editorial page editor at the Wall Street Journal.
18. David B. Sentelle, RICO: The Monster That Ate Jurisprudence, address at the CATO
Institute Seminar on RICO, Rights and the Constitution (Oct. 18, 1989) (copy available
from Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), quoted in Paul Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and
Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990). Judge
Sentelle sits on the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
19. Coffey, supra note 18, at 1049. Mr. Coffey is Deputy Chiefofthe Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division of the Justice Department.
20. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
21. Id. at 251-56.
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ants in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,22 the Eighth Circuit case in which the
Court recently granted certiorari, urged that RICO be narrowly
construed.
28
PART II. THE CURRENT NExus TESTS
The circuit courts of appeals currently employ four primary tests for
nexus: The Scotto-Provenzano test, the Cauble test, the facilitation or utili-
zation test and the manage or operate test.
Under the Scotto-Provenzano test, one conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when "(1) one is
enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position
in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the en-
terprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
enterprise.
'24
Under the Cauble test, to participate in the conduct of an enter-
prise's affairs, (1) a defendant must commit the racketeering acts, (2) the
defendant's position in the enterprise must facilitate the commission of
the racketeering acts and (3) the predicate acts must have some effect
directly or indirectly on the enterprise.
25
Under the facilitation or utilization test, there is a sufficient nexus
when there is "proof that the facilities and services of the enterprise
were regularly and repeatedly utilized to make possible the racketeering
activity .... -26
Under the manage or operate test, "[a] defendant's participation
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordina-
rily will require some participation in the operation or management of
the enterprise itself."27 The phrase "[conduct or participate in the con-
duct of] refers to the guidance, management, direction, or other exer-
cise of control over the course of the enterprise's activities."'2 8
A. The Scotto-Provenzano Test
The defendant in United States v. Scotto 2 9 argued that the jury should
have been instructed that the predicate acts were "concerned or related
to the operation or management of the enterprise" or that they "af-
22. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112
S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
23. Id. at 1325.
24. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982).
25, United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984).
26. United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819
(1984).
27. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
28. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs k Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
29. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980).
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fected the affairs of the [enterprise] in its essential functions." 30 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument on appeal. The court stated "that
the statute does not distinguish between predicate acts which play a ma-
jor or minor role."3 1 The court then articulated, without additional ex-
planation, the following test: One conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when "(1) one is
enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position
in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the en-
terprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
enterprise."'3 2 The Third Circuit adopted the Scotto standard in United
States v. Provenzano.
33
The Scotto-Provenzano test is overly broad in two ways. First, Scotto
states that if one is enabled solely by one's position within the enterprise
to commit the racketeering acts, one conducts the affairs of the enter-
prise.3 4 This test reaches activity beyond RICO's intended scope.
3 5
One's position could enable one to commit racketeering acts without
actually participating in the conduct of the enterprise. For example, in
United States v. Dennis,36 a General Motors employee collected usurious
loans from his co-workers at a General Motors plant. The indictment
charged that Dennis participated in the conduct of General Motors by
collecting these loans on the premises. The court in Dennis reached the
correct result when it dismissed the RICO count holding that merely
collecting loans on the premises did not constitute participation in the
conduct of General Motors.3 7 If the Scotto-Provenzano test was applied in
Dennis, however, it could be argued that the defendant's position as a
General Motors employee enabled him to collect the usurious loans on
its premises.
Second, the Scotto court stated that the nexus is sufficient when the
offenses are related to the affairs of the enterprise.3 8 Being related to an
enterprise does not mean that one is conducting or participating in the
conduct of its affairs. Congress did not state in § 1962(c) that the com-
30. Id. at 54. In Scotto, Anthony Scotto, the President of an International Longshore-
men's Union local, accepted payoffs from individuals representing waterfront employers
of ILA labor. The enterprise alleged in the indictment was the local union. Id. at 51.
31. Id. See also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)).
32. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
33. 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). See also, Sun Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195 (9th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit articulated a very
similar test and cited, but did not explicitly adopt, Scotto. See United States v. Zang, 703
F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983) (stating that "[t]o prove
a pattern, the Government must establish two or more predicate offenses which are related
to the activities of the enterprise.").
34. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
35. See Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 578; Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839
(1991).
36. 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
37. Id. at 199.
38. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
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mission of racketeering acts which are related to an enterprise is a crime.
Equating "related to" with "conduct or participate in the conduct of"
confuses nexus with pattern.3 9 The Supreme Court, in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.,40 recently defined "pattern" as acts which are
related to each other or to some outside ongoing entity, such as the
enterprise, and are continuous or pose a threat of continuity. 4 1 If acts
are related either to each other or to the enterprise, they may form a
pattern. This does not mean that they were committed while participat-
ing in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs.
B. The Cauble Test
In United States v. Cauble,4 2 the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
stating that merely working for a legitimate enterprise and committing
racketeering acts on the business premises do not establish nexus.
43
The court then cited, but reformulated, the Scotto test. The Cauble court
asserted that the Scotto test did not distinguish the enterprise-racketeer-
ing nexus from the defendant-racketeering connection4 4 and modified
the test as follows: To participate in the conduct of an enterprise's af-
fairs, (1) a defendant must commit the racketeering acts, (2) the defend-
ant's position in the enterprise must facilitate the commission of the
racketeering acts, and (3) the predicate acts must have some effect di-
rectly or indirectly on the enterprise.4 5 The court explained the para-
meters of the test by stating that the effect on the enterprise could be
direct or indirect and the racketeering acts did not have to benefit or
advance the affairs of the enterprise. The government must simply
"prove that the racketeering acts affected the enterprise in some fash-
ion."'4 6 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have followed the Cauble test.
4 7
39. For the statutory definition of pattern, see supra note 6.
40. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
41. Id. at 239.
42. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). In Cauble, the
defendant, Rex Cauble, and a group of individuals known as the "Cowboy Mafia" ran a
drug smuggling operation. The enterprise named in the indictment was Cauble Enter-
prises, a business owned by Rex Cauble. The court found a sufficient nexus between the
drug smuggling venture and Cauble Enterprises based upon the following: (1) Cauble
Enterprises' airplane was used for drug smuggling travel, (2) Cauble Enterprises' assets
were used to pay for travel related to the drug smuggling, and (3) Cauble's position in
Cauble Enterprises made it possible for him to make available funds for loans and other
assets of the enterprise which the drug smugglers used. Id. at 1341.
43. Id. at 1332.
44. Id
45. Id. at 1333.
46. Id. at 1333, n.24.
47. United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ellison,
793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986). But see Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, aff'd, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). In Ellison, the
Eighth Circuit applied the Cauble test in a criminal case without even mentioning Bennett v.
Berg and the manage or operate test. In addition, the Sixth Circuit cited Cauble but did not
explicitly adopt the Cauble test in United States V. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Qaoud court stated, "to establish that an enterprise's affairs have been conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity, there must be a nexus between the enterprise
and the racketeering activity." Id. at 1115.
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The Cauble test is obviously more restrictive than Scotto, primarily
because its elements are phrased in the conjunctive rather than the dis-
junctive. Moreover, the Cauble court used the term "effect" rather than
"related to." One problem with the Cauble test is that nexus is con-
cerned with whether one participates in the conduct of the enterprise,
not whether there was an effect on the enterprise. One could participate
in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity and, for instance, affect another victim but not the enterprise
itself.
48
An additional difficulty with the Cauble test is its requirement that
one's position within the enterprise facilitate the commission of the acts.
Does this mean that outsiders cannot violate RICO? Many courts have
held that outsiders can violate the statute.49 The text of RICO itself
states that the participation can be direct or indirect and provides that
the person need only be employed by, or associated with, the
enterprise. 50
48. See O'Neill, supra note 6, at 676. The author discusses the concept of enterprise as
"instrument", employing the example of United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985). In Blackwood, a Chicago police officer, was a court
sergeant in the Cook County Circuit Court. For more than a year he solicited and received
bribes from an FBI agent who was working undercover as part of Operation Greylord. In
return, Blackwood "influenced the disposition" of pending cases in the branch courts of
the Cook County Circuit Court. Blackwood was convicted under § 1962(c) for participat-
ing in the conduct of the Cook County Circuit Court's affairs through a pattern of bribery.
Thus, the enterprise played the role of instrument in the case. The Cook County Court
was not victimized by Blackwood's conduct, nor did it participate in the bribery, but Black-
wood used his position in the court as leverage, as a "tool" through which to carry on his
bribery scheme.
49. The Justice Department amicus brief in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. uses the example of
"outsiders who assist the enterprise to commit crimes, use its resources for criminal pur-
poses, or influence its actions by the payment of kickbacks to subordinates, surely 'partici-
pate . .. in the conduct' of its affairs through the prohibited pattern, even though not
significantly controlling its overall goals." Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 17. Courts
have consistently construed RICO to reach that behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Yonan,
800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987). In Yonan, a defense attor-
ney in Chicago attempted to bribe an Assistant States Attorney to "fix" a criminal case.
Yonan, the defense attorney, was charged with conducting the affairs of the State's Attor-
ney's office through a pattern of racketeering activity. The issue on appeal was whether
Yonan was associated with the States Attorney's office as required by the statute. The court
concluded that he was because he conducted business with the office. Id. at 168. How-
ever, even if Yonan was associated, it does not necessarily follow that he conducted the
affairs of the State's Attorneys office. The court in Yonan did not reach this issue, but it
seemed to treat the two elements as one.
Other examples of activity that would be excluded under the Cauble test are found in:
United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1390 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080
(1989) (lawyer who bribed judges participated in the conduct of the court's affairs); United
States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1987) (employee of subsidiary participated
in conduct of parent company by fraudulently procuring contracts for the subsidiary which
financially benefitted the parent company); United States v.Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226-27
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) (city councilman participated in the conduct of a
law firm's affairs by accepting bribe to facilitate approval of transaction from which the law
firm stood to benefit); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475-76 (11th Cir.
1985) (defendants participated in the conduct of a motorcycle gang's affairs by engaging in
acts of extortion and drug dealing at behest of gang members).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
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C. The Facilitation or Utilization Test
The Eleventh Circuit espoused the facilitation or utilization test in
United States v. Carter.51 In Carter, the defendants had argued that the
illegal activity must affect the common everyday affairs of the enter-
prise.5 2 The court rejected this limitation relying on an earlier Fifth Cir-
cuit case, United States v. Welch, which held that the enterprise must make
"possible the racketeering activity."5 3 The Carter court found that since
"proof that the facilities and services of the enterprise were regularly
and repeatedly utilized to make possible the racketeering activity" a suf-
ficient nexus existed.
54
The Fourth Circuit followed this approach in United States v. Web-
ster.55 In Webster 156 the court required that the racketeering activity
benefit the enterprise in some way.5 7 On rehearing, the Webster 1158
panel rejected Webster I by finding sufficient racketeering activity based
on the government's proof indicating that the facilities of the enterprise
"were regularly made available to and put in the service of" the racke-
teering activity.5 9
51. 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
In Carter, the defendants ran a marijuana importing business out of a dairy farm owned by
two of the defendants. The enterprise alleged in the indictment was the dairy farm. The
connections between the racketeering activity, the drug smuggling, and the dairy farm
were:
(1) a pasture located on the dairy farm was the site on which an airstrip was con-
structed and utilized for bringing in shipments of drugs; (2) the dairy farm office
was used for communication between conspirators concerning protection of the
drug smuggling activities from law enforcement authorities; (3) workers of the
dairy farm participated in the drug smuggling and protection activities; and (4) a
house on the dairy farm property was used for storing the drugs prior to
distribution.
Id. at 1525-26.
52. Id. at 1526.
53. 656 F.2d 1039, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Cashell v. United States, 456 U.S.
915 (1982).
54. Carter, 721 F.2d at 1527.
55. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 935 (1982). In Webster, the defendants ran a drug smuggling business. The en-
terprise alleged in the indictment was a restaurant owned by one of the defendants. Calls
regarding drugs were forwarded from the defendants' homes to the restaurant. Employ-
ees relayed narcotics related messages. An employee provided free drinks to a drug cus-
tomer who was waiting at the restaurant for drugs to arrive so that a transaction could take
place. Id. at 187.
56. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 184.
58. 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 187 (quoting from Webster 1). At least one district court has applied Webster
when physical facilities of an enterprise were put to the use of a racketeer. In United
States v. Thomas, 749 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), the Sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee
was charged in a RICO indictment with various predicate acts including mail fraud, ob-
struction ofjustice and extortion. The enterprise was the Sheriff's Department. An issue
arose as to whether one of the predicate acts had a sufficiently close nexus to the enter-
prise. This act was an extortion scheme in which the Sheriff, an extremely influential local
politician, offered to influence a zoning decision in exchange for money. The defense
argued that this scheme was unrelated to the Sheriff's Department. The district court
rejected this argument and, following Webster II, held that the "Sheriff's Department was
... regularly made available to and put in the service of the alleged illegal activity." Id. at
849. This decision was based upon the following: (1) The Sheriff received phone calls
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The author of the Nexus Note proposed a similar test, considering
"the extent to which the defendant utilizes the organizational structure or
infrastructure of the alleged enterprise ... -60 According to the author,
"utilization requires that the enterprise be more than a context for crim-
inal activity. To be 'utilized' the enterprise must be a 'weapon' of the
racketeer; it must enhance the ability to commit the crime." 6 1 Under
this test, one would look at various characteristics of utilization. 6 2 This
utilization test appears to be more narrow than that of Carter or Webster.
A problem with the utilization test, as espoused in Carter and Webster
11, is that the courts find utilization based solely on use of physical facili-
ties. If utilization of physical facilities alone is sufficient under the test,
then Carter and Webster cannot be distinguished from United States v. Den-
nis. 63 Collecting loans on the premises of General Motors (Dennis) is
arguably no different from conducting drug deals at a restaurant (Web-
ster) or smuggling drugs using a landing strip and the employees of a
dairy farm (Carter).
The problem with Carter, Webster, Thomas and Dennis may be that the
defendants did not conduct the affairs of those enterprises through a
pattern of racketeering activity. They simply utilized the facilities of the
enterprise.64 In contrast, the author of the Nexus Note would require
more than use of physical facilities. 65 The author defines utilization to
require that the enterprise be used as a weapon.6 6 This ignores many
about the matter at his office; (2) The Sheriff's secretary was instructed to set up a meet-
ing regarding the matter; (3) Meetings regarding the matter regularly took place at the
Sheriff's office; (4) A co-defendant in the scheme was seen leaving the Sheriff's office with
the Sheriff and another Sheriff's Department employee; (5) A Sheriff's Department em-
ployee drove the codefendant to a meeting which the codefendant had with the victim of
the extortion; (6) The Sheriff used Sheriff's Department stationery to send letters regard-
ing the matter. Id. at 848 n.2.
The author of this Article was one of the prosecutors of the Thomas case while an
Assistant United States Attorney.
60. Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 591 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. (footnote omitted).
62. Id. The other indicia mentioned by the author are:
(1) Whether the type of criminal activity in question requires or is generally asso-
ciated with an enterprise ... ; (2) the defendant's position in the enterprise and
the extent to which it furthered the racketeering activity ... ; (3) the extent to
which the enterprise served to complicate detection...; (4) the scope and gravity
of the offenses; (5) use of physical facilities of the enterprise.
Id. at 591-95.
63. 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). See supra text accompanying note 36.
64. Professor Robert Blakey has suggested that all of these facilities, including the
General Motors plant in Dennis, are proper RICO enterprises if they serve as "fronts" for
the illegal activity. Telephone interview with G. Robert Blakey, William J. and Dorothy
O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Mar. 5, 1992).
Barry Tarlow has suggested that the restaurant in Webster was a "front" because it
was not a profit making operation. Tarlow argues that there should be little question that
the enterprise's affairs are connected to the racketeering when "the racketeering occurs on
enterprise property as a part of the plan under which the enterprise is merely a 'front' for
the racketeering." He argues that analyzing whether the enterprise is a "front" would be
more useful than determining utilization of facilities and employees. Tarlow, RICO Revis-
ited, supra note 6, at 375. Of course, the problem then becomes ascertaining whether the
enterprise is a front.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 591.
[Vol. 70:1
NEXUS
other roles which the enterprise might play, such as the enterprise as a
victim.
6 7
D. The Manage or Operate Test
1. The Manage or Operate Test Before Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639
The Fourth Circuit was the first court to impose a manage or oper-
ate test. In United States v. Mandel,68 the government charged the de-
fendants with conducting the affairs of an investment company through
a pattern of racketeering activity. A co-defendant transferred a partner-
ship interest in the company to Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland in
exchange for his support of racing legislation. The Fourth Circuit held
that Mandel did not participate in the conduct of the enterprise because
Mandel acquired only a passive interest and did not manage or operate
the enterprise. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that
the "conduct or participate" language of § 1962(c) required some in-
volvement in the management or operation of the enterprise. 69 One
might question whether Mandel remains valid after Webster 11.70 In Web-
ster I, where the court required that the activity benefit the enterprise,
the court observed that "the Mandel panel opinion is not binding upon
us," presumably because the opinion had been vacated.7 1 When the
Fourth Circuit applied Webster II, it rejected both the Mandel and Webster
I standards.
The Eighth Circuit, in Bennett v. Berg,72 was the second court to
adopt a manage or operate test. The Bennett court said in dicta that "[a]
defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO
enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participation in the opera-
tion or management of the enterprise itself."
7 3
67. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 774 n.4, which states:. "The role of the enterprise
varies in each case depending upon its role in the underlying crimes. Often, the enterprise
is a perpetrator of illicit conduct. However, the enterprise may be a prize targeted for
takeover, a victim of racketeering activity, or an instrumentality facilitating the commission
of crimes."
See also O'Neill, supra note 6, at 675. O'Neill uses the case of Sun Say. & Loan v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987), as an example of the enterprise as victim.
Dierdorff was president of Sun Savings from 1980 to 1984. During that time, he solicited
and received kickbacks from of Sun's several larger customers. Using a fictitious name,
Dierdorff deposited upwards of $200,000 of kickback proceeds into his own account.
Through a series of phony letters, Dierdorff was able to conceal his activity from other Sun
officials for several years. He was fired upon exposure of the scheme. In its complaint,
Sun Savings alleged that Dierdorff violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting the affairs
of the savings and loan through a pattern of mail fraud thus benefitting himself to the
detriment of the company.
68. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, vacated on other grounds by an equally divided
court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) petition for rehearing denied (en banc) 609
F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 959, 961 (1980).
69. Id. at 1375-76.
70. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981). See discussion of Webster II, supra note 55 and ac-
companying text.
71. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 1981).
72. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
73. Id. at 1364. In Bennett, the plaintiffs were present and former residents of a retire-
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The Eighth Circuit cited Mandel for this proposition even though
the Fourth Circuit had already abandoned the manage or operate test in
Webster 1.74 Moreover, on remand the district court in Bennett v. Berg
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based on the fact that they had
not managed or operated the enterprise. The district court held that
"conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of the en-
terprise's affairs could not be limited to operation or management."175
In a later criminal case, the Eighth Circuit adopted the Cauble stan-
dard and did not even mention Bennett v. Berg.7 6 Courts deciding later
civil RICO cases in the circuit have used the Bennett v. Berg manage or
operate test. The panel in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves commented on the
split in the circuits, but stated that it was bound to follow Eighth Circuit
precedent set by Bennett v. Berg.7 7 No other circuit court subscribed to
the manage or operate test from the time of the 1983 decision in Bennett
v. Berg until the 1990 en banc opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit
in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639.78
2. The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.79 Case
Before Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., no other court had analyzed the nexus
tests and articulated the manage or operate test. Bennett v. Berg only
mentioned the manage or operate test in dicta80 but did not analyze it.
ment community. They brought suit against the not-for-profit corporation, Berg, the
founder of the retirement community, various other corporations founded by Berg, a life
insurance company, a mortgage lender to the community, the community's former ac-
countants, two attorneys formerly employed by the various defendants, and certain officers
and directors of various defendant not-for-profit organizations. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants defrauded them so that plaintiffs faced the loss of the "life care" which they
expected to receive and for which they had paid. Id. at 1363.
74. Id See also supra text accompanying note 71.
75. The district court judge stated:
I am unpersuaded. I do not believe the words 'conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs' can reasonably be limited to
the sort of'hands-on-management' of daily activities which Prudential and SG&M
suggest. I find no case authority supporting such a proposition; and to require
that degree of involvement would both seem counter to the broad Congressional
directive that '[t]he provisions of RICO shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes,' . .. and incompatible with the express language of the
statute, which provides that such conduct or participation in the affairs of the
enterprise may be accomplished 'directly or indirectly.' Unfortunately, neither
the Eighth Circuit nor any other court which has focused separately on this lan-
guage has undertaken to furnish any clear guidelines in the matter; but if this
wording must be viewed in isolation from the remainder of the statutory language
which follows, as the Eighth Circuit's en banc observation might seem to suggest,
it seems to me no more can logically be required than that the defendant be in-
volved in activities which constitutes some meaningful aspect of the operation or
management of the affairs of the enterprise.
Bennett v. Berg, No. 80-0281-CV-W, 1984 WL 2756 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 1984) (quoting
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947).
76. United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937
(1986).
77. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub
nom, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
78. 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Bennett, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
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The D.C. Circuit's articulation of the test, thus, accorded importance to
the manage or operate test. Because Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. is the only case
to enunciate an underlying rationale for the test, this part of the Article
analyzes that rationale.
In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., a bus company sued a union for allegedly
committing racketeering acts in the course of engaging in a recognition
strike. The company alleged that the union participated in the conduct
of the affairs of the bus company through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. The panel in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. upheld the RICO complaint and
"decline[d] to adopt a more restrictive standard than that enunciated in
Cauble and Scotto. '"8 1 The panel opinion stated that "[s]ection 1962(c) of
RICO refers to direct as well as indirect participation in the enterprise's
affairs, and imposes no requirement that participation be at the manage-
ment level or relate to 'core functions'."' 2
The District of Columbia Circuit Court reversed the panel.83 The
en banc court framed the issue as "[d]oes a union merely by conducting
a recognition strike against an employer 'conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly in the conduct of' the employer's affairs within the meaning
of 1962(c)?" 8 4 The court held that it did not and adopted a manage-
ment or operation test which is even narrower than that prescribed in
Bennett v. Berg.
The court first discussed some of the nexus tests. It rejected the
Scotto-Provenzano test as "far too lenient," because "[i]f section 1962(c)
can apply whenever predicate offenses are merely related to the activities
of an enterprise, then the 'participation in the conduct' element of that
section practically drops out." 85 Next it discussed, but did not criticize,
the Cauble test,86 and did not mention the Carter utilization test. The
court then stated that it was adopting the Bennett operation and manage-
ment test.
8 7
The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court observed that RICO does not pro-
scribe mere participation in the affairs of an enterprise, but rather par-
ticipation in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs. 88 It then stated that
"conduct" is synonymous with "management" or "direction" according
to Webster's Third New International Dictionary.8 9
The 'conduct of [the enterprise's] affairs' thus connotes more
than just some relationship to the enterprise's activity; the
phrase refers to the gifidance, management, direction or other
exercise of control over the course of the enterprise's activities.
81. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883
F.2d 132, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'den banc, 913 F2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 949.
85. Id. at 952 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 953.
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In order to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs,
then, a person must participate, to some extent, in 'running the
show.' 90
The court asserted that this interpretation was faithful to RICO's goals
because RICO's purpose is to eliminate "the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
state commerce." 9 1 Since the union did not conduct or participate in
the conduct of the bus line's affairs, it did not exercise control over the
management or operation of the bus company.
92
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. created a more stringent test than
the one articulated in Bennett because one must exercise "control over
the management or operation of the enterprise."'9 3 Under Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc., one not only has to participate in the management or opera-
tion of the enterprise but also have "control over the management or
operation.
' '9 4
3. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves
95
The Supreme Court has chosen to resolve the nexus issue with Ar-
thur Young & Co. v. Reves. This was a class action suit by shareholders in
the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. and other
owners of demand notes issued by the co-op. The co-op had a board of
directors comprised of farmers who were shareholders and a general
manager appointed by the board actually managed the co-op. The co-
op raised money by selling promissory notes.
9 6
Beginning in 1980, the general manager of the co-op, Jack White,
obtained loans from the co-op to finance the continued construction and
operating costs of a gasohol plant in which he had a substantial invest-
ment. White participated in certain activities with the co-op, which led
to the co-op's ownership of that gasohol plant and White's being re-
lieved of over $4 million of debt to the co-op. 97 In early 1981, White
was convicted of tax fraud in a scheme which included allegations that
he engaged in a course of self-dealing with the co-op and manipulated
the co-op's finances to serve his own personal ends.9 8
After his conviction, but while he was out on bond awaiting the out-
come of his appeal, White hired the firm of Arthur Young and Company
to serve as the co-op's accountants. 99 Over a period of years, Arthur
Young and Company's accountants used accounting practices that re-
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), reprinted in 1970
U.S.S.C.A.N. 4007).
92. Id. at 956.
93. Id. at 954.
94. Id.
95. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub
nom, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1316.
98. Id. at 1316 n.3.
99. Id. at 1316 n.4.
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sulted in the overvaluation of the gasohol plant and projected a false
financial picture of the co-op. 100 When the gasohol plant ultimately
became insolvent, the co-op's true financial position was revealed and
the co-op was forced into bankruptcy. 10 1
The plaintiffs primarily alleged that Arthur Young and Company
induced buyers to purchase demand notes through the concealment of
the co-op's financial position in violation of both federal and state secur-
ities laws. They also alleged that Arthur Young and Company was a
material participant in the operation and management of the co-op in
violation of RICO. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants and dismissed the RICO claim. At trial of the remaining
issues, the jury found that Arthur Young and Company committed both
state and federal securities fraud.102
Before the Eighth Circuit, the class argued that the district court
had improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young
and Company on its RICO claim.10 3 The panel relied on Bennett v. Berg
and applied the manage or operate test to conclude that:
Arthur Young's involvement with the Co-op was limited to the
audits, meetings with the Board of Directors to explain the au-
dits, and presentations at the annual meetings. In the course of
this involvement it is clear that Arthur Young committed a
number of reprehensible acts, but these acts in no way rise to
the level of participation in the management or operation of
the Co-op. 104
The class urged the Eighth Circuit to follow the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross &
Co. 10 5 In that case, the court had stated that "[i]t is not necessary that a
RICO defendant participate in the management or operation of the en-
terprise."'1 6 Acknowledging the split in the circuit courts on this issue
and citing Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., the court in Arthur Young & Co. concluded
that "until the Supreme Court rejects our standard or this court en banc
overrules Bennett, we are bound to follow that decision."
1 0 7
100. Id. at 1316-20. The accountants knew that if the plant were to be valued at less
than 1.5 million dollars, the co-op's net worth would be eliminated, thus provoking a run
on the demand notes and depriving the co-op of its primary source of funds.
101. Id. at 1320-21.
102. Id at 1321-22.
103. Id. at 1323.
104. Id. at 1324.
105. 782 F.2d 966 (l1th Cir. 1986). In Touche Ross, five banks which provided financing
for a bankrupt corporation sued the accountants who prepared the financial statements of
the corporation. The district court dismissed the RICO claim and the Eleventh Circuit
reinstated it. The circuit court stated that the "statute requires only that the defendant
'participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs'...." The
circuit court further stated: "The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to
insiders and outsiders - those merely 'associated with' an enterprise - who participate
directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
.. . The RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally
involved." Id. (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
106. 782 F.2d at 970.
107. Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
PART III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGE OR OPERATE TEST
The traditional sources of statutory interpretation are text, struc-
ture, purpose, congressional intent and legislative history. 10 8 The
Supreme Court has traditionally seen itself as an agent of the legislature,
responsible for implementing the original intent or purpose of the en-
acting Congress. According to this view, the judicial task is to ascertain
and apply judgments of the legislature. 10 9 When the Court undertakes
traditional analysis, "legislative history is usually relevant, either to sup-
ply the meaning for an ambiguous statute or to confirm or rebut the
plain meaning of a clear statute."1 10 This part of the Article analyzes
the traditional sources of statutory interpretation-language, structure,
and history-and finds no basis in the statute for the manage or operate
test.
Neither the Arthur Young & Co."i court nor the court in Bennett v.
Berg, 1 2 upon which the Arthur Young & Co. court relied, articulated a
rationale for the manage or operate test. The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court is the only court to have done so.'" 3 This Article will, there-
fore, criticize the test as enunciated in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.
A. The Test is Textually Incorrect.
"Textual analysis starts with the specific words of the statutory pro-
vision being interpreted. The interpreter should appoach the statutory
text as a reasonably intelligent reader would and give the text its most
commonsensical reading."
' 14
1. The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. definition of terms is too narrow.
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. construed the word "conduct" in
the statute to be synonymous with the words "management" or "direc-
tion," citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 1 15 Because
it found the words synonymous, the District of Columbia's circuit court
concluded that the conduct of the enterprise's affairs "refers to the gui-
dance, management, direction or other exercise of control over the
course of the enterprise's activities," and equated this with "running the
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
411 (1989). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutoy Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 20 (1988); Nicholas S. Zeppos,Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. LJ.
353 (1989).
109. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 415. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textual-
ism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (1990).
110. Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626; see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,
604 (1986).
111. 937 F.2d 1310.
112. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
113. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
114. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354-55 (1990); see also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).




The court's definition is flawed for two reasons. First, it incorrectly
limits the possible definitions to manage and direct. The Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary includes the meaning, "[t]o direct, manage, carry on (a
transaction, process, business, institution, legal case, etc.)," but adds:
"[t]he notion of direction or leadership is often obscured or lost; e.g. an
investigation is conducted by all those who take part in it.' 1 17 Webster's
Dictionary of Synonyms states:
conduct may imply the act of an agent who is both the leader
and the person responsible for the acts and achievements of a
group having a common end or goal.., but often the idea of
leadership is lost or obscured, and the stress is placed on a car-
rying on by all or by many of the participants .... I18
Finally, Black's Law Dictionary defines the verb conduct as "[t]o man-
age; direct; lead; have direction; carry on; regulate; do business." '1 19
The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. decision ignores the equally, if not more,
valid connotation of the word conduct as "carrying on." That Congress
intended this is reinforced because the statute says "conduct or partici-
pate ... [in] the conduct of an enterprise," 120 not merely "conduct an
enterprise."
This raises the second problem with the court's definitional inter-
pretation. It ignores the "participate in the conduct of" language. Why
did Congress add the "participate in the conduct" 12 1 language and what
does it mean? This language bolsters the idea of "carrying on by all or
by many of the participants."' 2 2 Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines participate as "to take part in something ... in com-
mon with others."' 123 In Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, the syno-
nyms for participate are share and partake.' 24 Black's Law Dictionary
defines participate as:
To receive or have a part or share of; to partake of; experience
in common with others; to have or enjoy a part or share in com-
mon with others. To partake, as to 'participate' in a discussion,
or in a pension or profit sharing plan. To take equal shares and
proportions; to share or divide, as to participate in an estate.
To take as tenants in common. 125
This language reinforces the notion that Congress intended these terms
to mean a "common undertaking," or in other words, "to take part in
carrying on the business in common with others," not merely to manage
or operate.
116. Id.
117. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis in original).
118. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 184 (1942) (emphasis added).
119. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 295 (6th ed. 1990).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
121. Id
122. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989).
123. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1646 (1986).
124. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 607 (1942).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1118 (6th ed. 1990).
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The court's interpretation of the statute also excludes the words
"directly or indirectly" which appear in all three subsections of
§ 1962.126 One cannot control the operation of an enterprise or "run
the show" indirectly, nor can one indirectly direct, guide or manage.'
27
Yet, that is what Congress expressly stated in all three subsections of
§ 1962. The use of the words "directly or indirectly" additionally dem-
onstrates that Congress did not intend a manage or operate limitation in
the statute.
In short, "conduct and participate" are words of ordinary meaning.
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. illustrates what Professor Gerard E. Lynch refers to,
in a closely related context as "twist[ing] a rather basic... concept into
elaborate knots in order to find.., lack of pattern in civil [RICO] suits
to which the courts are hostile."
1 28
2. The structure of RICO does not support the manage or
operate test.
In Russello v. United States, 129 the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[C]ongress selected th[e] general term, [interest], appar-
ently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute
in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth."' 3 0 Other terms of breadth
that the Russello Court referred to were "enterprise," "racketeering" and
"participate."' 3 1 "Conduct"' 3 2 is also a term of breadth. When Con-
gress placed the two words, conduct and participate together, as it did in
§ 1962(c), Congress must have intended the terms to be construed
broadly. Similarly, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 33 the Court declared
that "RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson ... of Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach.... 134
Moreover, Congress inserted more restrictive language in other
parts of the statute, thus indicating that it intentionally employed broad
language in § 1962(c). Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful to use or in-
vest income derived from racketeering activity "in acquisition of any in-
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). § 1962(a) makes it "unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income.... in acquisition... of any enterprise." See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)
(1988) (it is unlawful to acquire or maintain, "directly or indirectly," any interest in, or
control over, an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity). Id. § 1962(c) states
that "[iut shall be unlawful ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the con-
duct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."
127. The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court said that its construction of the statute allows for
indirect as well as direct participation, but the court failed to explain how one could con-
trol an enterprise indirectly. 913 F.2d at 954.
128. Lynch, supra note 14 at 772 n.8.
129. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
130. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 21-22. The terms appear in the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1988) (enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c) (1988) (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)
(participate).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
133. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
134. Id. at 497-98.
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terest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise....
This section also states that a "purchase of securities on the open mar-
ket for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling
or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do
so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection .... "1 36 Congress obvi-
ously knew that use of "control or participate ... in the control of"'3 7
was more restrictive than "conduct or participate in the conduct of."' 3 8
If Congress had wished to impose the same limitation on § 1962(c), it
could have done so.13 9 "When Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another... [the Court] gener-
ally presume[s] that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion."'
40
The word "control" is also included in § 1962(b), which states that
it is unlawful to "acquire or maintain directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise . . . through a pattern of racketeering
activity."' 14 1 Congress presumably knew what it was doing when it in-
cluded narrow terms in one part of the statute and more general terms
in another. If Congress had intended for manage or control to be a part
of § 1962(c), it could have added the term because it did so in
§§ 1962(a) and (b).
14 2
3. Consideration of the use of the same term in other provisions
of the same enactment does not support the manage or
operate test.
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1955, like RICO, as part of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970.14 3 Section 1955(a) provides:
"Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all
or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 144 This lan-
guage raises two issues. First, why did Congress include conducts, man-
age and supervise in § 1955 and only conduct in § 1962(c)? It cannot
possibly mean, as the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court states, that conduct
means only manage or direct. If conduct means only manage or direct,
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
136. l
137. L
138. Id § 1962(c).
139. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981).
140. Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722
(5th Cir. 1972)). See also HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
142. In 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute), Congress in-
tended only to reach managers and it specifically indicated so by stating "a person is en-
gaged in continuing criminal enterprise if . . . such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management"; see, e.g., Garrett
v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985) ("This language is designed to reach the 'top
brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers.").
143. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).
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Congress would not have needed to add those words to the statute in
§ 1955. According to that interpretation, the word conduct would have
been sufficient.
Common sense and common usage suggest that conduct be con-
strued as the more general term and manage, supervise and direct as
more specific terms within the general meaning of conduct. This is also
consistent with the dictionary definition. Moreover, Congress was ap-
parently aware of the meaning of the words manage, direct and super-
vise as it added them to § 1955, which is included as part of the same
Act. One must assume that Congress would have employed manage,
operate or direct in § 1962(c) if it had intended to so narrow the reach
of that provision. The Supreme Court has said that it should not lightly
infer that Congress intended a term to have wholly different meanings in
"neighboring" provisions passed simultaneously.1 4 5
Second, how have courts interpreted § 1955? If conduct is synony-
mous with manage and direct as the court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. sug-
gests, courts should find that conduct is superfluous in § 1955 and that
the provision requires one to manage or direct the gambling operation.
That has not happened. In fact, no court has imposed such a require-
ment. The United States Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that "18
U.S.C. § 1955 (1976 ed.) proscribes any degree of participation in an
illegal gambling business, except participation as a mere bettor."' 14 6 In
United States v. Zannino, 147 the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[t]he term 'conduct' embraces all who participate in the opera-
tion of the specified gambling business, that is, each and every
person who performs any act, function, or duty necessary or
helpful in the business' ordinary operation. As we read it, the
statute of conviction applies even to individuals who have no
role in managing or controlling the business and who do not
share in its profits.'
48
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Greco, 14 9 ob-
served that "[t]he word 'conduct' is broad in scope... [A] person may
be found to conduct a gambling business even though he is a mere ser-
vant or employee having no part in the management or control of the
business.. . ."150 In short, the construction of § 1955 has generated
little controversy.' 5 ' All courts agree that the term conduct is broader
than the terms manage or direct.
B. RICO's Legislative History Does Not Support the Manage or Operate Test
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. justified its narrow reading of the
145. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
146. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70-71 n.26 (1978).
147. 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 10.
149. 619 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1978)).
151. See generally G. Robert Blakey and Harold Kurland, The Development of the Federal
Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 923 (1978).
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statute by invoking the statute's goals and quoting a section of legisla-
tive history out of context. The court quoted *the Senate Report for the
proposition that "[t]he purpose of RICO is to eliminate 'the infiltration
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations oper-
ating in interstate commerce.'. .. [It] was passed in order to attack 'the
use of force, threats of force, enforcement of illegal debts, and corrup-
tion in the acquisition or operation of business."' 5 2 This portion of the legis-
lative history, however, explains the need for civil remedies; it was not
commenting on the intended coverage of § 1962(c). In fact, the legisla-
tive history supports no such narrow purpose of the statute, but clearly
states that § 1962(c) has a broad scope:
Unlike subsection (a), which provides an exception to the pro-
hibition against investing funds derived from racketeering ac-
tivity into an enterprise 'where there is no resulting control in
law or in fact to the investor,' subsection (c) applies to any 'con-
duct of the enterprise through the prohibited pattern'; 'there is
no limitation on the prohibition." 53
Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that RICO can
only reach the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legit-
imate organizations in United States v. Turkette,154 thus rejecting the limi-
tation on the statute's purpose which the District of Columbia Circuit
Court imposed. The defendant in Turkette argued that RICO was in-
tended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration
by racketeers and could not reach wholly illegitimate enterprises which
performed only illegal acts and which did not attempt to infiltrate legiti-
mate business.' 55
The Court rejected this limitation on RICO. First, it found that
nothing in the text of the statute supported such a restriction. The
Court also stated that the legislative history's support of the view that
RICO's major purpose was to address the infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness by organized crime does not support a negative inference that the
statute cannot reach others.' 56
The Supreme Court, in Russello v. United States, 157 observed that
RICO's legislative history evinces a broad Congressional intent. The
Court emphasized the sweeping language of the legislative history,
which states that the intent of RICO was to "provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its eco-
nomic roots."1 58 The Court stated:
152. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 954 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Sess. 76, 81
(1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
153. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 17 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 159 (1969)) (reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 4007) (emphasis in original).
154. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). But see HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (prologue of the statute describes a relatively narrow
focus upon organized crime).
155. Turhette, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
156. Id. at 591.
157. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
158. Id. at 26 (1983).
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What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not
only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be
made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack
must take place on all available fronts.159
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Court refused to
read an organized crime limitation into the statute 160 and stated that
such a limitation finds no support in the text and contravenes the tenor
of the legislative history. The opinion continues by stating that the leg-
islative history demonstrates that Congress intentionally adopted "com-
modious language capable of extending beyond organized crime."
16 1
The Court again invoked the legislative history for the idea that "[t]he
occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organ-
ized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more gen-
eral statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was
not limited in application to organized crime."1 62 The Court quoted
the legislative history: "It is impossible to draw an effective statute
which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet
does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside or-
ganized crime as well." 16 3 In sum, the legislative history does not sup-
port the narrow interpretation of the statute's terms by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court.
Some language in the legislative history of analogous provisions of
the same act supports the conclusion that Congress intended the word
"conduct" to be construed broadly. 18 U.S.C. § 1511,164 includes the
same conduct, manage, direct, or supervise language as does § 1955.165
The House Report on § 1511 states that Congress intended the statute
to reach both "high level bosses and street level employees."'1 6 6 This
language suggests that the word conduct was meant to reach "street
level employees" as well as "high level bosses." It certainly lends no
support to, and directly contravenes, a construction of the word "con-
duct" which would limit it to manage, operate or direct.
159. Id. at 27 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
160. 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring).
161. Id. at 246.
162. Id. at 248.
163. Id. (quoting Senator McClellan, the bill's principal sponsor).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988) states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the en-
forcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the
intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if...
(3) one or more of such persons conducts[,] finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.
165. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.




PART IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MANAGE OR OPERATE TEST
Adoption of the "manage or operate" test would eviscerate the
RICO statute. If the Supreme Court were to adopt the manage or oper-
ate test, it would have severe consequences for prosecutors of criminal
RICO cases and plaintiffs pursuing civil RICO.
A. The Implications for Criminal RICO
Under the manage or operate test, the Justice Department could
only prosecute persons in charge of enterprises. Consider, for example,
the "Club" case in the Southern District of New York.1 6 7 The Justice
Department prosecuted members of organized crime and their associ-
ates for racketeering acts involving, as the enterprise, the Genovese
crime family. Leaders of the family, the "foot soldiers" in the family and
even some nonfamily associates were prosecuted for their participation
in carrying out the business of the Genovese family. Under the manage
or operate test, only the heads of the family could be prosecuted. The
manage or operate test would exclude enforcers and others who carry
out the directives of those above them in the hierarchy.
An example in the public corruption context is the RICO prosecu-
tion of the sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee.168 In this case, there were
seven RICO defendants, including the sheriff and several of his depu-
ties. They all participated in the racketeering activity, but not all had
management positions within the Sheriff's Department, the enterprise
named in the indictment. In fact, some of the deputies were employees,
who were intimately involved in the racketeering activity but not highly
placed in the Sheriff's Department. Application of the manage or oper-
ate test means that only the sheriff could have been prosecuted for these
crimes. Such a result would be incompatible with the goal of RICO,
which is to pursue enterprise criminality in all its forms.1 69 As the Jus-
tice Department propounded in its amicus brief in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.,
senior management can yield significant profits to wrongdoers and
thwart the attainment of the enterprise's legitimate goals. 170 No court,
since the Fourth Circuit in Mandel,17 1 has applied the "manage or oper-
ate" test in a criminal context. In fact, the Eighth Circuit, the circuit that
first articulated the manage or operate test in a civil RICO case, em-
ployed a different standard, the Cauble standard, 17 2 in a later criminal
case. 173
167. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 931
(1992).
168. United States v. Thomas, 749 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
169. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984) (quoting Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6, at 1013-14).
170. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
171. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, vacated on other grounds by an equally divided
court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) petition for rehearing, denied (en banc),
609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 959, 961 (1980).
172. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
173. United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937
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In Arthur Young & Co., 174 the United States Supreme Court must
decide the meaning of nexus as applied to a civil case. Its decision, how-
ever, will govern the interpretation of the term in the criminal context as
well. Courts have imposed many of the limitations on RICO in the civil
context. Moreover, many observers believe that there is more judicial
hostility to civil RICO than to criminal RICO. 175 The Justice Depart-
ment uses civil RICO far less often than criminal RICO. It has stringent
guidelines for invoking criminal RICO, which operate as a kind of
"watchdog" against abuses of criminal RICO.17 6 That watchdog provi-
sion does not exist in civil RICO. 17 7 The Department of justice's con-
cern is that the Supreme Court will interpret RICO in ways which would
detrimentally affect both criminal and civil RICO.
178
The statute's text and legislative history offer no basis for treating
any of its terms differently in civil RICO than in criminal RICO and,
thus, interpretations of provisions of the statute apply to both criminal
(1986). But see, Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (D.C. Circuit followed Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. in a subsequent civil case).
174. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112
S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
175. See, e.g., Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil
RICO Cases Does Not Work." It's Time For Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1990):
My RICO perspective comes from my years as a federal district court judge in
Chicago .... As I dealt with these cases, it became clear to me that most civil
RICO cases simply should not be in federal court. The majority of civil RICO
cases involve commonplace commercial controversies, the facts of which reveal
an ordinary business relationship gone sour.
l at 674. "RICO has also come under fire recently from judges in and out of the court-
room. ChiefJustice Rehnquist was reportedly concerned about the number of RICO cases
on the federal docket." Coffey, supra note 18, at 1037.
176. See Coffey, supra note 18 at 1043; Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of
the Department ofJustice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 654 (1990).
177. H.R. REP. No. 1717, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), introduced by Rep. WilliamJ.
Hughes of New Jersey and currently pending in the House of Representatives, includes a
judicial gatekeeper provision:
(3) The court shall dismiss a claim against a defendant under this subsection if, at
any time before trial, upon motion of the defendant or on the court's own mo-
tion, the court determines after a hearing that the claim finds to meet the require-
ments of the final 3 sentences of paragraph (1) of this subsection, or the plaintiff
has failed to show that this extraordinary civil remedy is in the public interest and
is needed to deter egregious criminal conduct, considering any need to deter the
defendant and others similarly situated.
Id.; See also Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper
Concept, 43 VAND. L. REv. 735 (1990) (reviewing various gatekeeper proposals). Goldsmith
and Linderman suggest standards for a gatekeeper provision, proposing the following
statutory language:
In determining whether to permit a civil RICO claim to proceed, the court must
find that the allegations concern long-term criminal activity, or the threat thereof,
which pose a serious threat to society. Factors to consider in this respect include:
(i) the duration of the criminal activity and the degree to which each predi-
cate act inflicted independent injury;
(ii) the extent of economic loss and the number of victims;
(iii) whether the defendant held a position of special trust or committed
crimes against especially vulnerable victims; and
(iv) whether the allegations concern merely an ordinary commercial dispute.
The decision of the court must be accompanied by a statement of reasons reflect-
ing the application of these factors.
Id. at 766.
178. Dennis, supra note 176, at 656.
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and civil RICO. A court must remember that when it decides a case in a
civil RICO context, the ruling has important implications for criminal
RICO as well. Adoption of the manage or operate nexus test would
undermine criminal RICO.
B. The Manage or Operate Test Would Severely Frustrate Efforts in the
Criminal and Civil Arenas to Combat "Economic Crime."
If the United States Supreme Court adopts the manage or operate
test, who would be excluded? In Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves 179 the ac-
countants would be excluded. The "hue and cry" over RICO started
when it was applied in the white collar context. There has been little
complaint about 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The same language has been con-
strued for years to include everyone affiliated with the gambling busi-
ness, even cocktail waitresses who serve the gamblers drinks.18 0 The
controversy over RICO has focused almost entirely on its application to
white collar crime and to persons who are involved in white collar
crime. 181
The economic crime problem in this country has reached epidemic
proportions.' 82 The savings and loan scandal, particularly the collapse
of the Charles Keating empire, exemplifies the magnitude of the prob-
lem. At least one-half of bank failures and one-quarter of thrift failures
involve criminal activity by insiders. 18 3 In the savings and loan crisis,
the government is bringing criminal RICO suits and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) are using civil RICO.1 84 The enormity of the economic crime
problem is further evidenced by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), the consequences of which remain un-
known. Federal prosecutors and private parties have already filed RICO
suits based on the collapse of BCCI. 18 5
179. 937 F.2d 1310.
180. See United States v. Tucker, 638 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981).
181. See Crovitz, supra note 17. Mr. Crovitz, an editor of the Wall Street Journal is well
known for his opposition to RICO's use against Wall Street. See also G. Robert Blakey et
al., What's Next?: The Future of RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (1990) (a debate be-
tween Mr. Crovitz and Professor Blakey, RICO's principal drafter).
182. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 882-86; see also, Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Miscon-
duct in Financial Institutions: A Crisis? Renae v. Stevens, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222 (1989).
183. H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13 (1988), cited in Brief of Trial Law-
yers for PublicJustice as Amicus Curiae, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
184. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 885.
185. Federal prosecutors indicted BCCI, as a corporation, on RICO charges in district
court in the District of Columbia. A plea agreement has been reached in the case in which
all BCCI assets in the United States are to be forfeited. Half of the forfeited assets will be
sent to an overseas fund to repay creditors and half will be distributed here to government
entities and to victims. See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., DC, Crim.
No. 91-0655 (JHG), plea approved Jan. 1, 1992 (reported in Federal Judge Approves BCCI
Settlement Over Objections of Other BCCI Creditors, 17 BNA, Daily Report for Executives A-8,
Jan. 27, 1992). The plea agreement does not preclude the government from prosecuting
individuals who may have been involved in the scandal. A civil RICO class action suit
arising out of the BCCI collapse has been filed in Los Angeles. Among the defendants are
the accounting firms of Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young. See Victoria Slind-Flor,
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Some observers have tried to frame the issue as one of whether
RICO was intended to reach those who are peripherally involved in the
enterprise.' 8 6 They characterize accountants, lawyers and investment
bankers as only peripherally involved when the enterprise is the com-
pany or organization that hired them.' 8 7 This characterization is false.
Professionals have played key roles in many of the savings and loan fail-
ures.18 8 Accountants, lawyers or bankers may be so involved in shaping
the course of the business of the enterprise that they are conducting or
participating in its conduct. Attorneys may shape the activities of their
clients through the rendering of legal advice, accountants through their
accounting services, and lenders through their financing.' 89
An accountant, lawyer or banker will rarely manage or control the
enterprise as the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. test' 90 would require. In fact, that
test would include only the top management of the enterprise. Con-
gress intended RICO to reach anyone who conducts or participates in
the conduct of the enterprise. This may or may not include accountants,
lawyers or bankers depending on the circumstances of the case. If RICO
includes "Mafia" foot soldiers who carry out a mob murder at the behest
of the "family boss," then it includes an accountant who, by preparing
false statements or by otherwise misrepresenting the financial status of a
company at the behest of the chief executive officer, conducts or partici-
pates in the conduct of the company.
Three accounting firms are implicated in the Charles Keating scan-
dal.' 9 1 Accounting groups have been very active in seeking to restrict
BCCI Suit: Far-Flung, Massive, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 20, 1992, at 1. In addition, the Banking
Department of the State of New York, filed a civil RICO suit seeking recovery of loans
from the New York agency of BCCI. See Zephas v. Zurich Corp., 91 Civ. 7907 (JSM), D.C.
S.N.Y., Nov. 22, 1991 (reported in N. Y. Banking Department Seeks Recovery of Loans from BCCI
in Receivership Case, 231 BNA, Daily Report for Executives A-2, Dec. 2, 1991).
186. See Edward Brodsky, RICO-Conflicting Views about Professionals, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 11,
1991, at 3 (discussing the Arthur Young & Co. case).
187. Id.
188. Two Firms Settle Lincoln S&L Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al (Ernst & Young
and Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue settle lawsuits arising out of failure of Lincoln Savings
and Loan); Donna K. H. Walters, New Liability Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants Scunying, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1; Yes-Men Professionals, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 16,
1992, at 20 (editorial) ("[S]urrounding Keating like a praetorian guard were phalanxes of
lawyers and accountants who assured both investors and regulators that their client's Lin-
coln Savings and Loan was sound.");James S. Granelli, Keating's Advisers Under Fire: Attor-
neys, Accountants Helped Massive Fraud Work Investors' Lawyers Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992,
at Dl.
189. See Stephen Labaton, Law Firm Will Pay A $41 Million Fine in Savings Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al. (On March 2, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision filed a
RICO civil suit against the New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handle
for its role in the collapse of Charles Keatings' Lincoln Savings Bank. On March 9, 1992,
the firm agreed to pay forty-one million dollars to settle the lawsuit); see alsoJolie Solomon,
U.S. Did In S&L Advisor By the Book, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 35 (stating the
public should be delighted that the government cracked down on Kaye and Scholer).
190. See supra notes 79-94, and accompanying text.
191. One of those implicated is Arthur Young & Co. (now Ernst & Young). See Allison
Leigh Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S & L Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1992, at AI (Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Ernst & Young settle Keating litigation). See
also Eric N. Berg, Losing $2 Billion-An Accounting Quagmire; The Lapses by Lincoln's Auditors,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, at Dl. Arthur Young & Co. gave Lincoln and American Conti-
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the scope of RICO.19 2 The efforts of the accounting profession to limit
its liability under RICO should be considered in light of the role which
accountants have played in the collapse of the savings and loan institu-
tions. There are compelling reasons to construe "conduct" to include
these white collar offenders in the reach of RICO.
PART V. AN ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT RICO JURISPRUDENCE
This part of the article will discuss the Supreme Court's prior RICO
jurisprudence, focusing on five cases in which it has interpreted the stat-
ute.' 9 3 This jurisprudence indicates that neither the text of the statute
nor its legislative history support the restrictive manage or operate test.
A. United States v. Turkette 1
94
Justice White, writing for the Court in Turkette, decided that RICO
covered both the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime
and completely illegitimate organizations. The defendant in Turkette ar-
gued that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business en-
terprises from infiltration by racketeers and did not cover those
enterprises that perform only illegal acts and make no attempt to infil-
trate legitimate businesses. 195
The opinion analyzes the statute by looking first at its language.
Early in the opinion, the Court hints at its views of the interplay between
that language and the legislative history. "If the statutory language is
unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-
nental unqualified audit opinions at the time that examiners have claimed that Lincoln was
insolvent. Based on the firm's report that the company's financial condition was accurately
represented, American sold more than $200 million ofjunk bonds to over 23,000 inves-
tors. This sounds almost identical to what the plaintiffs in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves are
alleging the company did. Following these sales, the Arthur Young partner who handled
Lincoln's account accepted a $930,000 position with Lincoln. Nathaniel C. Nash, Auditors
of Lincoln on the Spot, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 14, 1989, at D1, cited in RICO Myths, supra note 6, at
885 n.108. Similar collapses of Arthur Young clients have occurred in Texas. See Lee
Berton, Spotlight on Arthur Young is Likely to Intensify as Lincoln Hearings Resume, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 1989, at A20, cited in RICO Myths, supra, at 855. In fact, five of the top six account-
ing firms were banned from doing new work for savings and loans by the RTC because of
pending litigation for past faulty audits and dozens of impending civil suits. See RICO
Myths, supra note 6, at 894-95 n.137.
192. See Briefs of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amici Curiae,
HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
193. In addition to the five cases discussed here, the Supreme Court has also construed
RICO in Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); and Shearson Am. Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The first four cases analyzed in the text
most clearly elucidate the Court's method of statutory interpretation. This Article includes
the final case, Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Co., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992), because
it is the Court's most recent interpretation of RICO.
194. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
195. Id. at 579-80.
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sive.' ,196 In other words, the Court will first examine the language, but
legislative history can trump even unambiguous statutory language.
1 97
In Turkette, the Court initially found that nothing in the language limits
enterprises to legitimate ones. 198 It considered the statutory language
unambiguous saying that "[t]he language of the statute, however-the
most reliable evidence of its intent-reveals that Congress opted for a
far broader definition of the word 'enterprise' " than the defendant
suggested. 19 9
The Court then examined the legislative history concluding that the
statement of findings and purpose is broad and that nothing in the legis-
lative history supports a narrow reading of the term enterprise.
2 00 It
rejected the view that the statute was only intended to reach the infiltra-
tion of legitimate business by organized crime. "This is not to gainsay
that the legislative history forcefully supports the view that the major
purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime."' 20 1 But none of these statements requires the nega-
tive inference that Title IX does not reach others. 20 2 The Court in
Turkette found unambiguous language and unambiguous legislative his-
tory. It ultimately discerned a clear Congressional intent in the legisla-
tive history that the terms of RICO be construed broadly.
203
B. Russello v. United States
20 4
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Russello, followed the
same approach to statutory interpretation as the Turkette Court. Justice
Blackmun quoted the language in Turkette that interpretation starts with
the statute's language, but clearly expressed legislative history can
trump unambiguous statutory language.20 5 The Court stated that, if the
relevant term is not defined in the statute, this silence compels the as-
sumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary mean-
ing of the words used.20 6 It then consulted the dictionary for a
definition of the words "interest and profit," which were at issue in Rus-
sello. The Court concluded that "Congress selected th[e] general term
["interest"] apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of
196. Id. at 580. See also Eskridge, supra, note 109, at 626-30. (Eskridge refers to this as
"soft plain meaning").
197. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), discussed in Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626.
198. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
199. Id. at 593.
200. Id. at 588-89.
201. Id. at 591.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 593.
204. 464 U.S. 16 (1983). In Russello, a person convicted under RICO for arson-related
offenses challenged the forfeiture of the insurance proceeds he received from his arson
activities. Defendant argued that the term "interest" in § 1963(a)(1) should be limited to
an interest in the enterprise, not profits or proceeds. The Court rejected this argument.
205. Id. at 20. See also Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626.
206. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21.
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the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth. '20 7
Among the terms of breadth in the statute to which the Court referred
are "enterprise" in § 1961(4), "racketeering" in § 1961(1) and "partici-
pate" in § 1962(c).208 The Court decided Russello by considering the
language of the statute, looking first to the dictionary meaning of the
terms, then analyzing how the terms were used throughout the entire
statute.
The Court considered the legislative history in Russello but indicated
that it may be unnecessary to do so. It said "[i]f it is necessary to turn to
the legislative history... that history does not reveal.., a limited con-
gressional intent." 20 9 As in Turkette, the Court discovered in RICO's
legislative history a broad scope since RICO was intended to provide
''new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized
crime and its economic roots."
'2 10
C. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.
2 11
The Court in Sedima rejected a restrictive interpretation of
§ 1964(c) that would have required plaintiffs in a civil RICO action to
prove both that the defendant had already been convicted of a predicate
racketeering act of a RICO violation and a special racketeering injury.
212
Justice White, who wrote the Turkette opinion, also wrote the Sedima
opinion. The Court again looked first to the language of the statute,
then to the legislative history, concluding "the language of RICO gives
no obvious indication that a civil action can proceed only after a criminal
conviction." '213 It observed that when Congress intends, in other stat-
utes, for a defendant to have been previously convicted, it says so.
2 14
The Court also looked to neighboring subsections of the statute and
concluded that Congress would not have "intended the term to have
wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections." 215 As before,
the Court then analyzed the legislative history:
The history is otherwise silent on this point and contains noth-
ing to contradict the import of the language appearing in the
statute. Had Congress intended to impose this novel require-
ment, there would have been at least some mention of it in the
legislative history, even if not in the statute.
21 6
The Court referred to the general principles in the legislative history
and concluded that a "less restrictive reading is amply supported by our
prior cases and the general principles surrounding this statute. RICO is
207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id at 26.
210. Id at 26 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
211. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
212. Id at 481.
213. Id at 488.
214. Id. at 489 n.7.
215. Id. at 489.
216. Id at 490.
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to be read broadly. This is the lesson.., of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach .... 217
Sedima also includes language which clearly shows that Congress in-
tended RICO to combat white collar crime and that its language should
be broadly read to include those types of criminal defendants:
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the
'extraordinary, if not outrageous,' uses to which civil RICO has
been put. (citation ommitted). Instead of being used against
mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a tool for eve-
ryday fraud cases brought against 'respected and legitimate
'enterprises." (citation ommitted). Yet Congress wanted to
reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises. (citation
ommitted). The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The
fact that [RICO] is used against respected businesses allegedly
engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct
is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is
being misconstrued. Nor does it reveal the 'ambiguity' discov-
ered by the court below. '[T]he fact that RICO has been ap-
plied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.' (cita-
tion ommitted).2
18
D. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
2 19
In H.J. Inc., Justice Brennan writing for the Court, looked first to
language and then to legislative history. The difference in H.J. Inc. is
that the Court found the language itself to be less clear than in the other
cases. H.. Inc. concerned what may be the most problematic term in the
entire statute: "pattern of racketeering activity." Once again, the Court
first consulted the dictionary, and upon finding it insufficient, consid-
ered how Congress used the term in analogous provisions within the
same act.2 20 It examined the legislative history and developed the defi-
nition of pattern as "continuity plus relationship" from the legislative
history of another provision within the act.
2 2 1
Moreover, in H.J. Inc., the Court explicitly rejected an organized
crime limitation on RICO, finding such a limitation is without support in
the text and contravenes the tenor of the legislative history.2 22 The
Court invoked the legislative history to demonstrate that Congress in-
tentionally employed commodious language capable of reaching beyond
organized crime 2 23 by referring to comments made by opponents of
RICO, that criticized the statute for potentially extending beyond organ-
217. Id at 497-98.
218. Id. at 499.
219. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
220. Id. at 239.
221. Id. at 252 (relying on S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969)) (reprinted
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
222. Id. at 244.
223. Id. at 246.
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ized crime. 2 24 The Court concluded with an allusion to the legislative
history: "[tlhe occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to
combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to en-
act a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime
as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime."
22 5
Justice Scalia sharply criticized the majority's statutory analysis in
perhaps a concurring opinion.2 26 He called the term "pattern of racke-
teering activity" "enigmatic."' 22 7 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for
"[e]levating to the level of statutory text a phrase taken from the legisla-
tive history .... " 228 Again criticizing the majority for taking the defini-
tion from another provision in the same act and applying it to RICO, he
said:
[I]f normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction were
followed, the existence of 3575(e) - which is the definition con-
tained in another title of the Act which was explicitly not ren-
dered applicable to RICO - suggests that whatever 'pattern'
might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that. '[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is gener-
ally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
disparate inclusion or exclusion.'
2 2 9
Justice Scalia concluded by indicating that he would find the statute
vague if faced with that issue squarely.
2 3 0
224. Id.
225. Id. at 248.
226. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia in the
concurrence.
227. H.. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251.
228. Ia at 252.
229. Ia (emphasis in original) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983)).
230. Id. at 255. Accepting Justice Scalia's invitation, many litigants have raised this
issue in the circuits and, so far, no circuit has held the pattern element vague. See United
States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (Ist Cir.), cert. deniedby Granito v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
130 (1990); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.), cert. denied by Virgilio v.
United States, I I I S. Ct. 2009 (1990) (post-H.. Inc. cases rejecting vagueness challenges).
Prior to H.. Inc., the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits found RICO's pattern requirement constitutionally sound.
Moreover, in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989), the Supreme Court
upheld the Indiana RICO statute, which has the same pattern language, against a void for
vagueness challenge and observed:
[B]ecause the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited than the scope of
the State's obscenity.statute-with obscenity-related RICO prosecutions possible
only where one is guilty of a 'pattern' of obscenity violations-it would seem that
the RICO statute is inherently ess vague than any state obscenity law: a prosecu-
tion under the RICO law will be possible only where all the elements of an ob-
scenity offense are present, and then some.
Id. at 58-59 n.7 (emphasis in original).
Professor G. Robert Blakey, the author of the RICO statute, has suggested that Fort
Wayne Books be read to settle the issue of the facial constitutionality of RICO type legisla-
tion. According to Professor Blakey, "RICO ... [does] not draw a line between criminal
and innocent conduct, [but] authorize(s) the imposition of different criminal or civil reme-
dies on conduct already criminal when performed in a specific fashion." G. Robert Blakey,
Is "Pattern " Void For Vagueness?, supra note 6, at 6, 11, nn. 13, 72 Dec. 12, 1989. Moreover,
"No person seeking to keep his conduct within the law need fear RICO. All he must do is
not violate the predicate offenses." Id. at 7. Blakey, therefore, contends that RICO cannot
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E. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. 231
On March 24, 1992, the Supreme Court decided that § 1964(c), the
civil Rico provision, includes a proximate cause requirement. 23 2 This
means that the racketeering activity must proximately cause the injury
claimed. 23 3 The Court's straightforward analysis looked to the legisla-
tive history and found that § 1964(c) was modeled after Section Four of
the Clayton Act2 3 4 which was based on Section Seven of the Sherman
Act.2 35 Lower federal courts had read Section Seven to incorporate
common law principles of proximate causation. The Supreme Court
previously held that Congress' use of Section Seven language in Section
Four presumably showed the intention to adopt the judicial gloss on
Section Seven.23 6 The Court said that this reasoning applies equally to
§ 1964(c). "[Congress] used the same words, and we can only assume it
intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given
them."
23 7
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor 2 38 agreed with the ma-
jority that § 1964(c) includes a proximate cause requirement. However,
be vague because a defendant is clearly apprised of the line between guilt and innocence.
"What the Constitution requires is that a defendant know to conform his conduct to the
law. Nothing else is required." Id
Professor Lynch has characterized the confusion over what the pattern requirement
means as bogus.
The notion that the concept of'pattern' is too vague to be understood by ajury of
English-speakers of ordinary intelligence can be credited only against the back-
ground ofjudicial efforts to twist a rather basic (if hard to define) concept into
elaborate knots in order to find patterns in criminal cases and find lack of pattern
in civil suits to which courts are hostile.
Lynch adds:
Far more than obscenity, a 'pattern' is something that we know when we see it; it
is the nature of our intelligence to group things into patterns based on perceived
relationships, while finding some things too random-too 'isolated and sporadic,'
if you will-to be so grouped. Asking jurors quite simply whether the facts fall
into a pattern or are just isolated and sporadic instances of crime strikes me as a
perfectly responsible course. Subdividing the fundamental notion of pattern into
rigid subtests of'relationship' and 'continuity' seems unnecessarily arcane, and it
is no wonder that the courts have wrought wonders of confusion by attempting a
technical definition of a readily understood lay term.
Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv.
769, 772 n.8 (1990).
One commentator has suggested that nexus, like the pattern element, is also vague.
See Reed, supra note 6, at 722. Reed thinks that nexus is susceptible to a vagueness chal-
lenge for the following reasons: (1) It has generated imprecise judicial interpretations, (2)
it is not defined in the definitional section of RICO, and (3) 1962(c) itself does not specify
"the degree of interrelationship between the pattern of racketeering and the conduct of
the enterprise's affairs." IdL
231. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992) (Justice Souter wrote the opinion).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) states that: "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
233. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
234. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
235. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
236. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983).
237. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
238. Justices White and Stevens joined Justice O'Connor. Justice Scalia concurred sep-
arately with the opinion.
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these three justices and Justice Scalia would have reached the other is-
sue presented in the case-whether a plaintiff must be a purchaser or a
seller of securities to bring a RICO claim predicated upon allegations of
fraud in the sale of securities. 239 The four justices would have found no
such limitation in the statute. Justice O'Connor's opinion considered
the text of the statute and found that § 1964, on its face, has no pur-
chaser/seller standing requirement and sweeps broadly, using the words
" '[a]ny person' who is injured by reason of a RICO violation." 240 The
four concurring justices found that "any person" cannot reasonably be
read to mean only purchasers and sellers of securities. 24 1 Furthermore,
Justices O'Connor, White, and Stevens said that "[tlhere is no room in
the statutory language for an additional ... requirement.1
24 2
PART VI. A PROPOSAL FOR INTERPRETING NExus
A. The Court's Prior RICO Jurisprudence Should Lead It to Reject the
Manage or Operate Test.
If the Supreme Court follows its past RICO jurisprudence, the
Court will apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation in Reves
v. Ernst & Young.243 The Court will consider first the words of the stat-
ute and then, if the Court considers the language clear, it will analyze
the legislative history to support that finding. If the Court considers the
language ambiguous, the Court will examine the legislative history in an
attempt to discover the intent of Congress.
In its prior RICO opinions, the Court has found that Congress used
terms of breadth244 in RICO; has interpreted the statute broadly in ac-
cordance with a general statutory plan employing such terms; and has
distilled from the legislative history a congressional intent that RICO be
broadly applied. The Court's language in Sedima is illustrative: "RICO
is to be read broadly. This is the lesson... of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach .... "245
The Court, in determining whether adoption of the manage or op-
erate test is warranted, should first consider the language of the statute.
The Court, as it did in Turkette,246 Russello24 7 and Sedima,2 48 should re-
ject the addition of language which does not appear in the statute. To
ascertain whether the text of the statute supports the manage or operate
239. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322.
240. lid at 1323.
241. lId
242. Id.
243. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), cert. granted sub nom from, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
244. Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
245. Id. at 497-98.
246. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
247. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
248. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Moreover, four concurring justices in Holmes would have
reached the issue of whether one was required to be a buyer or seller of securities to bring
a RICO action based on a violation of securities laws and would have found as well that no
such limitation appears in the statute.
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test, the Court should consider the definition of the terms "conduct" or
"participate" in the dictionary, the structure of the entire RICO statute,
including how the same terms are used in other parts of the statute, and
how the same terms are construed in analogous provisions of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act.
Application of these concepts should lead to rejection of the man-
age or operate test. First, the word conduct should not be restricted to
manage or operate. That reading ignores other equally valid definitions
which appear in the dictionary, such as "to carry on." The District of
Columbia Circuit Court's definition reads the statutory terms "conduct
or participate in the conduct of," too narrowly proceeding as if the stat-
ute simply said "conduct. ' 249 The restrictive definition in Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc. also ignores the word "participate" and the words "directly or
indirectly" which appear in § 1962(c). That these words appear with
conduct in § 1962(c) additionally undercuts limitation of the word con-
duct to manage, operate, or control.
Moreover, Congress' use of more restrictive language in other parts
of the statute indicates that it intentionally employed broad language in
§ 1962(c). The words "control or participate in the control of" appear
in § 1962(a), and § 1962(b) uses the term "control of any enterprise."
Congress presumably would have used equally restrictive terms in
§ 1962(c), had it so wished.
Analogous provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act, such as
18 U.S.C. §§ 1555 and 1511, and judicial interpretation of those provi-
sions support a broad reading of conduct. Sections 1555 and 1511
which also use the word "conduct" have routinely been applied to indi-
viduals who did not "manage or operate" a gambling establishment. In
short, Supreme Court scrutiny of RICO's language should lend no sup-
port to the manage or operate test.
The Court, following its prior method, should find persuasive sup-
port for a broad reading of RICO's terms in its legislative history. It
should hold, as it has in earlier RICO cases, that RICO's legislative his-
tory evidences a broad scope. The Court should reject the manage or
operate test based upon the language of the statute, its structure and the
legislative history.
The Court may be influenced by the "new textualism" 2 50 of which
249. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883
F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reu'den banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2839 (1991).
250. This term was coined by William Eskridge, Jr.. See Eskridge, supra note 106, at 623
n. 11. Eskridge defines "new textualism" as:
once the court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legisla-
tive history become irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted
to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text. Such confirmation comes, if
any is needed, from examination of the structure of the statute, interpretations
given similar statutory provisions, and canons of statutory construction.
Id. at 623-24. For additional critiques of "new textualism," see Sunstein, supra note 108;
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597
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Justice Antonin Scalia is the leading proponent. There is evidence that
his views on statutory construction are increasingly influencing the
Court's statutory construction. 251 Scalia favors a "hard plain meaning
rule," which ignores legislative history except in the rare instance when
the text is absurd on its face. 252
Justice White and Justice Scalia have sparred on the issue of statu-
tory interpretation in other cases; most recently in Wisconsin Public Inter-
venor v. Mortier.2 53 In Mortier, Justice White wrote the majority opinion,
joined by everyone on the Court except Justice Scalia. The majority
opinion relied heavily on the legislative history of the federal statute be-
ing construed. Justice Scalia wrote a scathing concurrence attacking the
majority's use of legislative history to reach its conclusion-a conclusion
which he agreed with based on his reading of the text alone.25 4
A "new textualist" analysis of nexus would differ from traditional
statutory interpretation since it requires less consultation of legislative
history and relies on the language of the statute itself and the dictionary
definitions of the terms. Such an approach would examine other terms
within the same statute and then consider how the same terms are inter-
preted in other statutes. This procedure would differ minimally from
the Court's prior RICO analysis. A "new textualist" approach would
(1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward A
Factfinding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
251. These views have not, however, commanded a majority on the Court. Eskridge,
supra note 109, at 656. See also Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476
(1991).
252. Eskridge, supra note 109, at 651.
253. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
254. The concurrence elucidates Justice Scalia's "new textualist" approach:
Their [the majority's] only mistake was failing to recognize how unreliable Com-
mittee Reports are-not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent but as
a safe predictor ofjudicial construction. We use them when it is convenient, and
ignore them when it is not .... All we know for sure is that the full Senate
adopted the text that we have before us here, as did the full House, pursuant to
the procedures prescribed by the Constitution; and that that text, having been
transmitted to the President and approved by him, again pursuant to the proce-
dures prescribed by the Constitution, became law. On the important question
before us today .... we should try to give the text its fair meaning, whatever
various committees might have had to say-thereby affirming the proposition that
we are a Government of laws not of committee reports.
Id. at 2488, 2490.
Justice White, in the majority opinion, responds to Justice Scalia's criticism by stating:
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that
inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it. As
ChiefJustice Marshall put it, '[w]here the mind labors to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived.' [citation omit-
ted] Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists
should never employ them in a good faith effort to discern legislative intent. Our
precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history
reaches well into its past. [citation omitted] We suspect that the practice will
likewise reach well into' the future.
Id. at 2485 n.4.
Justice Scalia responded to Justice White's statement by observing:
I am depressed if the Court is predicting that the use of legislative history for the
purpose I have criticized 'will ... reach well into the future.' But if it is, and its
prediction of the future is as accurate as its perception that it is continuing a
'practice... reach[ing] well into [our] past,' I may have nothing to fear.
Id. at 2491.
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consult legislative history, however, only if the language of the statute
were not only ambiguous but ridiculous.2 55 Even were the Court to ap-
ply Justice Scalia's "new textualist" approach, it should reject the man-
age or operate test. The test has no support in the particular language
being construed nor the structure of the statute itself.
B. The Court Should Require That One "Manage, Operate, or Carry On the
Business of the Enterprise. "
If the Court rejects the manage or operate test, how then should it
interpret this provision of the statute? I suggest an "ordinary meaning"
approach. 25 6 I propose that the Court construe "conduct or participate
in the conduct of an enterprise" to mean "manage, operate, or to take
part in the carrying on of the business of the enterprise." This construc-
tion conforms to the dictionary definition of the terms, and it is consis-
tent with the structure of the statute which demonstrates that Congress
intended § 1962(c) to be construed more broadly than §§ 1962(a) or
(b). It is also consistent with the construction of the terms in analogous
provisions such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511 and 1555 where conduct has been
interpreted to cover more than just those who manage or operate. This
construction is true as well to RICO's legislative history which indicates
that Congress intended to create a "new weapon of unprecedented
scope for an assault on organized crime and its economic roots. '2 57
The test which I propose is preferable to other nexus tests that
courts currently employ. The Scotto-Provenzano test 2 58 is too broad. This
test means that one can conduct the affairs of the enterprise simply if
one's position in the enterprise enables one to commit the racketeering
acts. The test also states that, if the racketeering acts are related to the
enterprise, one conducts or participates in the affairs of the enterprise.
It would include acts committed when one was not managing, operating
or carrying on the business of the enterprise. The Cauble test 259 is prob-
lematic because it requires that the racketeering activity affect the enter-
prise and that one's position within the enterprise facilitate the
commission of the acts. This requirement would exclude outsiders who
are associated with the enterprise. The facilitation test 260 is deficient
because using the facilities and services of an enterprise does not mean
that one is conducting or participating in the conduct of the enterprise.
The test which I have proposed includes outsiders as well as insid-
ers but requires that one at least carry on the business of the enterprise.
255. See Eskridge, supra note 109, at 623 (quotingJustice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480,U.S. 421 (1987)).
256. Michael Goldsmith proposed such an approach to the issue of pattern in RICO and
"Pattern:" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship." Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 973.
257. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
4007.
258. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
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This is truer to congressional intent than tests which merely require re-
lation or utilization.
Does this test apprise people of ordinary intelligence what conduct
is forbidden, and is it precise enough to avoid arbitrary and discrimina-
tory law enforcement by those applying the statute?261 Criminal stat-
utes must pass two tests not to be found vague. First, they must give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that she can conform her actions to the law. Second, crim-
inal statutes must be precise enough to avoid arbitrary and discrimina-
tory law enforcement by those applying them. The notice requirement
does not impose on statutory language impossible requirements of spec-
ificity. Statutory language does not have to approach mathematical cer-
tainty and a court will not invalidate a statute for vagueness simply
because Congress could have drafted the law more precisely.
2 62
Words never stand by themselves. The significance of congres-
sional enactments necessarily depends on context.265 One, therefore,
looks not only to the words, but to their context. If one assumes that the
words "conduct or participate in the conduct of" mean manage, operate
or carry on, one must then determine what the phrase means within the
whole context of § 1962(c).26 4 Second, the individual must manage, op-
erate or carry on the business of the enterprise. Third, the person must
do this through a pattern of racketeering activity. It is not a crime to
manage, operate or carry on the business of an enterprise. One must go
through a pattern of racketeering activity. In other words, one must first
commit a crime.
The United States Supreme Court has already stated that the vague-
ness line is drawn in RICO at the commission of the predicate offense.
In Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana,265 the Court said, if the predicate offense
is not unconstitutionally vague, the RICO statute cannot be. The Court
observed:
[B]ecause the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited
than the scope of the State's obscenity statute-with obscenity-
related RICO prosecutions possible only where one is guilty of
a "pattern" of obscenity violations-it would seem that the
RICO statute is inherently less vague than any state obscenity
law;, a prosecution under the RICO law will be possible only
where all the elements of an obscenity offense are present, and
then some.
2 66
261. Reed, supra note 6, at 723; Bauerschmidt, supra note 6, at 1115; Gartenstein &
Warganz, supra note 6, at 512-17.
262. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); see also Blakey, Is "Pat-
tern" Void for Vagueness?, supra note 6, at 6; Gartenstein & Warganz, supra note 6, at 514.
263. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 416; see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 217-27 (1975).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it illegal for "any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt."
265. 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
266. Id. at 925 n.5.
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Professor G. Robert Blakey contends that RICO does not draw a
line between criminal and innocent conduct but authorizes additional
penalties for activity that is already criminal when performed in a spe-
cific fashion.26 7 The purpose of notice is to give a person an opportu-
nity to conform his or her actions to the law. A person should not have
the right to commit a predicate act yet still avoid RICO prosecution. 268
As Professor Blakey has stated, one does not get "two bites at the vague-
ness apple." 26 9 Even Reed, who argues most vociferously that RICO is
vague, concedes that any vagueness challenge to RICO must overcome
the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Wayne Books drawing the vagueness
line at the predicate act.
270
Assuming that there is no notice problem, it is my proposal that
"conduct or participate in the conduct of" be interpreted simply to
mean "manage, operate, or carry on the business of an enterprise."
This test is sufficiently broad to encompass acts which Congress in-
tended the statute to cover and narrow enough to exclude conduct
which Congress intended not to include. Application of this proposal
can best be demonstrated by applying these definitions to the facts of
some of the leading RICO cases.
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.
2 7 1
The union did not manage, operate or carry on the business of the
bus lines. The bus company was merely the target of the union's illegal
acts. The facts of Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., therefore, fail the test which I
have proposed.
United States v. Dennis
2 7 2
The facts of Dennis would also fail to establish nexus under this con-
struction. Dennis did not carry on the affairs of General Motors through
a pattern of racketeering activity. He simply participated in the activity
while on General Motors' premises.
United States v. Thomas
2 73
In the case of the Sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee, nexus would be
present not only for the Sheriff but also for the deputies who were
charged. The deputies who carried on the racketeering activity were
carrying on the affairs of the Sheriff's Department as well.
267. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6, at 1031-33.
268. Garterstein & Wanganz, supra note 6, at 520 n.236.
269. Blakey, CIVIL RICO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
270. Reed, supra note 6, at 727.
271. 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd en banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
272. 458 F. Supp 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). See also text accompanying note 36.
273. 749 F. Supp 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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United States v. Webster 2 74
If one applies this construction of "conduct or participate in the
conduct of" to the facts of Webster, no nexus would be found. The de-
fendant in Webster did not manage, operate, or carry on the affairs of the
restaurant through a pattern of racketeering activity. The restaurant
was merely the situs for some of the indicia of racketeering activity. Em-
ployees only forwarded calls regarding drugs from the restaurant to the
defendant's home. An employee provided free drinks to one of the de-
fendant's drug customers.2 75 The defendants were conducting the af-
fairs of their narcotics-selling organization through a pattern of
racketeering activity, but they were not conducting the affairs of their
restaurant through their drug selling activity.
United States v. Cauble
2 76
In contrast to Webster, the ranching business in Cauble was com-
pletely interwoven with the drug smuggling activity. All of the facilities
and assets of the enterprise were regularly put to the use of drug smug-
gling. Most importantly, the drug smuggling financed the enterprise
and kept the enterprise going. The defendants carried on the business
of the enterprise through the drug smuggling. A sufficient nexus, there-
fore, exists under the facts of Cauble.
United States v. Scotto
277
Scotto presents a difficult case. Anthony Scotto was president of an
International Longshoremen's Union local and accepted payoffs from
individuals representing waterfront employers of union labor. The rea-
sons for those payoffs varied. Some were to secure Scotto's assistance in
"reducing fraudulent and exaggerated workmen's compensation claims
filed by Scotto's local." 278 Others were to garner his assistance in solic-
iting new business.
The question is did he carry on the business of the local through the
acceptance of those illegal payoffs? The answer is perhaps. Under the
test enunciated in Scotto, it was unnecessary for the court to decide this.
Using that test, one could easily determine that Scotto was enabled to
accept these payoffs by being president of the local. But this is not nec-
essarily sufficient. If Scotto simply accepted the payoffs and did not oper-
ate, manage or carry on the business of the local based upon receiving
these payoffs, there would be no nexus. If he did, however, for example,
encourage union managers to file or not file fraudulent workers com-
pensation claims because he received these payoffs, Scotto would be car-
rying on the business of the local through a pattern of racketeering
274. 639 F.2d 174 (1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 935 (1982).
275. Webster II, 669 F.2d at 187.
276. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
277. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
278. Id. at 51.
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activity. The evidence would have to show not only that he received the
payoffs solely because he was president of the union but also that he
pursued some course of action within the local based upon receiving
those payoffs.
United States v. Yonan 
279
What about outsiders under this test? In Yonan, a defense attorney
offered bribes to an Assistant State's Attorney to fix a case.280 Did he
manage, operate, or carry on the affairs of the State's Attorney's office
through a pattern of racketeering activity? The answer is yes. He con-
ducted business with the county attorney's office. The business of the
county attorney's office was to prosecute criminal cases in Chicago. The
defendant tried to affect that business, and he did business with the en-
terprise. Under the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. test, the nexus in Yonan would
obviously have been insufficient. Yonan hardly exercised "control over
the course of the enterprise's activities."
'28 '
Reves v. Ernst & Young
282
If all that the accountants did was prepare false financial statements,
they would not be carrying on the business of the enterprise. However,
they also met with the board of directors and with the shareholders and
gave false information at those meetings. Their interaction with the
general manager in this scheme to overvalue the assets of the co-opera-
tive would be critical to determining whether they carried on the busi-
ness of the enterprise. If they worked with the general manager in this
overall scheme to overvalue assets and hide the liabilities that were in-
curred by the gasohol plant, they might very well have been participat-
ing in carrying on the business of the enterprise, even though they may
not have managed or operated it.
These examples illustrate that simply construing the terms in ways
that comport with their common everyday meaning is workable and real-
istic for courts. It does not broaden the terms so that they lose any
meaning.
CONCLUSION
Congress has steadfastly repelled vigorous attempts to eviscerate
RICO. The Supreme Court has, in the past, refused to impose limita-
tions upon RICO which are unsupported by its text and legislative
history.
The Supreme Court should similarly reject the manage or operate
test in Reves v. Ernst & Young because RICO's language, structure, and
279. 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
280. Id. at 165.
281. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
282. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), cert. granted sub nom. from, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
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legislative history do not support the test. The Court should construe
"conduct or participate in the conduct of" to mean "manage, operate,
or carry on the business of" the enterprise. This test honors the words
of RICO, and is consistent with the structure of the statute and is sup-
ported by the legislative history.
Such a test would not exclude those people such as lawyers or ac-
countants who play significant roles in fraudulent activity, but who,
nonetheless, do not manage or operate the enterprise. Congress did
not intend to exclude this type of person from RICO's reach.

BOOK REVIEW
PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND
TRADEMARKS
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR.*
The preface of the well-produced book Protecting Trade Secrets, Pat-
ents, Copyrights, and Trademarks (Protecting Trade Secrets)1 states:
This book not only explains the basic principles of intellectual
property, but it also (1) provides valuable business tips to mini-
mize future legal liabilities while maximizing their intellectual
property interests, (2) provides access to resources including
leading references, books, articles, databases, and associations
.... and (3) provides legal checklists, legal forms, and case
examples.
2
In the first five chapters, Dorr and Munch cover the following top-
ics: Protecting Trade Secrets, Protecting Patents, Unfair Competition,
Protecting Trademarks, and Copyrights. A book of this scope is particu-
larly useful for attorneys serving small businesses, most of whom are
ignorant about basic information concerning intellectual property. For
many such attorneys, the trademark chapter may be the most important
part of the book. Although trade secrets, copyrights or patents may be
of little immediate concern to most businesses, every business has trade-
marks or service marks that deserve adequate protection.
3
Dorr and Munch do not stint in pointing out the importance of
trademark and related rights. They not only explain how to protect and
preserve such rights,4 but also how to avoid infringing the rights of
others. 5 Moreover, the authors note that trademark rights arise auto-
matically under common law when a mark leads consumers to recognize
it as a source indicator, but only in the geographic market served. 6 Dorr
* Professor of Law and Director of the Innovation Clinic, Franklin Pierce Law
Center, Concord, New Hampshire. Professor Field received an A.B. (Chemistry, 1964),
and J.D. (1969) from West Virginia University and an LL.M. (Trade Regulations, 1970)
from New York University, where he was the 1969-70 Food and Drug Law Fellow. He is a
former Patent Examiner as well as a founding member of the Franklin Pierce Law Center.
1. ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PAT-
ENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS (1990 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter DORR & MUNCH].
Robert C. Dorr is a partner in the law firm of Dorr, Carson, Sloan & Peterson, Denver,
Colorado. Christopher H. Munch is Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Denver Col-
lege of Law.
2. Id. at v.
3. Technically, the term "trademark" should be used only for source indicators of
goods; the term "service mark" should be used only for source indicators of services. Id.
at 129; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
4. Trademark and related rights can be preserved, for example, through proper
grammatical use of marks. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 151-54.
5. Id. at 137-41.
6. Id. at 130.
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and Munch infer that state registration of marks will provide protection
in addition to the protection provided by common law.7 Specifically,
Dorr and Munch suggest all businesses should file for state or federal
protection.8 Unfortunately, Dorr and Munch fail to address the value of
state registration when faced with the fact that most states register marks
without searching beyond the local register; if a prior federal registra-
tion exists, a state registrant is apt to get no protection for the effort and
expense of state filing.9
Historically, the question of whether to file on the state or federal
level has put many small businesses in a bind. On the one hand, they
were unable to register federally because the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) usually required a registrant to be involved in
interstate commerce. On the other hand, unless their market was na-
tional, owners of common law marks or state registrations faced a con-
stant risk that later users in other markets would register federally and
foreclose the earlier user's ability to expand. After a recent court deci-
sion, however, single location businesses that simply affect interstate
commerce should now be permitted to register federally.' 0 The value of
Protecting Trade Secrets would increase if the book addressed such matters
and, also, if it mentioned that while federal registration may cost
$1000.00 or more," the benefits often vastly outweigh the expense.
Such oversights are mostly a product of the scope of Protecting Trade
Secrets. Coverage is comprehensive, indeed considerably broader than
the title suggests. For example, the chapters entitled "Officer and Di-
rector Personal Liability"' 12 and "Advertising"' 13 go beyond protecting
intellectual property and offer important advice for avoiding both firm
and personal liability. Protecting Trade Secrets covers a remarkable amount
of territory' 4 by extensively citing treatises and other works that deal
7. Id. ("Most businesses are involved in the interstate sales of goods and services;
therefore they are principally concerned with obtaining federal trademark rights. Some
businesses, however, are solely located within the confines of a particular state and may
prefer to seek only state trademark protection.")
8. Id.
9. See Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
10. Larry Harmon Pictures v. Williams Restaurant Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 85 (1991). Thejurisdiction of the Federal Circuit in such cases
is set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1)(1988). See also, Peter C. Christensen & Teresa C.
Tucker, The "Use in Commerce" Requirement for Trademark Registration after Larry Harmon Pic-
tures, in 32 IDEA J.L. & TECH 327.
11. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw ASSN., REPORT OF EcoN. SURV. 1991, at
24 (1991)(costs for trademark search and opinion, federal application, and federal prose-
cution are indicated by quartile for selected cities).
12. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 249-59.
13. Id. at 261-73.
14. Compare DORR & MUNCH (342 pages and Annual Supplement) with Donald S.
Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law (MB)(1992)(similar in
scope to DORR & MUNCH, but contains over 1000 pages); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, DESK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1991)(contains 385 pages and offers little
more than detailed definitions of intellectual property terms of art). However, depending
on the purpose of the discussion and the intended audience, basic intellectual property
concepts can be covered in far fewer pages. See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Brief Survey of
Intellectual Property, 31 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 85 (1990)(45 pages).
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specifically with subsets of intellectual property law. The result is a com-
paratively slim volume which cites specialized literature. Thus, general
attorneys who serve businesses and intellectual property specialists
working in an unfamiliar area will find valuable forms, check lists and
guidelines, not only for protecting intellectual property but also for
avoiding infringing the rights of others.' 5
For a work of this scope and size, substantial editorial decisions
were undoubtedly difficult. Unfortunately, citations are sparse in some
areas, 16 while in others, primary sources are reprinted unnecessarily.
For example, it is unclear why eight pages are devoted to the text of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act, 17 or why several pages
reproduce free and easily obtainable copyright forms.' 8 Finally, the pat-
ent discussion may provide too many details, and thus may be unhelpful
to general business attorneys.
The PTO is the sole federal agency that requires otherwise licensed
attorneys to pass a bar examination 19 before permitting them to apply
for patents or prosecute applications. Non-specialists are ill advised to
seek ad hoc admission to appear before the PTO.2 0 Thus, it is unclear
why Don" and Munch include detailed discussions about, for example,
continuation, continuation-in-part applications and secrecy orders.
2 1
These are topics general business attorneys probably have no need to
know. Even if a business attorney needs detailed patent information,
Don. and Munch do not mention crucial tools such as divisional applica-
tions. 2 2 The space given to details likely to concern only patent special-
ists probably would, be better devoted to more forcefully pointing out
15. However, intellectual property law specialists are more likely to consult one of the
more focused and comprehensive works. See, e.g., JAMES E. HAWES, COPYRIGHT REGISTRA-
TION PRACTICE (1990), JAMES E. HAWES, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACTICE (1987).
16. See, e.g., DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 91 ("Please keep in mind that being too
successful in the aggressive use of patents can lead to antitrust problems." The caution is
not specifically documented, nor, as is often the case, is a comprehensive work cited at the
beginning of the section).
17. Id. at 240-48 & 1991 Supplement at 58-59.
18. Id. at 193-99. It is also unclear why several pages reproduce or excerpt selected
patents. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 56-63, 288-96.
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 500(e)(1988).
20. Ad hoc admission to appear before the PTO is permitted under 37 C.F.R. § 10.9
(1991) & 57 Fed. Reg. 29248 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Parts I & 10)(proposed July 1,
1992). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 31-33 (1988)("Practice Before Patent and Trademark Of-
fice"); 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.5-10.7 (1991)("Individuals Entitled to Practice Before the Patent
and Trademark Office") & 57 Fed. Reg. 29248 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Parts I &
10)(proposed July 1, 1992). The PTO requires that any attorney wishing to sit for the
patent exam have one of several specified degrees or otherwise satisfy guidelines designed
to demonstrate an adequate technical background. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINA-
TION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES (1992). These booklets are updated
and published several months in advance of examinations, which generally are given in
April and October. The PTO guidelines are difficult to understand. For example, com-
puter engineering is an acceptable degree, whereas computer science is not. Id. at 2. For
those without a specified degree, twenty-four hours of physics or biology is adequate,
whereas in chemistry thirty hours are required and in other subjects, forty hours. Id
21. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 81-82.
22. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.60 (1991).
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that certain acts may forfeit all potential patent protection, immediately
in most foreign countries and after one year in the United States. Once
the right to a patent is forfeited by offering a product for sale prior to
filing a patent application, for example, there is little that even a patent
specialist can do to secure the patent. The United States situation is
discussed at some length in Protecting Trade Secrets.23 However, the for-
eign discussion, only a part of one short paragraph, easily could be
missed.
24
Because generalists need to keep in mind overall corporate strategy
for protecting intellectual property, a very useful part of Protecting Trade
Secrets discusses the value of patents in securing risk capital and in fore-
stalling competition. 25 Scientists, inventors, businessmen, and general
business attorneys often forget that patents are no more fungible than
the proverbial Blackacre. A building lot in Manhattan warrants far more
expense to assure title than does a square inch of Arctic tundra. The
situation with inventions and patents is identical. In some cases, given
the market value of the invention, it would be foolish not to spend any
amount necessary to secure the broadest possible protection for an in-
vention.2 6 In other cases, it would be foolish, at least from a competitive
standpoint, 27 to invest any money in prosecuting a patent application.
Worse, such problems can fall between the cracks. Patent attorneys may
fail to possess, much less be able to evaluate, necessary business infor-
mation, and, conversely, general attorneys possessing business informa-
tion may be unable to evaluate sophisticated and highly interrelated
legal options. Such considerations become more compelling as PTO
costs increase.28 For that reason, Protecting Trade Secrets would be even
more valuable if it provided additional information on how to choose
and work with patent or other specialized counsel, when and why it is
unwise to cut corners,2 9 and how to save money without running the risk
of compromising important rights.30
The final chapter, "Protecting Software,"'' s contains some informa-
23. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 71-73.
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id at 91-92.
26. Patent prosecution is essentially negotiation between patent examiners and patent
attorneys. If an attorney will settle for a patent of little scope, prosecution can be quick
and inexpensive. Often, however, to secure protection commensurate to the market value
of the invention, costly and time-consuming intramural and judicial review are needed. See
generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 134, 141-145 (1988)(appeal and review provisions).
27. See supra text accompanying note 24. From the standpoint of attracting risk capi-
tal, patents may encourage unsophisticated lenders. One has to wonder, however, about
the ethics and legality of attracting risk capital with a patent portfolio that confers little or
no competitive advantage.
28. Compare DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, Table 2-1, at 55 with DORR & MUNCH, supra
note 1, Table 2-1, 1991 Supplement, at 10 (within a year, the filing, issue and maintenance
fees for small and large entities rose, respectively, from $1,975 to $2,340 and from $3,950
to $6,680). A host of other fees such as fees for extensions of time also should be noted,
as many can be avoided by careful planning.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. Inventors can forgo employing specialists to undertake some tasks which they can
accomplish themselves, such as conducting a preliminary patent search.
31. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 275-303. For additional information on protect-
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tion tending to serve the ends of how to work with specialized counsel,
when to cut comers, and how to safely save money. Unfortunately, the
discussion is limited and comes too late in the book.8 2 As discussed in
the chapter, both copyrights and patents furnish very important protec-
tion for software.83 Yet, the authors should have pointed out that copy-
rights alone may be adequate to recover development costs even if
patents are available. Evaluating the tradeoffs between patents and
copyrights is compelling when one considers that copyright registration
is apt to be much quicker and less expensive.
3 4
If intellectual property alternatives covering a broader spectrum of
subject matter were compared more frequently and more directly, the
value of Protecting Trade Secrets would be considerably enhanced. For ex-
ample, the cost of precautions necessary to preserve trade secrets is apt
to be substantial,3 5 but, in some circumstances, a trade secret may be
preferred even though patent costs could be lower.36
Given the importance and pervasiveness of intellectual property,
general attorneys need to understand fundamental patent, trademark
and copyright law. Dorr and Munch have come a long way toward meet-
ing that need. Many readers will recover the cost of the book from in-
formation contained in the chapter on trademarks alone. In view of the
pace with which intellectual property law changes, supplementation by
pocket parts is also an important feature of Protecting Trade Secrets. If fu-
ture supplements or editions focus attention on securing the most intel-
lectual protection for the least money, particularly in difficult economic
times, this book could easily become a "must have" for many general
lawyers.
ing software see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
(1992).
32. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at 275-303.
33. Id.
34. Copyright registration is a one-time, single fee, generally only $20. Contra DORR
& MUNCH, supra note 1, Table 2-1, 1991 Supplement, at 10 (describing different fees asso-
ciated with utility patents); see also Policy Decision: Revised Special Handling Procedures,
56 Fed. Reg. 37,528 (1991)(copyright registration fee is $200 for special handling). Copy-
right registration is much simpler and quicker than patent prosection even with special
handling. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)(addressing availability of extraordi-
nary remedies as a function of the relative dates of infringement and registration).
35. Most of the first chapter of Protecting Trade Secrets is devoted to such precautions,
but cost is not specifically addressed. DORR & MUNCH, supra note 1, at'l-41.
36. Perhaps the most important case addressing the interface between patents and
trade secrets is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), wherein the court
laid to rest any notion that federal patent law preempts state trade secret law. In doing so,
the court stated that "[i]n the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence
from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted a patent exists."
Id. at 489. However, there are several circumstances where a trade secret might be prefer-
able to a patent, such as where the invention consists of a process for making a product. If
a patent is not secured, the process more than likely cannot be "reverse engineered" by
competitors. More importantly, should the inventor possess a patent, he or she may have
serious difficulty in determining whether others are infringing it.
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TRUE EQUALITY FOR BATrERED WOMEN:
THE USE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
Statistics regarding the frequency and severity with which women
are abused by their mates1 fill the media.2 Until recently, American so-
ciety accepted spousal abuse,3 and the legal system protected husbands
who beat their wives because it defined wife abuse as a marital right or
privilege.4 Today, although our society no longer condones or encour-
ages spousal abuse, battered women must overcome substantial obsta-
cles to remove themselves from abusive relationships. 5 In many
instances, when abused women fight back, their batterers kill them.
Intra-familial homicides accounted for nearly one-fourth of all homi-
cides in 1984, and in two-thirds of these deaths, husbands killed their
1. This Note focuses on women who are repeatedly abused by husbands or boy-
friends, but that does not diminish the fact that men can be the victims of battering rela-
tionships and face similar barriers to asserting self-defense claims.
2. See, e.g., Sara L. Johann & Frank Osanka, "I Didn't Mean to Kill Him!" 14 BARRIS-
TER Fall 1987, at 19-20 ("Estimates of battered women in the United States range from
two million to 40 million, with only twenty-five percent of all wife beatings reported to
police."); Walter W. SteeleJr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self Defense
to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169 n.2 (1991) ("Every 15 seconds a
woman is beaten, and more than 2,000 women are murdered each year by husbands and
boyfriends.").
The realities of abuse are not confined to the United States. A woman in Great Brit-
ain, recently convicted of killing her abusive husband, was granted a new trial by the Brit-
ish Court of Appeals in order to present new evidence regarding her state of mind at the
time of the murder. Frances Gibb, Battered Wife Who Set Fire to Husband Wins Right to Retrial,
THE TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1992, Home News Section.
Battering often continues while the woman is pregnant. A March of Dimes study esti-
mates that domestic violence is the leading cause of birth defects, more than all other
medical causes combined. Stan Grossfeld, 'Safer' and injaik Women Who Kill Their Batterers;
Love and Terror, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1991, at 1.
3. Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetrating
Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 264 (1987).
4. As far back as the Middle Ages, society condoned wife beatings. In fact, United
States and British courts acknowledged that the husband had a right to beat his wife in the
early nineteenth century. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 11-12 (1979). As
recently as the 1970s, a field study revealed that men are much more reluctant to intervene
in a physical altercation between a man and a woman than in altercations between two men
or between two women. KATHLEEN H. HOFELLER, BATrERED WOMEN, SHATTERED LIVES 67
(1983). Police response to "domestic" disturbances reflects this reluctance as well. See id.
at 70-73.
5. Seven out of ten battered women are routinely turned away from shelters. 20/20:
Pushed to the Edge (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1991) transcript at 7 (transcript
available from Journal Graphics, Inc.). Friends, relatives and clergy often encourage bat-
tered spouses to stay with the abuser. Frances, who has been sentenced to fifteen years to
life for killing her abusive husband of almost fifty years, was advised by her pastor to "give
him lots of loving and he'll be alright." Id. at 6. Separation, divorce and restraining or-
ders are not enough to stop some cases of abuse. Tracey Thurman left her husband,
moved to another state, filed for divorce, and had restraining orders in hand when her
husband beat and stabbed her severely; she is now permanently paralyzed. Id. at 4.
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wives. 6 Statistics show that thirty-one percent of all female homicide
victims in 1988 were slain by their husbands or boyfriends. 7 However,
women who successfully fend off their abusers and must kill to protect
themselves from further harm8 are frequently charged with manslaugh-
ter or murder.9 Prosecutors often characterize these women as cold-
blooded killers seeking revenge or life insurance proceeds.10 Seventy to
seventy-five percent of them are either convicted or plead guilty to a
lesser charge. 1 Typically, battered women who kill their abusers do not
deny committing the act but claim they acted in self-defense.1 2 How-
ever, unless the woman kills her batterer during a battering incident, her
action does not fit the traditional concept of self-defense.' 3 Common
misconceptions about battered women 14 as well as a male bias in inter-
preting the reasonableness standard for self-defense' 5 often bar the bat-
6. See Angela Browne, Family Homicide: When Victimized Women Kill, HANDBOOK OF FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE 275 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
7. See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1988).
8. It is estimated that between 800 and 1,200 women a year kill men they say abuse
them. Robert Cross, Burning Issues-Threat of Death Penalty Ignites Controversy, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 1991, at 1.
9. See, e.g., People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Browne, supra note
6, at 275.
10. See, e.g., Nancy Montgomery, Women Who Kill Abusers Face a Skeptical System, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, May 6, 1991, at A4 (defense attorneyJohn Henry Browne, stating that evidence
of a past abusive relationship gives the prosecution a motive for the killing); Susan
Paterno, A Legacy of Violence; The Courts Say They Are Killers But They Say They Were Abused And
Had No Other Way Out, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at El (detailing the story of Susan Busta-
mante, whom prosecutors claimed killed her husband for a $50,000 insurance payoff). An-
gela Browne, however, notes that "women charged with the death of a mate have the least
extensive criminal records of any female offenders." Browne, supra note 6, at 275. Ac-
cording to FBI statistics, fewer men are charged with first or second degree murder than
women who kill a man they have known, and the prison sentences the women receive are
frequently longer. Id.
11. See Cross, supra note 8, at 1.
12. See CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL41 (1987); Regina A. Schuller
& Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
273, 275 (1992). Battered women typically state that their only choices were to kill or be
killed. See EWING, supra, at 12-13; MJ. Willoughby, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 169,
171 (1989).
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Sco-r,JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 2d ed.
§ 53, at 391 (1972) (self-defense justification is premised on the principle "that one who is
unlawfully attacked by another, and who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his
defense, should be able to take reasonable steps to defend himself.").
14. Such misconceptions include the belief that women are masochistic and actually
enjoy being beaten, that they purposely provoke their husbands into violent behavior, and
that if the beatings were severe, they would leave their abusers. See WALKER, supra note 4,
at 19-31.
15. Traditionally, the rules governing self-defense were oriented towards situations
such as two men fighting in a bar. Self-defense was designed to apply to "single incidents
of violence among strangers," not complex, ongoing issues of family violence. Montgom-
ery, supra note 10, at A4. Susan Paterno stated:
The law on self-defense assumes a fight between two men of the same size and
strength, where the killer uses only as much force as the victim. If a woman
shoots a man while he has his hands around her neck, she can be-and has
been-convicted of murder.
Paterno, supra note 10, at El.
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tered woman from successfully raising the defense. 16
The judicial system lacks uniformity in dealing with women who kill
their abusers when a contemporaneous assault by the abuser is absent.
Some prosecutors and courts never charge battered women, while
others charge them with crimes ranging from first-degree murder to
manslaughter. Of those convicted, the sentences are equally as varied. 17
In addition, commentators 18 and courts advance different theories on
how the legal system should treat battered women who kill their abus-
ers. Some courts 19 and scholars20 remain steadfast in the idea that
these women are able to leave their abusive environment, so the legal
system should treat them as it would any murderer. Focusing on legal
defenses to murder, other courts advance non-traditional or innovative
theories ofjustification or excuse including (1) the battered woman de-
fense,2 1 (2) a "reasonable woman" standard for evaluating self-de-
fense,2 2 and (3) a completely subjective evaluation of the reasonableness
of self-defense.
23
However, developing new legal theories to deal with women who
kill their abusers only reinforces the idea that they acted in a manner
unacceptable to the legal system. In other words, the system does not
believe that they acted in self-defense. As this Note will argue, these
women are acting in self-defense when they kill their abusers, and their
conduct should be justified-not excused.
24
16. Approximately 2,000 women are in prison for killing their batterers. Grossfeld,
supra note 2, at 1. Forty percent of the women currently on death row are there for killing
their abuser. Cross, supra note 8, at 1.
17. Willoughby, supra note 12, at 171-73.
18. See generally EWING, supra note 12, at 77-94 (proposing a legal theory of "psycho-
logical self-defense").
19. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (self-defense was not
proper in a case where the defendant killed the victim while his back was turned); State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (implicitly deciding that defendant planned murder
because husband was asleep when she killed him); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C.
1989).
20. See, e.g.,James R. Acker & Hans Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testi-
mony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 Crim. L. Bull. 125, 146-51 (1985) (suggesting that
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome may lead juries to believe the killing was just);
Marilyn H. Mitchell, Note, Does WifeAbuseJustify Homicide, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1705, 1715-16
(1978) (observing that acquittals of abused wives may sanction retaliation and revenge).
21. See Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Be-
half of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 32-33 (1986) (advocating the creation
of the "Battered Woman's Defense").
22. See generally Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, in THE RESPONSIBLE COMMU-
NrrY 36 (Fall 1991) (advocating the adoption of a separate reasonableness standard for
women because human perceptions regarding any event are colored by the persons'
gender).
23. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (applying a subjective evalua-
tion of reasonableness).
24. Alternative established defenses for these murders are diminished capacity and
temporary insanity. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-102 (West 1990) (defining diminished
capacity as a severely abnormal mental condition which impairs understanding of reality);
Id. § 16-8-101 (West 1990) (defining insanity as being incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong). Both of these are based on the mental state of the defendant resulting from
the years of abuse. I have chosen not to address these defenses because they excuse,
rather than justify, the woman's actions by labelling her as mentally deficient.
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This Note focuses on how the legal system, when dealing with a
battered woman who kills her abuser during a lull in the violence, can
use Colorado's self-defense statute and rules of evidence to provide
equality for battered women. Self-defense statutes already in existence,
with subjective and objective elements, can and should allow these wo-
men to defend their actions. The only difference between traditional
self-defense and a battered woman raising the defense should be the
admission of expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome to ed-
ucate jurors of the realities of the defendant's life with the victim. Part I
of the Note deals with the historical theories for justifying punishment
of criminals, the development of the law of self-defense and the admissi-
bility and use of expert testimony concerning Battered Spouse Syn-
drome. It also gives an overview of how other jurisdictions handle the
self-defense claims of battered women and examines the current state of
the law concerning battered women in Colorado. Lastly, Part II of the
Note analyzes the use of self-defense by battered women and how Colo-
rado courts should address this subject using the state's current self-
defense statute and rules of evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
Courts have wrestled with the propriety of battered women self-de-
fense claims for decades 25 and have failed to reach an agreement as to
whether a battered woman should receive a jury instruction on self-de-
fense.2 6 Additionally, most battered women first encounter the judicial
system after they kill their abusive mates. 27 Whether these women
should be punished for killing their abusers is another unresolved issue.
A. Theories of Punishment
The law punishes certain behavior for various reasons: deterrence
(both general and particular), incapacitation, rehabilitation and retribu-
tion.2 8 Under the deterrence theory, the defendant's punishment is in-
tended to discourage both the general public and the defendant from
committing the same (or similar) crimes in the future.2 9 Punishment
25. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (court refused self-defense
instruction on the grounds that the defendant shot husband while he slept); State v. Lan-
drum, 113 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (wife claimed self-defense in the murder of
her abusive husband even though she planned the killing).
26. Several courts have held that the defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction
and that expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome is admissible. See, e.g., State
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (adopting a purely subjective
test of reasonableness for self-defense); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984). Other courts have held the defendant
was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because there was no evidence of a threat of
imminent harm, therefore belief in imminent harm was not objectively reasonable, making
expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome irrelevant. See, e.g., People v. Aris,
264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State
v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
27. See Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
28. LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 13, § 5, at 22-26.
29. Id.
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used as a particular or special deterrent discourages the individual from
committing the same crime again. According to the theory, criminal
punishment of a woman who kills her batterer will reduce the likelihood
of it happening again because during incarceration the woman will not
be in a position to engage in spousal homicide. The punishment will
also teach the battered woman that spousal homicide is counter-produc-
tive.30 In addition, general deterrence uses the wrongdoer as an exam-
ple to society so that others will refrain from similar behavior for fear of
arrest, conviction and imprisonment. The theory also contemplates that
if the battered woman knows that killing her abuser will not result in
punishment, she has less incentive to avoid using deadly force against
the batterer.31 The theory of incapacitation rests on the idea that pun-
ishment protects the rest of society from the criminal's dangerous
propensities,3 2 while retribution is premised on the idea that wrongdo-
ers should suffer for the harms they caused by being incarcerated or
punished by the legal system.33 Rehabilitation rests on the idea that
criminal anti-social behavior stems from an identifiable cause that thera-




Self-defense developed in an era when men executed the laws and
women were possessory interests of their fathers or husbands. A mascu-
line model necessarily developed.3 5 In describing self-defense cases,
one commentator stated that "familiar images of self-defense are a sol-
dier, a man protecting his home, family, or the chastity of his wife, or a
man fighting off an assailant."3 6 At that point in time, society charged
men with responsibility for the actions of their wives and daughters and
it followed that society expected men to protect and defend women.
3 7
Therefore, the doctrine of self-defense, from its inception, did not take
into account the possibility of a woman defending herself, especially
against a man.
3 8
The traditional concept of self-defense centered on two men of
equal strength and size engaged in a one-time violent encounter.3 9 It
did not account for the cumulative effects of repeated violence.40 In
order to raise the traditional defense, the defendant must show that he
reasonably feared for his life, that the peril was imminent and that the
30. See EWING, supra note 12, at 88.
31. d at 86.
32. Id.
33. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 13, § 5, at 24.
34. Id. at 23.
35. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 175.
36. ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 14
(1981).
37. Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 175.
38. Id.
39. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 172 (1987).
40. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 176.
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force employed in defending himself was no greater than the force used
against him.4 1 The court viewed the reasonableness and imminence
standards from the perspective of a "reasonable man." This standard
incorporated the perceptions, beliefs and fears of men.42 In addition, a
non-aggressor could only use retaliatory force once the threat of harm
was immediately necessary to protect himself. Threats of violence, un-
accompanied by an overt act of the attacker, were not enough to justify
self-defense. 4 3 Courts required the defender to delay the use of force
because of the presumption that the threatened harm might not actually
occur-that the alleged attacker might be bluffing.4 4 The judicial sys-
tem developed this concept of imminence when men were the only ac-
ceptable combatants. 45 Comparable in size and strength, they could
conceivably defend themselves once a struggle began. As a result, if the
aggressor did not employ a weapon, neither could the person defending
himself.
2. Elements
Under Colorado law, a person is justified in killing another person if
he has reasonable grounds to believe and actually does believe that he is
in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily injury.4 6 The
statute also requires that in order to use deadly force, the actor must
reasonably believe that a lesser degree of force is inadequate.
4 7
Neither the Colorado legislature nor case law has defined "immi-
nent" in the self-defense context.48 In People v. Brandyberry,4 9 the court
of appeals defined imminent as it appears in the "choice of evils" stat-
41. See LAFAVE & ScoTrr, supra note 13, § 61, at 454-57.
42. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality For Battered Women Who Kill in Self-
Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 121, 123-25 (1985).
43. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896).
44. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 178-80.
45. Id. at 175.
46. The Colorado self-defense statute explains:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justi-
fied in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a
third person from what he reasonably believes is the use or imminent use of un-
lawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which
he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.
(2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a
lesser degree of force is inadequate and;
(a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or an-
other person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily
injury....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704 (1986).
47. In cases involving battered women, abusers are typically much larger and stronger
than the woman. Therefore, a woman will generally be allowed to use a weapon when the
man used his hands to strangle or beat her (i.e., when he could have killed her with his
bare hands). However, this physical difference may not help the battered woman's defense
if the court believes that she should have, and could have, resorted to non-violent means
of avoiding the confrontation, like police intervention or domestic violence counselling.
Kerry A. Shad, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive
Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1164-65 & n.37 (1990).
48. See People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
49. 812 P.2d 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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ute 50 as "near at hand, impending or on the point of happening."5' An-
other definition of imminence appears in the Model Penal Code at
section 3.04. That section expands the imminence requirement to in-
clude an action "immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself... on the present occasion." '5 2 Because the key to resolving the
self-defense problems for battered women turns on whether the
threatened action comes within the definition of "imminent danger,"
58
cases from other jurisdictions are instructive.
In State v. Gallegos,54 the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined a
self-defense claim by a battered woman. New Mexico's self-defense stat-
ute is similar to Colorado's in that they both require an honest belief
and an objectively reasonable belief in imminent (or immediate) dan-
ger.5 5 The court held imminence does not require actual physical as-
sault, and "threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger." 5 6 To support that conclusion, the
court recognized that incidents of domestic violence tend to follow pre-
dictable patterns and that certain remarks or gestures, although mean-
ingless to the average member of the public, may be understood by the
abused person as an affirmation and indication of impending abuse.
5 7
New Mexico's interpretation of immediate harm or death is much
more expansive than some other states.58 In People v. Aris,59 for exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court employed a much stricter definition.
The court held imminent danger requires "a demonstration of an imme-
diate intention to execute the threat .... A previous threat alone, unac-
companied by any immediate demonstration of force.., will not justify
50. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-702 (1986) (conduct which would otherwise constitute a
crime is justifiable if the actor engages in such conduct, under extraordinary circum-
stances, out of necessity to prevent greater harm from occurring).
51. Brandybeny, 812 P.2d at 678 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 676 (5th ed.
1979)).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985). See also B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us
Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1 DUKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 172-73 (1991). Although the Colorado General Assembly has not
specifically embraced the Model Penal Code (MPC), it did recodify the state's criminal laws
following the appearance of the Model Penal Code in 1971. People v.Jefferson, 748 P.2d
1223, 1228 (Colo. 1988). In specific areas, the Colorado courts have adopted the MPC
interpretations. Id. at 1228 (recognizing that the "extreme indifference" to murder statute
applied the MPC's four levels of culpability); People v. Merrill, 687 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo.
1984) (finding that the statute on resisting arrest abrogated the common law right to use
reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest).
53. See People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
54. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
55. New Mexico requires that the person claiming self-defense subjectively believe
that he or she is in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm and that belief must be
objectively reasonable. Id. at 1270-71.
56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id.
58. Those states that exclude Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony do so on the
premise that imminent danger means that there is no escaping the harm; it will occur
immediately. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. App. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763
P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
59. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (1989).
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or excuse an assault ... .",60 The court concluded there was "no evi-
dence of any reasonable indication in the sleeping victim's behavior that
he was about to attempt to harm the defendant," 6 1 and therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to receive a self-defense instruction. The
policy reasons behind the court's decision included the belief that a bat-
tered woman must look to other means provided by her family, friends
and society to resolve her problems. The court refused to accept that
killing her husband was an appropriate alternative. 6 2 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, in State v. Norman, applied a similar definition of
imminent to deny the defendant a self-defense instruction.65 There, the
court applied the traditional policy reasoning and said the defendant
must be faced with an instantaneous choice between killing her husband
or being killed or seriously injured to satisfy the imminence
requirement.6 4
In order to claim self-defense, a defendant's fear regarding immi-
nent danger of death or great bodily harm must be both honest and
reasonable. 6 5 Honesty focuses on the defendant's subjective state of
mind. Did the defendant actually believe she was in danger of death or
great bodily harm? Reasonableness, however, is an objective determina-
tion. Given the same set of circumstances, would an ordinary, prudent
person have believed that her life was in imminent danger? The objec-
tive determination is necessary to prevent people from acting on irra-
tional or unreasonable fears.
C. Battered Spouse Syndrome
1. Definition
The Battered Spouse Syndrome, developed by Dr. Lenore
Walker,6 6 provides a framework for assessing the abused woman's be-
havior. The syndrome consists of a three-phase cycle. During the first
phase, the "tension building" phase, the male verbally abuses the wo-
man and engages in minor battering.6 7 The woman often attempts to
placate her batterer by giving in to his demands, agreeing with him in an
argument or submitting to the abuse in order to stave off more intense
violence.6 8 The second phase, the "acute battering" phase, is most
often triggered by some event in the life of the battering male. This is
when the woman sustains the most severe injuries, including broken
60. Id at 173.
61. Id. at 176.
62. Id. at 174.
63. 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989), rev g 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
64. Id. at 13.
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2)(a) (1986).
66. See generally WALKER, supra note 4. Prior to Dr. Walker's published studies of bat-
tered women, Del Martin explored the common traits and problems facing battered wo-
men. Although the terminology "Battered Spouse Syndrome" was not used, Martin's
observations and conclusions conform with Dr. Walker's theory. See generally DEL MARTIN,
BA-rrERED WIVES(1976).
67. WALKER, supra note 4, at 56-59.
68. Id.
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bones, concussions, lacerations or even death.69 In the final phase, the
"contrition" phase, the batterer pleads for forgiveness and vows never
to do it again. This phase reinforces the woman's desire to believe that
her marriage/relationship is worth saving.70 The woman often feels
partially responsible for the battering incident, thinking it was some-
thing she did or said, or even believing her abuser was right to be angry
with her. This acceptance of the blame makes it easier for her to take
the batterer back. As time goes on and the cycle is repeated, the period
of time between the acute batterings gets shorter and shorter. Accord-
ing to Dr. Walker, a woman is a victim of the Battered Spouse Syndrome
when the cycle of violence occurs twice.
7 1
2. Use of Expert Testimony
Expert testimony72 'about the Battered Spouse Syndrome serves
two purposes. First, it dispels common myths about battered women.
Second, it provides the jury with some insight into the practical realities
of life as a battered woman so that the jury can assess her actions from
her perspective. The testimony is not supposed to justify the woman's
behavior, rather, it should serve as background information used to as-
sess the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that death or great
bodily harm is imminent. The expert provides a sense that the woman's
belief was reasonable, both objectively and subjectively. Consequently,
the expert's testimony is more persuasive than the defendant's own tes-
timony regarding the cycle of abuse.
Aside from offering testimony about the cyclical nature of the vio-
lence as mentioned above, the expert's testimony also focuses on the
other aspects of the syndrome that help explain why the battered woman
stayed with her abuser. 73 This type of testimony is essential to combat
the common myth that battered women choose to stay with their abusive
mates. The expert can explain that these women often do not have al-
ternatives and, at some level, do not want to see the relationship end.
After all, the entire relationship was not abusive and the contrition
phase provides hope that the abuse will stop. The expert can also offer
69. Id. at 59-65.
70. Id. at 65-70.
71. Id. at xv. The abuse does not always have to be physical. The batterer maintains
control over the woman through verbal and psychological abuse as well. Belittling and
degrading comments reinforce feelings of insecurity in the woman, and the batterer uses
that insecurity to keep the woman from asserting her independence.
72. According to Charles Ewing, the expert's testimony has two main components.
First, the expert describes the syndrome and explains the three-stage cycle. Then, the
expert describes how the abuse escalates as the cycle is repeated as well as the psychologi-
cal consequences of repeated abuse, such as depression, learned helplessness and false
hope that the batterer will change. The expert then explains how these consequences and
economic and social factors prevent the abused woman from leaving. Second, the expert
indicates whether the defendant suffered from the syndrome and explains how her exper-
iences with the batterer affected her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing. See
EWING, supra note 12, at 51-52.
73. See Shad, supra note 47, at 1167 & n.61 (discussing the dynamics of a battering
relationship and feelings of helplessness associated with repeated violence).
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evidence that most of these women suffer from low self-esteem, possess
traditional beliefs in their role as a wife and mother, have tremendous
feelings of guilt that the relationship is failing and accept responsibility
for the batterer's actions. 74 These characteristics also help combat the
lay-person's perceptions that the abused woman consciously chose to
stay with the batterer.
D. Self-Defense Claims of Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers in Other
Jurisdictions
The battered woman who kills her abuser usually does so in one of
three ways: (1) she hires a third person to kill the abuser, (2) she kills the
abuser when he is physically attacking her, or (3) she kills the abuser
during a lull in the violence or immediately following the violence.
75
Courts that address the situation where the defendant hires someone to
kill her batterer consistently refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense.
76
On the other hand, virtually all jurisdictions allow a self-defense instruc-
tion when the defendant kills her abuser at the moment of a physical
attack.7 7 However, when faced with the third scenario-the woman who
kills her abuser during a lull in the violence-the availability of a self-
defense instruction depends on state interpretations of the defense.
Scholarly debate78 and judicial scrutiny79 focus on the use of self-de-
fense and expert testimony in these types of cases. The following illus-
trates the different approaches courts use to resolve the self-defense
claims of these women.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Norman,80 reversed
the court of appeals' decision that allowed the defendant to introduce
testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome and proffer a self-defense
instruction to the jury on remand. The heinous abuse to which Mrs.
Norman was subjected for almost twenty-five years parallels that of a
prisoner of war.8 1 Yet, the court found that she was not entitled to a
74. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (referring to WALKER, supra note 4, at
35-36). However, a woman does not need to exhibit all of these characteristics to be a
victim of abuse.
75. People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
76. Id. at 763 (citing State v. Anderson, 758 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1983)).
77. Id. at 761 (referring to State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985)) (victim was
shot during a abusive incident).
78. See generally Byrd, supra note 52; Steele & Sigman, supra note 2; Willoughby, supra
note 12.
79. The states which have addressed the use of Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony
to support a self-defense claim include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wyoming, and the District of
Columbia. Cynthia L. Coffee, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissability of Expert
Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1987).
80. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
81. See Byrd, supra note 52, at 169-71 (comparing Judith Norman's experience to that
of a POW). Judith Norman's husband denied her food, beat, kicked and prostituted her.
In addition, on various occasions he crushed glass in her face, put cigarettes out on her
body and poured boiling liquids over her. Id. For a parallel discussion analogizing the
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self-defense instruction because she shot her husband while he slept.
On the day of the murder, Mr. Norman beat the defendant the en-
tire day and made her lie on the floor like a dog while he slept on the
bed. The defendant testified that the abuse had escalated in the two
days preceding his death and that she had to kill him. She "knew" that
when he woke up the abuse would start again, she could not take it any-
more, and she was too afraid of him to press charges or leave. 82 How-
ever, the supreme court stated that because the defendant was not faced
with the "instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being
killed or seriously injured," there was no imminent danger.83 Accord-
ing to the court, the defendant's subjective belief, no matter how honest,
could not overcome the absence of an objectively reasonable belief that
the danger was imminent. The court also expressed a deep concern that
allowing self-defense instructions in cases where the abused person kills
during a lull in the violence would legalize the "opportune killing of
abusive husbands . . .solely on the basis of the wives' testimony con-
cerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future feloni-
ous assaults by their husbands."
'8 4
The California Court of Appeals, in People v. Aris,85 held that the
trial court erred in omitting testimony about the Battered Spouse Syn-
drome and how years of abuse affected the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the killing. However, the court found the error harmless
because the defendant was not in imminent danger at the time of the
killing. The defendant's marriage to the victim, marred by years of
abuse, ended when she fatally shot him while he slept.8 6 On the evening
of the killing, the husband severely beat the defendant and, prior to fall-
ing asleep, warned her that he did not know if he would let her live until
the morning. The defendant testified that she felt she had to kill him
before he awoke because she feared that he would carry out his threat.
87
The court, sympathetic to the defendant's plight, stated that a valid self-
defense claim requires an honest belief that the defendant is in immi-
nent danger. Previous threats alone did not satisfy the imminence re-
quirement, unless the abuser couples those threats with an apparent
design at the same moment to carry them out, because the person who
made the threats could always abandon his intent to make good on the
them. 88 Lastly, the court stated that it could not excuse the defendant's
crime merely because walking-away from the sleeping victim would not
effects of the Thomas/Hill hearings on women with POW treatment, see Penelope E.
Bryan, Holding Women's Psyches Hostage: An Interpretive Analogy on the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 69
DENV. U. L. REv. 2 (1992).
82. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (the progressive nature of his abuse would inevitably
lead to her death).
83. Id at 14.
84. Id. at 15.
85. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
86. See Paterno, supra note 10, at El (detailing the events leading up to the abuser's
death).
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
88. Id. at 174.
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avoid future confrontations. The court explained that a battered spouse
must look to other means of protecting herself, such as family, friends, a
restraining order or a shelter. Although dicta, the court did find the
defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of the Battered Spouse
Syndrome to establish reasonableness.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in State v. Gallegos,89 adopted a
more liberal definition of imminence. Establishing self-defense in New
Mexico requires (1) the danger of death or serious bodily harm must
appear imminent to the defendant, (2) the defendant must actually be in
fear of that danger and (3) the defendant must act as a reasonable per-
son would act in the same circumstances. 90 The court stated that "[t]he
defendant must show that she was in fear of an apparent or immediate
danger . . . [but] need not prove that she was in actual danger." 9 1 In
addition, the court found the subjective perceptions of an individual
brutalized by domestic violence were especially critical to the determina-
tion of whether her actions were reasonable. However, the court made
it clear that evidence of a violent relationship is not sufficient alone to
give a self-defense instruction to the jury. Prior to the battered woman
defendant's use of force, the abuser-victim must exhibit some threaten-
ing behavior.
9 2
The case of State v. Leidholm9 3 represents the most liberal approach
to battered women who kill their abusers. Mrs. Leidholm ended her tu-
multuous and abusive marriage by stabbing her husband to death with a
butcher knife while he slept. The defendant and victim fought for sev-
eral hours on the evening of the killing. At one point, Mrs. Leidholm
attempted to call the police, but her husband prevented her from using
the phone. After he went to sleep, the defendant took a butcher knife
and stabbed him several times. At her trial, Mrs. Leidholm claimed she
acted in self-defense as a result of years of abuse,9 4 but she was nonethe-
less convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's conviction and adopted an entirely sub-
jective test for the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the immi-
nence of death or serious bodily harm. Based on North Dakota's self-
defense statutes, 9 5 the court held that if the defendant has an honest
belief that she is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm,
the question of self-defense can be put to the jury.96 The court also
held that the defendant can use expert testimony on the Battered
Spouse Syndrome to support her theory of self-defense because such
testimony allows the jury to evaluate the defendant's self-defense claim
from her perspective.
97
89. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
90. Id. at 1270.
91. Id. at 1271.
92. Id.
93. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
94. Id. at 814.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03 (1988).
96. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 818-19.
97. Id. at 819.
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E. Colorado Cases Involving Battered Women
Colorado appellate courts have decided two cases in which the de-
fendant claimed to have killed her abusive mate while acting in self-de-
fense: People v. Yaklich 98 and People v. Hare.99 Although neither case
presented a scenario in which the woman killed her abuser during a lull
in the violence, a brief description of each case is helpful in understand-
ing the current state of the law in Colorado.
In Yaklich, the defendant Donna Yaklich, hired two men to kill her
husband, Dennis, following years of abuse. 10 0 Whenever she tried to
leave him, he would threaten to kill her or a member of her family. In
constant fear for her life and believing that Dennis could kill her and get
away with it,' ° 1 Donna arranged to have her husband killed. On Decem-
ber 12, 1985, Edward and Charles Greenwell shot and killed Dennis
Yaklich in the driveway of his home. Following the murder, Donna paid
the Greenwells $4,200. 102 The police charged Donna Yaklich with first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The prosecution
maintained that the proceeds from her husband's $250,000 life insur-
ance policy and revenge for the years of abuse motivated Yaklich to ar-
range her husband's death.' 0 3 Donna, on the other hand, maintained
that she killed her husband in self-defense.10 4 The trial court allowed
Donna's attorney to introduce evidence that Donna was a victim of the
Battered Spouse Syndrome and tendered instructions to the jury con-
cerning self-defense, duress and apparent necessity. The jury acquitted
Yaklich of the murder charges, but convicted her of conspiracy to com-
mit first-degree murder and sentenced her to forty years in prison. 0 5
The prosecution appealed the propriety of the trial court's self-de-
98. 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant hired two men to kill her abusive
husband).
99. 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant killed abusive live-in boyfriend
while struggling over a gun) aff'd 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990).
100. The events leading up to the murder are important in understanding Donna's
self-defense claim. During her eight-year marriage to Dennis, Donna suffered physical and
emotional abuse at the hands of her husband. Her husband often used steroids, which
increased his violent nature. Various episodes of abuse included pushing her down a flight
of stairs, choking her, aiming a gun at her, repeatedly beating her head against a window,
kicking her and threatening to kill her and members of her family. In addition, Dennis
required Donna to be awake and dressed when he came home from work at three or four
in the morning with a meal prepared for him. She had to stay awake and carry on a con-
versation with him and listen to his constant belittling and degrading comments about her.
After slapping her around, Dennis forced sex on her but never let her sleep in the same
bed with him. Because Dennis was a police officer, Donna believed that reporting the
abuse, either to police or other authorities, would only aggravate the situation. In the
months preceding his death, the episodes of abuse and threats of death intensified. Appel-
lee's Opening Brief at 6-11, People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) [herein-
after Opening Brief].
101. Id. at 16-17.
102. She paid the brothers over a period of weeks following the murder and subse-
quent funeral. Appellee's Answer Brief at 6-7, People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct.
App. 199 1) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
103. Opening Brief, supra note 100, at 1.
104. Id.
105. Yaklich, 833 P.2d at 760.
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fense instruction in a "murder-for-hire" situation. The appeals court
held that, even if the defendant presents credible evidence that she suf-
fers from the Battered Spouse Syndrome, the court cannot give a self-
defense instruction to the jury in a murder-for-hire case. 10 6 The court
gave three reasons for its holding: (1) of the other jurisdictions to con-
sider the Battered Spouse Syndrome in conjunction with a murder-for-
hire case, none have allowed a self-defense instruction, 10 7 (2) a self-de-
fense instruction in a murder-for-hire situation would undermine "an-
cient notions" of self-defense' 0 8 and (3) such a decision would establish
poor public policy because the men she hired were convicted for mur-
der.'0 9  Adopting the reasoning of the Missouri and Tennessee
courts, 10 the Colorado Court of Appeals implicitly concluded that the
defense had not presented any evidence to support the instruction, and
therefore, was not entitled to an instruction "embodying its theory of
the case.""'I  In order to reach that result, the court decided that the
defendant was not in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm
at the time of the killing, 112 but, the court refused to define "immi-
nent. " 3 The court, however, did accept the admission of the Battered
Spouse Syndrome testimony without commenting on whether it was
properly introduced or what circumstances might justify introduction of
such evidence. 14 Thus, the precedent established by People v. Yaklich is
limited to the situation where the battered spouse hires a third party to
kill her mate. 
1 15
In People v. Hare,116 the defendant shot and killed her live-in boy-
friend. The only issue on appeal was whether the judge must provide
the jury with an instruction on "apparent necessity," ' 1 7 in addition to a
106. Id.
107. Id. at 763. These courts conclude that a self-defense instruction and evidence of
Battered Spouse Syndrome in murder-for-hire cases is improper because those situations
pose no immediate or imminent danger. See State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Leaphart, 673
S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
108. Id. (citing State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) ("The killing of another
human being is the most extreme recourse to our inherent right of self-preservation and
can be justified in law only by the utmost real or apparent necessity brought about by the
decedent.")).
109. Id.
110. State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App 1990) (the fact that defendant
hired the killers does not support a self-defense claim); Missouri v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d
895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Battered Spouse
Syndrome where defendant hired a hit man); Tennessee v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870
(Tenn. Grim. App. 1983) (wife was not in immediate danger at the time husband was killed
by hired killers).
111. Yaklich, 833 P.2d at 763.
112. Donna was at home in bed when the Greenwells killed her husband. Opening
Brief, supra note 100, at 17.
113. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 763.
114. Id. The court's conclusion assumed that the evidence was admissible and
credible.
115. The court specifically stated that "a self-defense instruction was not available in a
contract-for-hire situation." Id. at 760.
116. 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990).
117. Apparent necessity is the idea that the actor may act on the appearance of immi-
nent danger. The danger may not actually be real, it needs only be real to the actor. This
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self-defense instruction. Only the dissenting opinion mentioned the de-
fendant's history of abuse at the hands of her mate.' 1 8 The defendant
testified that she lived with the victim for approximately six months
before the shooting and during that time the decedent repeatedly beat,
threatened, humiliated and intimidated her.1 9 On the evening of the
shooting, the decedent threatened the defendant's life with a gun after
assaulting her. The decedent was shot during a struggle for the gun,
120
therefore, neither the supreme court nor the court of appeals addressed
the propriety of a self-defense instruction or the admissibility of Bat-
tered Spouse Syndrome testimony. Because the scenario in Hare in-
volved traditional self-defense by fulfilling the imminent danger
requirement, the court saw no reason to address the special self-defense
issues of battered women.' 21
In light of the foregoing analysis and the absence of affirmative leg-
islation on the matter, it is clear that Colorado has not yet addressed the
issue of availability of a self-defense instruction or the admissibility of
expert testimony concerning the Battered Spouse Syndrome in cases
where a woman kills her abuser. Consequently, the remainder of this
Note analyzes (1) how theories of punishment do not support punishing
battered women and (2) why courts can and should use Colorado's self-
defense statute and rules of evidence to provide equality for women who
kill their batterers during a lull in the violence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Theories of Punishment
By punishing women who kill'their abusers, the judicial system does
not further any of the theories of punishment. First, particular deter-
rence is not served because the object of the crime, the abusive spouse,
no longer poses a threat and there is no continuing incentive for the
woman to commit the crime in the future. Even assuming she enters
into another abusive relationship, the fear of incarceration will not deter
her from killing again. In fact, the resulting economic effects of a prison
sentence may further limit her ability to extricate herself from the sec-
ond abusive relationship.1 2 2 In addition, general deterrence does not
apply to battered women, because the women who kill their batterers do
so when they believe their only options are tor "kill or be killed." 1 23 The
premise of general deterrence is that once she has killed, she poses a
threat to the community or at least to other men with whom she may
develop a relationship. The self-preservation aspect of these crimes out-
weighs any deterrent effect of punishment. A battered woman, on the
concept is also termed "the right to be wrong." People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 833 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989).
118. Id. at 833 (Dubofsky, J. dissenting).
119. Id. at 831, 833.
120. Id. at 831.
121. Id. at 833.
122. See EWING, supra note 12, at 88-89.
123. Willoughby, supra note 12, at 171.
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brink of using deadly force, in all likelihood will not stop and ponder the
consequences of her actions. As an inmate in the Framingham Correc-
tional Institution in Massachusetts explained, "it's not something that
happens overnight, like, my boyfriend slapped me, so I killed him. This
is years of abuse-mental, physical, all kinds." 124 Even if she does stop
to consider the consequences, the resulting conclusion will likely be that
the benefits of killing-specifically preservation of her life-will out-
weigh the costs. 12 5 Incapacitation is also not a suitable motive for pun-
ishing these women because the objects of their violent acts, the
decedents, no longer pose threats. Therefore, the risk of harm to others
is minimal. Similarly, rehabilitation as a means of reforming the crimi-
nal 126 does not serve a useful purpose in the battered-woman context.
The criminal will not likely kill again because the situation precipitating
the crime no longer exists.
The only theory of punishment that might fit this situation is retri-
bution. However, this theory is not persuasive in the context of women
who, as a last resort, strike out against their abusers. The women serv-
ing time for killing their abusers feel much freer in jail than they did
while their batterers were alive. 127 In essence, their incarceration is not
nearly as punishing as the life they faced while their abusers were
alive.12 8 Somejudges, governors and congressmen believe the agony of
living in a battering relationship for any number of years is enough pun-
ishment for these women, 12 9 and retribution in the form of imprison-
ment would be redundant.
124. Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
125. See EwING, supra note 12, at 86-88.
126. Id.
127. Grassfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
128. The stories recounted by these women include abusers pouring boiling water on
them, smashing their teeth out with hammers and forcibly raping them. The fear of repri-
sal from the batterer is an all-encompassing fear that is more debilitating than the fear of
incarceration. Id.
129. For example, a judge in Illinois refused to re-sentence a 61 year-old woman con-
victed of killing her abusive husband whose conviction was overturned on appeal. He
reasoned that in addition to the three and a half years she had already spent in prison, she
had served a twenty-year sentence at the hands of her late husband. Peter Kendall, Woman
Who Killed Her Husband Won't Have to Return to Prison, CHI. TIRis., Dec. 7, 1991, at D-5. See
also Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1 ("[These women] are doubly punished. First battered by
their lover, then imprisoned by the state for defending their lives.").
Subject to severe criticism, the governors of Maryland, Ohio and Washington recently
commuted the sentences of women serving time in those states for killing their abusive
husbands. See generally Paterno, supra note 10. Governor Schaefer of Maryland commuted
the sentences of ten women because he believed that these women were "driven to vio-
lence by their abusive mates." Howard Scheider, Schaefer to Free 2 Inmates, WASH. PosT,
June 28, 1991, at B1. The governors of Illinois, New Hampshire, Louisiana, New Jersey
and Tennessee freed inmates serving sentences for killing their abusers. Texas and Flor-
ida are investigating whether to release similar prisoners. Florida Considers Clemency, USA
TODAY, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3A.
The House Judiciary subcommittee is considering a bill that would set aside $1.2 mil-
lion for research and judicial training programs involving domestic violence. Rep. Con-
stance Morella sponsored the bill because she believes that congressional support, to
broaden the defenses available to battered spouses who kill their abusers, would prompt
widespread changes in state laws. KentJenkins,Jr., Morella Bill Would Provide Aidfor Defense
of Battered Spouses, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1992, at B3.
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When society punishes women who kill their abusive spouses, it
must also consider the impact on the children of these relationships.
For years, these children watched their fathers or step-fathers physically
and emotionally batter their mothers or step-mothers without the legal
system or law enforcement personnel intervening or punishing him for
his behavior. Yet when a mother fights back to protect her life and her
children's lives, that same system punishes her. Are young boys left with
the message that it is acceptable to abuse women? Are young girls left
with the idea that they must accept the beatings and cannot attempt to
fight back? If the tragedy of abuse is ever to end, society in general (and
the legal system specifically) must show children that abuse is not ac-
ceptable. Because punishing these women does not further any of the
goals of punishment, the legal system could better serve society by al-
lowing battered women to start new lives.13 0 More specifically, courts
could achieve justice for these women by allowing them to use self-
defense.
B. Self-Defense
Assumptions regarding (1) the amount of force necessary to repel
an attack, (2) the need to wait until the aggressor attacks and (3) percep-
tions of imminence associated with self-defense and forming the basis of
traditional self-defense, are unwarranted in a male-female confronta-
tion. First, the man is usually much larger and stronger than his female
counterpart. Second, considering these differences, the deadly force
employed by a battered woman would be reasonable ifjudged from her
perspective, with her physical characteristics and personal experiences
as a victim of abuse.' 3 ' Consequently, in the context of a battered wo-
man, evidence of women's perceptions and fears should be presented to
juries to counter the long-standing male bias inherent in self-defense.
The crucial aspect of self-defense for battered women is the objective rea-
sonableness of her belief that she is in imminent danger.132 Definitions of
imminent danger and reasonableness, therefore, must take into account
the circumstances surrounding the situation in order to treat women
fairly.
1. Perceptions of Imminent Danger
In general, men and women perceive danger differently. A woman
walking down a dark street with a strange car following her will fear for
her safety sooner than a man. Her perception of fear is grounded in her
physical characteristics (strength and size) and her past experiences with
danger. Therefore, it is patently unfair to judge the reasonableness of a
130. Many of the women in prison for killing their abusers are genuinely sorry they did
it-not because they have to serve time, but because they really loved the person they
killed. They say they never intended to kill the abuser but only wanted to stop the pain.
See generally Grossfeld, supra note 2; Paterno, supra note 10.
131. See Shad, supra note 47, at n.37.
132. See generally Montgomery, supra note 10, at A4.
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woman's fear that she is in imminent danger, as required for self-de-
fense, without considering the situation as she perceived it, including
her physical characteristics and past experiences.
The narrow views of North Carolina and California courts on rea-
sonableness and imminence ignore the realities of a battering situation.
From the personal experiences of the battered woman, she knows the
patterns and predispositions of the attacker. "A battered woman may
believe she is in imminent danger every moment she is in the presence
of her partner." 133 She is certain he will carry out his threats and that
the next beating will be more severe than the last. After all, he repeat-
edly beat her in the past, and the abusive episodes are escalating.'
8 4
The likelihood that the threatened harm will not occur may be minimal.
In fact, the batterer often promises that he will kill her, and she believes
him. In this type of situation, the abused woman must be prepared to
protect herself at all times, lest her abuser carry out his death threats. 13 5
"[N]ot knowing precisely when the next attack will occur is not tanta-
mount to a lack of imminent peril."' 1 6 In fact, the cyclical nature of the
abuse teaches the abused woman to recognize the signs of an impending
attack.13 7 Testimony concerning the reality of a battered woman's life
helps the jury ascertain whether her fear for her life or safety at the time
she killed her batterer was warranted. Most courts agree that expert
testimony is relevant on this issue, regardless of whether the court ac-
cepts the expert testimony to establish the objective reasonableness of
the defendant's actions.
1 38
2. Reasonableness of Belief in Imminent Danger
As previously mentioned, the definition of imminent is subject to
varying judicial interpretations; a similar split in judicial decisions
plagues the reasonableness standard. The courts that narrowly define
"imminent" also hold the defendant to a "reasonably prudent person"
133. Kathee Rebernak Brewer, Note, Missouri's New Law on "Battered Spouse Syndrome:" A
Moral Victory, A Partial Solution, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 227, 233 (1988).
134. Most of these women strike back when they sense their attacker may seriously
injure or kill them. There is an urgency about the situation-they know someone will die.
See, e.g., People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 833 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (the decedent told the
defendant that "he would kill her and that one of them would not be alive in the morn-
ing.") aff'd, 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990). Aside from the barrage of death threats, exact
behavior that triggers the woman's fear of impending death is hard to pinpoint, except
that, usually, the "reign of terror" has been non-stop for the twenty-four hours preceding
the killing. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (the abuse, which included
deprivation of food, kicking, slapping, throwing objects and putting cigarettes out on her
body, escalated over the two days preceding the killing).
135. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 179.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); See also State v. Stewart,
763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (although the court held expert testimony was inadmissible to
show the reasonableness of defendant's actions, that same testimony was relevant to judg-
ing the honesty of the defendant's belief that she was in danger); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the expert testimony was relevant to both the honesty and
reasonableness of belief in danger).
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or "a person of ordinary firmness" standard.'1 9 The wording of those
standards was modified in recent years to make the test gender-neutral,
however, the actual implementation of those standards is not gender-
neutral.' 40 "A man's mental perceptions of danger, immediacy, and
harm inform the perception of what constitutes a reasonable physical
response." 141
Those courts that refuse to give a self-defense instruction to the
battered-woman defendant fail to recognize that a woman's belief in
danger can still be reasonable, although it may be different because of
her experiences and size. By rejecting her claim of imminent danger,
courts perpetuate the reasonable man standard and usurp the jury's role
in deciding what is "reasonable." To hold the defendant to a standard
of whether a reasonable, non-battered person would react in an identical
manner is to judge her actions in a vacuum. Such a standard ascribes
alternatives to the battered woman that may never exist in her world.
Society, in general, believes that the battered woman can either leave or
seek police protection. These alternatives are actually quite unrealistic.
A common experience among battered women who try to leave their
mates is that they are tracked down and beaten and/or killed for at-
tempting to leave.14 2 In addition, the abuser often threatens to kill the
woman or someone she loves if she leaves. 143 Relying on the police also
proves ineffective. For years, police reluctantly got involved in domestic
disputes, and often sought a reconciliation, as opposed to an arrest.
144
However, when women call the police to arrest their mates, they often
face even more severe beatings if the husband returns home. 14 5 When
restraining orders are not enforced, and arrest warrants are not issued,
what alternatives does the battered woman have?
These misconceptions about battered women govern jurors' ideas
of reasonableness. The jurors judge the defendant's actions by a stan-
dard that accords her many more opportunities to escape than she actu-
ally had at the time. Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse
Syndrome can combat these misconceptions and inform the jury of how
the defendant perceived her situation. In State v. Kelly,14 6 the court con-
cluded that "the expert's testimony [concerning the Battered Spouse
Syndrome], if accepted by the jury, would have aided it in determining
whether, under the circumstances [i.e., the circumstances of her life, not
just at the time of the incident], a reasonable person would have be-
139. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (rejecting the idea that evidence of the
battering relationship could serve as a basis for reasonable belie).
140. Crocker, supra note 42, at 126-28.
141. Id. at 127.
142. See generally Shad, supra note 47.
143. Id.
144. In Metropolitan Denver, 50%6 of the police departments use mediation or separa-
tion of the parties in response to domestic violence calls. MILE HIGH UNITED WAY RE-
SEARCH & PLANNING DEPARTMENT, SPECIAL REPORT: CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - METRo DENVER 7 (1989).
145. See Crocker, supra note 42, at 134.
146. 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984).
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lieved there was imminent danger to her life." 14 7 Preventing the intro-
duction of this testimony forces the jury to judge the defendant's
reasonableness from a perspective of a non-battered person, a world to-
tally foreign to the defendant when she acted.
148
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "reasonable
belief rather than absolute certainty is the touchstone of self-de-
fense."' 149 In addition, the supreme court in Beckett v. People 150 held the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions must be judged from the to-
tality of circumstances. 1 5 1 A defendant is justified in self-defense if a
reasonable person, under like conditions and circumstances, would be-
lieve the use of force was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
harm. 152 Based on these readings of the self-defense statute, a battered
woman should be entitled to have the reasonableness of her actions
judged from her perspective. The jury should be allowed to consider
her life experiences in determining whether her actions were reason-
able. The effects of such experiences are usually offered by an expert
witness.
A common myth regarding battered women is that they are all low-
income, uneducated women. However, the reality is the abusive rela-
tionship knows no class boundaries. The battering may begin with ver-
bal abuse and criticism, as well as isolation from friends and family.
Eventually the victim begins to believe she is actually a bad mother or
bad wife or stupid, leaving her with little self-confidence or self-esteem
and very few friends. 15 3 Once the physical abuse begins, her first reac-
tion is to flee. But, many have nowhere to go and fear reprisal from
their batterers if they do leave. 15 4 Leaving the batterer is often not an
option even if the woman can overcome the fear of reprisal. Typically
the husband knows where she works and can easily track her down. 155
The systematic demoralization and isolation that result from continued
physical and verbal abuse leaves the battered woman with little confi-
dence or resolve. These factors, combined with the reality of having
147. Id. at 377.
148. See State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 578 (based on the court's perception of immi-
nence, as opposed to the defendant's perception of imminence, the court "objectively"
concluded that a battered woman cannot reasonably fear imminent life-threatening danger
from her sleeping spouse).
149. See Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74, 78 (Colo. 1990); People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9,
13 (Colo. 1984).
150. 800 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1990).
151. Id. at 78.
152. Id. (quoting People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)).
153. See Carol Lawson, Violence at Home: 'They Don't Want Anyone to Know', N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1992, at CI (reporting on the abuse of successful, educated women by their
equally successful husbands).
154. In many cases, the violence only escalates after a separation. "Violent men...
search desperately for their partners once [they] leav[e]" and it is this fear of reprisal or
death once the men find them that makes remaining with them preferable. BROWNE, supra
note 39, at 114-15. See EWING, supra note 12, at 12-21 (describing the realities of battered
women's lives that limit their ability to leave the batterer); Martin, supra note 65, at 72-86
(explaining why these women are often unable to leave the abusive relationship).
155. If she has ajob, it limits the geographic area available to her. If she does not have
a job, then her option of leaving is limited by her lack of financial resources.
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nowhere to go, tend to keep the woman in the abusive relationship.1 5 6
Finally, the court in State v. Kelly stated that "[o]nly by understand-
ing these unique pressures that force battered women to remain with
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe
bodily harm and isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a
battered woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood."
15 7
This approach presents a much more realistic view of the life of these
women.
C. Battered Spouse Syndrome Testimony
People unaccustomed to the dynamics of a battering relationship,
including most jurors, cannot understand why a woman stays in an abu-
sive relationship.1 58 The complexities of a battered woman's life and
the reasons she remained in the marriage are "beyond the understand-
ing of an average juror."'15 9 Expert testimony is, therefore, essential to
a successful assertion of self-defense.1 60 Colorado Rule of Evidence
702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.' 6 1 Colorado courts
have not discussed the admissibility of expert testimony on Battered
Spouse Syndrome under Rule 702. However, the Colorado Supreme
Court discussed the admissibility of expert testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome in People v. Hampton.' 62 The prosecution used testimony
about rape trauma syndrome to bolster the victim's credibility, a Similar
to testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome, this testimony does not
tell the jury the victim was actually raped because she fits the profile of a
rape trauma victim. Instead, it informs the jury the actions taken (or not
taken) by the defendant are consistent with those of the typical rape vic-
tim. 16 3 For example, if the victim does not report the crime immedi-
ately, the defense attorney will try to use that fact to attack the victim's
credibility. However, a delay in reporting the rape is consistent with
Rape Trauma Syndrome. Armed with such knowledge, the jury can bet-
ter ascertain the veracity of the victim's testimony.16
4
In Hampton, the supreme court announced that Colorado did not
follow the Frye test' 65 to determine the admissibility of expert testimony
156. Dr. Walker explains that the battered woman's options are limited by learned
helplessness. This helpless state evolves from the battered woman's belief that she cannot
control what happens to her. As a result, she believes that she can never influence or
change her situation and stops trying. WALKER, supra note 4, at 45-51. See also EWING,
supra note 12, at 20-21.
157. 478 A.2d 364, 372 (NJ. 1984).
158. See Shad, supra note 47, at 1165.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. COLO. R. EVID. 702.
162. 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987).
163. Id. at 952-53.
164. Id. at 952.
165. The Frye test is a standard used forjudging the admissibility of expert testimony of
a scientific nature that originated prior to the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence.
According to the Frye test, the technology must be accepted by a majority of the relevant
scientific community for the court to consider it reliable. Id. at 950 n.5.
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when the testimony involves psychological theories or models, as op-
posed to physical evidence (i.e., polygraph tests). The court held that
"expert testimony assists the jury within the meaning of [Colorado Rule
of Evidence] 702 because it is helpful to the jury in determining what
effect should be given to the victim's delay in reporting the crime."
166
Similar analysis would allow defendants to introduce expert testimony
on the Battered Spouse Syndrome. Although the Colorado appellate
courts have not ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony on the
Battered Spouse Syndrome, some trial courts allow it.
16 7
The opponents of admitting Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony
and tendering self-defense instructions believe that it will give women
free rein to kill their husbands. In fact, the North Carolina Supreme
Court decision in Norman expressed this fear. 168 The court stated that
"[t]he relaxed requirements for.., self-defense.., would tend to cate-
gorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands by their
wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjec-
tive speculation as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their
husbands."' 69 However, those same criticisms could be leveled against
any affirmative defense where the decision turns on the defendant's
word against the decedent's (i.e., heat of passion or traditional self-de-
fense). As with any affirmative defense, there is always the risk of error
favoring the defendant. But, the defendant cannot simply plead self-
defense without competent evidence to support her claim and expect to
be acquitted. 170 That is precisely why we use jury trials. Juries are to
determine the credibility of the defendant's witnesses and the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's belief that she was in danger. 17 1 The out-
right refusal to admit testimony of Battered Spouse Syndrome to
support the defendant's story or the refusal to tender a self-defense in-
struction to the jury is tantamount to depriving the defendant of a jury
trial-the court has determined that her version of the facts is
implausible.
For example, when the court in State v. Norman refused to acknowl-
edge the self-defense claim of a woman who killed her abuser during a
lull in the violence, it effectively imposed its perception of imminence on
the defendant. As noted above, perceptions of imminent danger vary
depending on situations and experiences. By imposing the court's per-
ception of danger on the defendant's actions, the court ignores the reali-
ties of the defendant's life with the batterer and holds the defendant to
an unrealistic standard of reasonableness. Only when courts allowjuries
to assess the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in light of her
166. Id. at 952.
167. Alan Katz, Reali Psychologist Vaffles on the Stand, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1992, at Cl
(Dr. Lenore Walker testified about the effects of the Battered Spouse Syndrome on Jen-
nifer Reali, a woman who claimed to be insane at the time she killed her lover's wife).
168. 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989).
169. Id.
170. See EwING, supra note 12, at 89-91 (explaining how burden of production and re-
quiring some competent evidence will reduce the number of spurious claims).
171. Byrd, supra note 52, at 189.
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situation at the time of the murder will self-defense attain gender-
neutrality.
Colorado adheres to the proposition that a defendant is entitled to
a jury instruction embodying her theory of the case if there is any evi-
dence to support it.172 This means that in order for the judge to in-
struct the jury on self-defense, the defendant must present credible
evidence that she acted in fear for her life. In fact, the Colorado
Supreme Court has held that failure to issue an instruction on self-de-
fense when the defendant offered evidence to show that he acted in self-
defense amounts to a usurpation of the jury's function. 173 Concrete evi-
dence in a battered-spouse case showing (1) the defendant suffered
years of physical, sexual and mental abuse, and (2) the batterer had
threatened to kill or severely beat her, is clearly "some evidence" that
the defendant acted in fear of death or great bodily harm. With that
evidence, the jury should decide whether her story is credible and
whether her belief was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Intra-familial violence continues to be a major problem in the
United States. Statistics show that, in any given year, as many as six
million women will be beaten by boyfriends or husbands. 174 With the
prevalence of violence in our society, Colorado must inevitably decide
how its judiciary will treat battered women and whether its legal system
will inject equality into self-defense. The ultimate decision will speak
volumes about the status of women in the criminal justice system. Since,
punishing women who kill their abusers does not fit the commonly ac-
cepted justifications for imposing punishment and will impact the chil-
dren who witnessed the repeated violence, strong motivation exists for
encouraging Colorado courts to allow these women to employ the self-
defense doctrine.
Traditional self-defense focuses on one-time attacks or violent en-
counters between men. In order to successfully claim self-defense, a de-
fendant must prove that the actions were based on a real and reasonable
fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm. But this defense can
only be employed by battered women if courts choose to make the
ground rules gender-neutral. In order to progress towards gender-neu-
trality, juries should decide whether the battered defendant's belief was
reasonable based on evidence of the defendant's perceptions and fears.
Colorado's current self-defense statute and its rules of evidence should
172. People v. Banks, 804 P.2d 203, 206 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that "a
defendant is entitled to ... an instruction [on his theory of the case] no matter how im-
probable or unreasonable his theory may be, as long as the instruction is grounded on the
evidence.").
173. Young v. People, 107 P. 274, 276 (1910).
174. See EWING, supra note 12, at 95; see also Lara Gold, Women Who Leave Abusive Men
Sometimes Pay Lethal Pice, FORT MYERS NEWS-PRESS, Aug. 4, 1992 (indicating that current
projections indicate that nearly one-quarter of the women in the United States, more than
12 million, will be abused by a current or former partner at some time during their lives).
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allow these women to proffer self-defense instructions to the jury be-
cause (1) the defendant need only present some evidence to support her
theory of the case to receive the instruction and (2) the use of expert
testimony regarding Battered Spouse Syndrome provides that evidence.
Then, by judging these women in light of their history of abuse, the
traditional male-oriented concepts of reasonableness and imminence
will finally become gender-neutral standards which allow battered wo-
men to prevail on legitimate self-defense claims.
Joan L. Cordutsky
THE COLORADO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
PANACEA OR PANDORA'S Box?
I. INTRODUCTION
One easily forgets the rampant marketplace abuses that existed in
this country less than ninety years ago. Unscrupulous sellers of proprie-
tary medicines and nostrums preyed on desperate consumers, checked
only by limits of their creativity and greed. In the early Twentieth Cen-
tury, a consumer could select from a variety of cures for cancer, tumors,
asthma, diphtheria, gallstones and epilepsy. 1 During the heyday of
quackery, there existed little, if any, regulation of the market, and con-
sumers relied primarily on dependable publications to warn them of po-
tentially fraudulent claims.
2
Both Texas and Colorado enacted deceptive trade legislation within
three years of each other.3 Both Acts provide treble damages and attor-
1. In 1912, the American Medical Association published a book entitled NOSTRUMS
AND QUACKERY, intended to warn unsuspecting consumers of the fraud perpetrated by
nostrum vendors and proprietors of patent medicines. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
NosTRuMs AND QUACKERY (2d ed. 1912). The book described over a dozen fraudulent
"cancer and tumor cures" available to consumers of the time. The most notable of these
cures was Dr. Bye's Combination Oil Cure, touted as "[a]n infallible cure for all forms of
cancer... [and] an absolute antidote for all cancerous afflictions." Id. at 34. C.W. Mixer,
another cunning entrepreneur of the time, claimed his cancer cure gave "safe, speedy and
certain relief to the most horrible forms of cancer of the breast, face, stomach and womb."
Id. at 57. The Radio-Sulpho Company of Denver, Colorado marketed its own product,
which, when used in conjunction with a plaster made of Limburger cheese, was supposed
to cure cancer. "The cost of this evil-smelling treatment [was] $25.00 a month 'and up-
ward'." Id. at 62-63.
Dr. D.H. Dye made even more outlandish claims. He claimed that "[n]o women need
any longer dread the pains of childbirth, or remain childless," and that he "has proved
that all pain at childbirth may be entirely banished .... Id. at 237. Another enterprising
businessman was A.W. Van Bysterveld, a self-proclaimed expert urine inspector. "A.W.
Van Bysterveld, the chief inspector, whose secret methods are not taught in schools, exam-
ines on an average of 25,000 bottles of urine a year. This alone stamps him as an authority
and of exceptional qualifications." Id. at 290-91. In Cincinnati, Otto Kalmus headed the
"Epileptic Institute," which distributed "The Schbnka Treatment." The advertisements
for this treatment professed that "[n]o epileptic, no matter how severe his trouble, should
hesitate in taking the Sch~nka Treatment, for if his case is curable this treatment is the one
he can depend on." Id. at 350-351.
2. See id
3. The Texas legislature enacted the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA) in
1973. The current enactment is found in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (West
1987 & Supp. 1992). The Texas legislature has amended the DTPA in every regularly
scheduled legislative session since its original enactment. See DTPA, 63d Leg., R.S., ch.
143, 1973 TEx. GEN. LAws 322; DTPA, ch. 62, 1975 TEx. GEN. LAws 149; DTPA, chs. 216
& 336, 1977 TEx. GEN. LAws 600, 892; DTPA, ch. 603, 1979 TEx. GEN. LAws 1327; DTPA,
ch. 307, 1981 Tx. GEN. LAws 863; DTPA, ch. 883, 1983 TEx. GEN. LAws 4943; DTPA, ch.
564, 1985 TEx. GEN. LAws 2165; DTPA, ch. 280, 1987 TEx. GEN. LAws 1641; DTPA, ch.
380, 1989 TEx. GEN. LAws 1490. Unless otherwise indicated, the Act referred to will be
the 1989 amended version.
On the other hand, the Colorado legislature enacted its Consumer Protection Act in
1969, and has made only minor changes since. The current enactment is found in COLO.
REv. STAT. § 6-1-101 (1973 & Supp. 1990). The only changes were made by 1975 COLO.
SEss. LAws 259, § 1; 1984 CoLo. SESS. LAws 289, 290, §§ 2, 2; 1985 COLO. SESS. LAws
141
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ney fees for a successful plaintiff. Drastic disparities, however, exist in
the number of deceptive trade cases litigated in each state, the number
ofjournal articles published on the topic in each state and the legal com-
munity's general familiarity with the Acts in each state.4 In essence, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA) that originally served as
a shield against unscrupulous sellers 5 has now become a sword,6 while
disuse has relegated the Colorado Act to virtual obscurity. Part I of this
Article provides a general overview of deceptive trade legislation while
Part II compares the historical development and current treatment of
deceptive trade statutes in both Colorado and Texas. Part III discusses
the reasons for the Colorado Act's relative obscurity and speculates as to
whether increased use would be a panacea or Pandora's box.
II. BACKGROUND
Although quackery did not die easily, crackdowns by the United
States Postal Service and the Food and Drug Administration in the early
Twentieth Century eventually led to its demise.7 During this same time
period, Printer's Ink, a trade publication, proposed a model statute to
deal with misleading, deceptive and unfair practices.8 This proposed
307, § 2; 1987 COLO. SEss. LAws 357, §§ 3, 4; 1989 COLO. SESS. LAws 360, 363, 357, §§ 1,
2, 4; and 1990 COLO. SEss. LAws 380, 378, §§ 2, 2; 1991 COLO. SESS. LAWs 329, 331 §§ 1.
4. One commentator observed the importance of familiarity with UDAP legislation:
If we fail to tell our students that this legislation exists, they may overlook it when
they enter practice. The risk of overlooking such statutes appears even greater
when we recognize that the relatively low amounts at issue seldom justify exhaus-
tive research. If we fail to consider these statutes when we write about contracts
problems, our discussion may be incomplete and misleading.
Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections of Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 575, 589
(1989).
The staggering number of cases generated by the TDTPA and the shear number of
periodical and law journal articles on the topic suggest that most practicing attorneys in
that state are aware of the statute. Indeed, the more cases and articles discussing the topic,
the more familiar the respective legal community becomes with the state's consumer pro-
tection statute. In Colorado, however, over the past twenty years, there have only been
approximately 20 reported cases involving the Colorado DTPA-half of which were
brought by the Attorney General's office. There are no law review articles specifically dis-
cussing the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), but a few articles contain vague
and tangential references to the Act. The lack of primary and secondary material suggests
that Colorado attorneys are unaware of the Act and the benefits it can offer wronged con-
sumers and their attorneys.
5. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977)(Texas legislature intended
DTPA to deter unscrupulous sellers who engage in deceptive trade).
6. See generally John R. Harrison, Jr., The Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act: The Shield Becomes A Sword, 17 ST. MARY's LJ. 879 (1986).
7. Id.
8. The proposed statute read:
Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell or in any wise
dispose of merchandise, securities, services, or anything offered by such person,
firm, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or
distribution, or with intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the
public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire
title thereto, or an interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates, or
places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this State, in a newspaper
or otherpublication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, circu-
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statute was the first dealing with deceptive practices prior to the forma-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. Quackery, however, was
only one form of deceptive or fraudulent trade practice. Although that
particular form faded into history, many other forms still exist today.
In the past thirty years, all states have enacted some sort of legisla-
tion intended to curb fraudulent, deceptive and unfair trade practices. 9
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initially prompted states to enact
UDAP statutes1 ° and most states eventually adopted one of the forms
suggested by the FTC.1 1 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
also encouraged states to enact similar consumer protection legisla-
tion. 12 Most of the state UDAP statutes are patterned after the language
lar, pamphlet, or letter, or in any other way, an advertisement of any other re-
garding merchandise, securities, .service, or anything so offered to the public,
which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
EARL W. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES: A GUIDE FOR THE
BUSINESSMAN 480 (1971). While this proposed legislation was far from a model of clarity,
containing a single sentence with over 160 words, forty states eventually adopted it. Id. at
14.
9. See generally Appendix I.
10. Marshall A. Leaffer and Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Decep-
tive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses Of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 521, 522 (1980); William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL.
L. REV. 724, 729 n.10, 730 n.14 (1972) [hereinafter Lovett I]. The acronyms UDAP (Un-
fair or Deceptive Acts and Practices) and DTPA (Deceptive Trade Practices Acts) are used
somewhat imprecisely in this Article and Appendix I to describe various state enactments
proscribing unfair, unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent trade practices. This impreci-
sion is necessary because there is no uniform term used to describe these statutes.
11. In 1967, 1969 and 1970, the Council of State Governments published recommen-
dations for model deceptive trade practices legislation. The 1967 version was extremely
broad and merely suggested state legislation that would award attorney fees and damages
against a person found to have knowingly committed deceptive trade practices. THE COUN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION D-30 (1967). The 1969 ver-
sion went further to suggest a modified version of the 1967 proposal that provided for
"comprehensive protection to the public against all the various trade practices which un-
fairly injure competitors or deceive consumers." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-4 (1969). Moreover, the suggested 1969 legislation en-
couraged states to pass statutes that gave "due consideration and great weight" to the
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and federal court decisions relating to
similar provisions in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1988). THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-5 (1969).
In 1970, for the first time, the Federal Trade Commission set forth three alternative
forms of legislation concerning deceptive trade practices for states to consider. The first
form contained the same broad language as § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which "prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and prac-
tices" in trade or commerce. THE COUNCIL OR STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED LEGISLA-
TION 142 (1970). The second suggested form, a bit less obtuse than the first, still
recommended outlawing all forms of deceptive, fraudulent and unfair acts or practices in
trade or commerce. Id. The third form specifically set forth the proscribed practices and
contained a "catch all" clause intended to reach most other forms of deceptive or unfair
trade practices. Id.
12. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggested two leading forms: The
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 35 (1978) and the Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1978). Several commentators have noted that the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) has limited usefulness because it only allows
private consumers to seek injunctive relief. Eight jurisdictions, including Colorado, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon borrowed language
from the UDTPA. However, most of these jurisdictions, altered their enactments to pro-
vide for private remedies. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform
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found in Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 13 which
provides a remedy to the federal government for deceptive trade prac-
tices but not to private individuals. 14 The FTC believed state legislation
allowing private remedies could give consumers more bargaining
power, and diffuse the wide economic losses caused by fraud in the
marketplace. 15
The FTC recognized that while traditional commercial law provided
acceptable remedies for sophisticated businesspersons, consumers often
suffered because of vexatious litigation costs and insurmountable bur-
dens of proof. In most consumer controversies, the risk involved and
the expense of litigation outweigh the likelihood of recovery under
traditional common law theories of recovery. "[U]nder the traditional
rules of the game, it was less expensive to suffer most deceptive trade
practices than to remedy them through legal action." 16 But most state
enactments, including those in Texas and Colorado, authorize private
actions to encourage private litigation and to deter unscrupulous
merchants by providing for attorney fees, double or treble damages and
punitive damages. 17 The generous damage and attorney fees provisions
available under most UDAP enactments give consumers the ability and
incentive to pursue redress without the fear of owing extraordinary
court costs and attorney fees, despite success on the merits of the case.
Many courts have observed that state UDAP enactments make individual
consumers "private attorney generals."'
18
A. Distinctions Between UDAP Acts and the Common Law
Noting the differences between UDAP statutes and common law
tort actions reveals why private UDAP actions are so attractive. Under
state UDAP statutes, the "deception" standard is broader and more dy-
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE LJ. 1101, 1110-13. The Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act contains more liberal provisions for individual redress and gives consumers
incentive to bring claims against those engaged in fraudulent or deceptive trade practices.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 41-77 (1976).
14. It is well settled that private consumers have no remedy under the FTC Act. Ac-
cording to the court in Carlson v. Coca-Cola Company, 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973),
section 5(a)(1) of the Act "provided [plaintiff] with no direct remedy, either explicitly or
implicitly. The protection against unfair trade practices afforded by the Act vests initial
remedial power solely in the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at 280.
In fact, private individuals never had recourse under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) when they
fell victim to deceptive practices. Amalgamated Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261, 268 (1940)(dictum); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926);
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1966)(dictum); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v.
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 1964), aft'd, 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
15. William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271
(1971) [hereinafter Lovett II]; Lovett I, supra note 10, at 724-25.
16. Lovett I, supra note 10, at 725.
17. See generally Appendix I, cols. 3-5.
18. Economic Dev. Assoc. v. Cititrust, No. 052665, 1991 WL 50316, *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1991); Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 586 A.2d 619, 624 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991),




namic than the standard required for common law fraud. 19 In fact, most
states prohibit "unfair" or "deceptive" practices, which include: (1) any
practice that offends public policy-whether under some common law,
statutory or other standard of unfairness; (2) any immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous practice; or (3) any practice that causes sub-
stantial injury to consumers. 20 On the other hand, a prima facie case of
common law fraud usually requires: (1) a false representation; (2) reli-
ance on the representation by the plaintiff; (3) damage as a result of the
reliance; and (4) defendant's knowledge of the falsity.2 1 Most state
UDAP enactments do not require intent or knowledge unless they pro-
vide to the contrary.2 2 Most states statutes contain few provisions that
require scienter.2 3 Since the purpose of UDAP legislation is to protect
the consumer regardless of the seller's intent, requiring scienter under
all provisions of a UDAP statute would "effectively emasculate the act
and contradict its fundamental purpose." 24 Moreover, treble damages
can be awarded for any UDAP violation, regardless of intent. The Texas
Supreme Court specifically overruled a lower court holding implying an
intent requirement for an award of treble damages. 2 5
19. In Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1065 (Mass. 1978), the court
held:
Silverbranch has ignored years of precedent pertinent and unfavorable to its
present appeal. Both this court and the Supreme Court have consistently held
that consumer protection statutes created new substantive rights by making con-
duct unlawful which was not previously unlawful under the common law or any
prior statute. The statutory language is not dependent on traditional tort or con-
tract law concepts for its definition.
Id. at 1069-70.
20. FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 525-50 (1977).
22. Bond Leather Co. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., 764 F.2d 928 (lst Cir. 1985) (applying
Massachusetts law); United Roasters Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.
1981) (applying North Carolina law) cert. dened, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); State v. O'Neill
Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Stephenson v. Capano, Dev. Inc., 462
A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983); Duhl v. Nash Realty Inc., 429 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 399 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Smith
v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.
1980); Williams v. Trail Dust Steak House, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
Chambless v. Barry Robinson Farm Supply, 667 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Hyder
& Ingram Chevrolet, Inc., v. Kutach, 612 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Bowers v.
Transamerican Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1983).
23. For example, the Colorado Consumer Protection Act requires scienter for three
of its fifteen provisions:
(a) Knowingly passes off goods, services, or property as those of another;
(b) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, ap-
proval, or certification of goods, services, or property;
(c) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, alterations, or quantities of goods, food, services, or property or a
false representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connec-
tion of a person therewith ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1) (1973 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act only requires scienter under one provision:
(13) Knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need
for parts, replacement, or repair service.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17A6 (13) (West 1987) (emphasis added).
24. Thomas, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
25. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 682.
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A few courts require that the consumer rely on the deceptive act,2 6
however, these courts generally interpret this requirement narrowly.27
Courts may base liability on a de minimis finding that the seller intended
to do the act that caused the deception-not the deception itself. 28
Even where the courts require the consumer to demonstrate the seller's
intent to deceive, this requirement is generally liberally interpretated
such that a failure to supply goods conforming to the consumer's re-
quest creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive.
29
B. Limited Common Law Defenses Available Under UDAP Statutes
Several UDAP enactments limit the defenses that might normally be
available for common law fraud. While only a few states have reported
case law on this issue, some state courts specifically concluded that the
primary purpose of UDAP legislation is to provide consumers a cause of
action without the additional burden imposed by traditional common
law defenses.3 0 Other states codify the available defenses to a UDAP
action. Although many common law defenses might not be available, a
plaintiff's action may still fail for various reasons. A claim may fail if:
(1) the litigant is not a "consumer" under the act; (2) the alleged
wrongdoing is not proscribed by the act; (3) notice, if required by the
act, is not sent; or (4) the litigant fails to plead a cause of action with
particularity, if required to do so by the state's courts.
In an action brought by a private individual, a defendant has an ab-
solute defense if the plaintiff is not a "consumer" under the statute.
While most state enactments give liberal interpretation to the word
"consumer," the facts of each case will dictate whether the plaintiff is a
protected party.3 1 Moreover, the deceptive act or omission that forms
the basis of the action must be proscribed by one of the provisions in the
state enactment. Obviously, if the act or omission in question is not for-
26. See Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 517 P.2d 661 (Or. 1973); Luedeman
v. Tri-West Constr. Co., 592 P.2d 281, 282 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
27. In re Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., 312 A.2d 632, 633-34 (Del. 1973).
28. State v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 626 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (basing
liability on the fact that the seller intended to do the act-not that the seller intended to
deceive).
29. Id.; cf. Bidwell v. German Motors, 586 P.2d 1003 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that while defendant had disposed of the engine in plaintiff's car without authorization
and replaced it with a rebuilt engine, there was no showing of a knowing, intentional or
false representation.).
30. The Texas courts have held that "[iln general, however, common law defenses
cannot defeat a DTPA claim." Watkins v. Hammerman and Gainer, 814 S.W.2d 867, 870
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)). In
Smith, the Texas Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act was to provide consumers a cause of action without the numerous
defenses available in common law actions of fraud and breach of warranty.
31. Most enactments include corporations in the term "consumer." In some in-
stances, however, a corporation may be engaged in a strictly commercial transaction, and
will not be entitled to the protections afforded consumers. Heller v. Lexton-Ancira Real
Estate Fund, Ltd., 1972, 809 P.2d 1016 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) rev'd on other grounds 826
P.2d 819 (Colo. 1992); Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co., 616 F. Supp. 790 (D. Colo. 1985).
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bidden, an absolute defense exists. The National Consumer Law Center
recommends that practitioners:
,specify itemized prohibitions in which the seller has engaged,
and also allege a violation of the 'catch-all' prohibition ....
Catch-all allegations are more likely to survive motions for dis-
missal or summary judgment, will allow a wider range of proof,
[will] allow consumers to raise new facts at the summary judg-
ment stage, and improve the chances that amendments to the
complaint relate back to the first filing for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.
3 2
Most statutes also require plaintiffs to give informal notice to defendants
prior to the initiation of actions alleging UDAP violations and, while this
requirement is generally construed very liberally, it is nonetheless a de-
fense if the plaintiff fails to comply.
3 3
Some defendants successfully argue that since the elements of a
UDAP violation are so similar to the elements for common law fraud,
the allegations must be pleaded with particularity as with fraud. In
Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co. ,34 defendants moved for dismissal of plain-
tiff's UDAP action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule
9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud . . ., the circumstances
constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity."35 Defendant
asserted that because the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)
contains the same elements as fraud, the plaintiff's claims were subject
to the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).3 6 The court held that
Rule 9(b) applied to actions under the CCPA by reasoning that because
Rule 9(b) applied to securities act violations, which are not "precisely
actions for fraud,"3 7 it should apply to the CCPA. Further, the court
held that Rule 9(b) should apply because the purpose of the act was to
protect against consumerfraud.3 8 The application of Rule 9(b) to UDAP
actions makes little analytical sense when the plaintiff seeks redress
under a provision that does not require scienter. Nonetheless, a plaintiff
must recognize that courts have not made this distinction,3 9 and a de-
fense might lie if the complaint contains only general averments of a
defendant's wrongdoing.
32. JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, § 1.8.2 (1988).
33. Although the Colorado Consumer Protection Act contains no such requirement,
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act does. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505
(West 1987). See also Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin, 668 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); Hollingsworth Roofing Co. v. Morrison, 668 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Bandy
Lab., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
34. 616 F. Supp. 790 (D. Colo. 1985).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
36. Duran, 616 F. Supp. at 793.
37. Id.; see also Temple v. Haft, 73 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Del. 1976) (holding FED. R. Civ. P.
9(b) applicable to securities act violations).
38. Temple, 73 F.R.D. at 52.
39. Id.
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III. VARIATIONS IN UDAP LEGISLATION
A. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act
The CCPA40 was enacted in 1969 by the General Assembly's House
Bill 1030, § 13.41 The Act, in its original form, was codified by Colo-
rado Revised Statute § 55-5-13 (1969) and later by § 6-1-101 (1987). In
1969, when the General Assembly passed the original CCPA, the legisla-
tive history of the Act was not memorialized in any way. In fact, prior to
1973, the Colorado legislature kept no records of any legislative history.
Senator John Fuhr, who sponsored the Act, maintained only a copy of
the final draft of House Bill 1030 in his "member file." Therefore, the
purpose of the act and events leading up to its passage will most likely
remain speculative.
Although similar to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
4 2
the CCPA incorporates the broader and more expansive language found
in the FTC's suggested legislation.43 The CCPA specifically enumer-
ates eighteen prohibited acts, including several of broad "catch-all" pro-
visions. The legislature uses these catch-all provisions most often
because they do not require scienter and proscribe a wide range of con-
duct.44 The CCPA allows a successful plaintiff to recover treble dam-
ages and attorney fees,4 5 although the court may award attorney fees at
its discretion. 4 6 The CCPA also allows the seller to recover attorney
fees and costs if the court determines the action was initiated in bad
faith, or for the purpose of harassment. 4 7 The statute gives the state
attorney general's office authority to bring an action to enforce the pro-
visions of the CCPA, and allows equitable relief in the form of an injunc-
tion. 48 If the attorney general succeeds, the CCPA provides for
restitution to the injured consumer(s), civil penalties in the amount of
$2,000 for an initial violation and up to $10,000 for subsequent viola-
40. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
41. House Bill 1030 was codified in 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 143.
42. See generally Dole, supra note 12 (describing the limited usefulness of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act as originally suggested by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws). "Colorado's Act differs, however, in important particulars from the proto-
type." People ex tel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp., 660 P.2d 1295, 1296 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982).
43. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
44. See Jonathan Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, § 3.2.1 (2d ed. 1988).
By way of example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1973 & Supp. 1990) sets forth several
"catch-all" prohibitions. The statute provides:
(1) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his
business, vocation, or occupation, he:
(g) Represents that goods, food, services, or property are of a particular stan-
dard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if he
knows or should know that they are of another ....
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
46. Witters v. Daniels Motors, Inc., 524 P.2d 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-1-113 (2)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1991) indicates that "[i]n the case of any successful
action to enforce said liability, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court [will be granted]." Id. (emphasis added).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113 (3) (1973 & Supp. 1991).
48. Id. § 6-1-112 (1973 & Supp. 1991).
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tions. 49 As with private civil actions, the attorney general can recover
attorney fees and costs in the court's discretion. 50
Since the General Assembly enacted the CCPA in 1967, only a few
reported decisions have helped to delineate the extent and limits of its
reach. In fact, the state attorney general initiated over half of the re-
ported cases under the CCPA-a remarkable statistic in light of the
treble damages and attorney fees available to private consumers.5 1
In one of the first cases to discuss the scope of the CCPA, Western
Food Plan, Inc. v. District Court,5 2 the state attorney general sought to re-
cover restitution from a corporation engaged in deceptive trade prac-
tices, including false representation and false and misleading
advertising. 53 In response to defendant's argument that the statute
does not provide the attorney general the ability to seek restitution, the
Colorado Supreme Court held "[i]n our view the quoted language must
be read in light of the broad legislative purpose to provide prompt, eco-
nomical, and readily available remedies against consumer fraud."'54
Subsequent CCPA decisions repeated the language in Western Food Plan
concerning the legislative purpose of the Act.55 Frequent citations to
the Western Food Plan language indicates the courts' willingness to give
the CCPA a broad, liberal application.
Colorado courts interpreting the CCPA seem to take an expansive
approach by reading and considering the CCPA in its entirety and inter-
preting the meaning of any one section by considering the overall legis-
lative purpose. 56 In People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp.,5 7 the
Colorado Court of Appeals reiterated that "[t]he Consumer Protection
Act was enacted in order to control various deceptive trade practices in
dealing with the public.... [I]n enacting a broad protective statute such
as the Consumer Protection Act, the General Assembly need not rede-
fine operative terms adequately indicated by the language utilized." 58
The Alpert court went on to hold that the CCPA applied to false or mis-
leading statements in the advertisement and sale of real estate. 59
In City & County of Denver v. May Dept. Stores Co., 60 another action
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. A precursory search for law journal articles on the Act was fruitless, except for a
few vague and tangential references.
52. 598 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1979).
53. Id. at 1039.
54. Id. at 1041.
55. See, e.g., People ix rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp., 660 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co., 616 F. Supp. 790, 793 (D. Colo. 1985).
56. Alpert, 660 P.2d at 1297 (citing Howe v. People, 496 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1972) and
State Highway Comm'n. v. Haase, 537 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1975)). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 2-4-201 (1)(b) (1980 & Supp. 1991) (describing the preferable means of statutory
interpretation).
57. 660 P.2d 1295 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
58. Id. at 1297.
59. Id.
60. No. 89CV9274, 1990 WL 322653 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1990), rev'd and remanded with
instructions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June 18, 1992) (reversed on grounds that trial
court's injunction failed to adequately prohibit the defendant's deceptive practices).
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brought by the Colorado Attorney General's Office, the trial court ini-
tially, and the appeals court subsequently, recognized the importance of
FTC jurisprudence in CCPA interpretation for the first time. FTCjuris-
prudence involves litigation under the Federal Trade Commission Act
and, while some states expressly rely on FTC jurisprudence in determin-
ing which trade practices are deceptive or unfair,61 the CCPA makes no
mention of the FTC. The May court began its discussion by acknowl-
edging that there were no cases on point in Colorado addressing most
of the CCPA questions at issue in the case. The court then noted the
considerable FTC authority and experience in the area of consumer pro-
tection, and turned to prior FTC precedent for guidance. 6 2 The May
court's recognition of FTC precedent opens a bountiful source of UDAP
case law to the CCPA plaintiff. Although the CCPA does not expressly
mention the FTC or its rulings, the May court's determination is sensi-
ble because the FTC initially prompted states to enact UDAP
legislation.
63
FTC decisions are extremely helpful for their precedential value be-
cause of the volume of decisions showing how a practice works, how the
practice is deceptive or unfair, how consumers are injured or misled and
demonstrating how even truthful statements can be unfair or mislead-
ing. But, given the language in May, it is important to understand that
61. See generally ALA. CODE § 8-19-1 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (giving "great weight" to
FTC interpretation); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (giving "great
weight" to FTC interpretations); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521 (1987 & Supp. 1991)
(FTC determinations used as a guide); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201 (West 1988) (FTC inter-
pretations are given "due consideration and great weight"); IDAHO CODE § 48-601 (1977 &
Supp. 1992) (FTC interpretations given "due consideration and great weight"); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2 para. 261 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1991) (consideration given); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (FTC determinations control over
state); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (guided by FTC interpre-
tations); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-101 (1991) (FTC determinations given due considera-
tion and great weight); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (1984 & Supp 1991) (guided by
FTC determinations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-1 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1992) (guided by
FTC); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1991) (Due considera-
tion and great weight given to FTC interpretations and rulemaking); R.I. GEN. LAw § 6-
13.1-1 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (due consideration and great weight given to FTC decisions);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 (Law. Co-op (1976 & Supp. 1991) (guided by FTC interpreta-
tions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-101 (1988 & Supp 1991) (interpreted and construed
consistent with FTC); TEX. Bus. AND COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1987) (guided by
FTC Act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-1 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (make state regulation consis-
tent with FTC policies on consumer protection, make uniform with states that enact simi-
lar laws); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (guided by FTC construction);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010 (1989) (guided by FTC interpretations); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6-101 (1992) (guided by federal court interpretation).
62. The Colorado District Court for the City and County of Denver held:
There are no Colorado cases which address most of the questions of law raised as
issues in this lawsuit. However, there is considerable federal law and experience
in the area, and federal authorities are highly persuasive under these circum-
stances. (citations omitted) Further support for looking to federal law is found in
the CPA itself. . . . Therefore, the federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) and 16
C.F.R. § 233.1 et seq. (FTC Guides) provide a legal framework to view the issues
raised in this case.
May, No. 89 CV 9274, 1990 WL 322653, *7 (Colo. Dist. Ct.), rev'd and remanded with instruc-
tions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June 18, 1992).
63. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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FTC decisions are merely guiding, not binding, on the Colorado courts.
In this respect, a state court may still find a certain practice violative of
the CCPA despite a contrary ruling by the FTC.64 This fact might be
beneficial to the CCPA plaintiff because the courts are not required to
blindly follow FTC precedent, as are states whose UDAF legislation spe-
cifically requires adherence to FTC precedent.6 5 While a complete dis-
cussion of the existing FTC case law is beyond the scope of this Article,
the UDAP plaintiff should be aware that tremendous precedent, on all
aspects of deceptive and unfair practices, is available to analogize in
CCPA litigation.
Although the May case was reversed and remanded, the reason for
the reversal was that the trial court's injunction failed to adequately pro-
hibit the defendant's deceptive practices.6 6 In reaching this ruling, the
Colorado Court of Appeals looked extensively to FTC jurisprudence
and indirectly supported the proposition that Colorado courts will look
to FTC case law when no Colorado case law exists.
67
B. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Since the Texas legislature passed the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (TDTPA) in 1973,68 the Act has spawned consumer litigation in
mammoth proportions. While the TDTPA and the CCPA have similar
parentage and wording, Texas attorneys litigate the TDTPA so fre-
quently that its contours and limits are more clearly established than
those of the CCPA. As a sailor undoubtedly prefers to sail well-charted
waters, attorneys certainly prefer to litigate well-charted areas of the law.
The case law precedent on virtually all aspects of the TDTPA is partially
responsible for the Pandora's box of litigation and it is incontrovertible
that the Texas legal community is intimately familiar with the reach and
limitations of the TDTPA. The TDPTA's passage was well-documented
and chronicled. By passing the TDTPA, the Texas legislature provided
consumers with a remedy for deceptive and misleading trade practices
without forcing them to shoulder the burden of proof and the numerous
defenses available under common law tort theories.
69
The current TDTPA prohibits deceptive acts or practices, but goes
64. In fact, several courts have, in fact, held that a practice may violate state UDAP
legislation without violating FTC regulations. See, e.g., Ramson v. Layne, 668 F. Supp.
1162 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Perlman v. Time, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State v.
American TV & Appliance, 410 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) rev'd on other grounds, 430
N.W. 2d 709 (Wis. 1988).
65. See supra note 60.
66. May, 16 Brief Times Rptr. at 1043.
67. Id at 1041 (citing Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.
1979); Grolier, Inc. v. F.T.C., 699 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Thompson Medical Co.,
104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Amrep v. F.T.C., 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985)).
68. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1987; Supp. 1992).
69. Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983); Rotello v.
Ring Around Prod., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Smith v. Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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further to enumerate twenty-three specifically proscribed practices. 70
The TDTPA also provides consumers with additional actions for breach
of warranty, 71 or any other unconscionable practice, 72 that takes unfair
advantage of the consumer. In addition to actual damages, the TDTPA
allows two times that portion of the actual damages that does not exceed
$1,000 and up to three times the actual damages if the finder of fact
determines that the defendant acted knowingly.7 3 The TDTPA allows a
prevailing consumer to recover court costs and reasonable attorney
fees, 74 and also allows the court to award the defendant costs and fees if
the action was brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. 75
The Act provides for the District Attorney to seek civil remedies and
equitable relief under the Act, and provides for civil damages up to
$10,000.76
The TDTPA was designed to give the individual consumer greater
leverage to overcome the merchant's unequal bargaining power in the
marketplace. 7 7 The objectives behind the passage of the TDTPA were
three-fold. First, the generous damage provisions available under the
TDTPA were established to remove the economic barriers posed by vex-
atious litigation costs, court costs and attorney fees.7 8 By providing
treble damages, attorney fees and court costs, the TDTPA encourages
consumers to litigate claims despite their relatively low-dollar amount.
Second, at common law, consumers who fell victim to deceptive or un-
fair trade practices were limited to recovery under traditional tort and
70. Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) aft'd, 566 S.W.2d
561 (1977) (enumeration of specific acts is not an exclusive list. The listing encompasses
any type of business activity that deceives consumers.); Prairie Cattle Co. v. Fletcher, 610
S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (ifjury finds that act or practice falls under list of enu-
merated prohibitions, act or practice is a deceptive trade practice as a matter of law);
Cravens v. Skinner, 626 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) ("laundry list" of deceptive
trade practices is not all-inclusive).
71. Troutman v. Traeco Bldg. Sys., Inc., 724 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1987); Tom Benson
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Chrysler Corp. v.
Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799 (rex. Civ. App. 1981); Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile Co.
v.Johnson, 624 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
72. Tax. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (a)(3) (West 1987).
73. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (b)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
74. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (d) (West 1987).
75. Il § 17.50 (c).
76. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) (1987 & Supp. 1992).
77. See David F. Bragg, Comment, Caveat Vendor: The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 425 (1973) (Act shifts balance of bargaining
power from seller to buyer); see also Michael A. Gist, Note, Commercial Law--The Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act Protects Foreign Purchasers in International Transac-
tions, 18 Tax. INr'L LJ. 369, 370 (1983) (initial purpose of the TDTPA was to correct the
effects of unequal bargaining power in marketplace).
78. Timothy Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec-
tion Act, 33 BAYLOR L. Rav. 533, 533 (1981) (TDTPA passed to encourage litigation of
small claims, ease burdens of proof, and discourage deceptive trade practices); Michael
Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, 32 BAYLOR
L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1980) (setting forth factors leading to the passage of the TDTPA, in-
cluding removal of economic barriers to litigation); Vincent P. Dhooghe, Note, Trade Regu-
lation-Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act-A Purchaser for Resale is a Consumer
Protected by DTPA, 16 ST. MARY'S LJ. 473, 478 (1985) (discussing removal of economic
barrier to litigation under generous damage provisions of TDTPA).
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contract theories.79 A plaintiff seeking redress under traditional com-
mon law theories must overcome onerous burdens of proof and com-
plex defenses. 80 By restricting the defenses available under the
TDTPA,8 l and by removing the scienter requirement from almost all
provisions of the Act,82 the statutory scheme imposed strict liability for
false, misleading or deceptive trade practices.8 3 The third objective be-
hind the passage of the TDTPA was deterrence. Provisions allowing
treble damages, attorney fees and court costs deter unscrupulous sellers
from engaging in deceptive trade practices.
8 4
By enacting section 17.44,85 the Texas legislature intended the
courts to give liberal construction to the Act to promote its underlying
purpose. Similar to the Colorado Act, the purpose of the TDTPA was to
protect consumers and provide efficient and economical procedures for
consumers to seek redress for harm caused by deceptive, unfair, mis-
leading or unconscionable trade practices.8 6 The TDTPA expressly
mandates liberal construction. In fact, several courts that have inter-
preted section 17.44 held that the TDTPA requires the most liberal con-
struction and comprehensive application possible without doing
violence to its terms.8 7 Indeed, since its inception in 1973, the Texas
courts expanded the definitions of "consumer"8 8 and "goods and serv-
79. See City & County of Denver v. May Dept. Stores Co., No. 89CV9274, 1990 WL 322653
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1990), rev'd and remanded with instructions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June
18, 1992); David F. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to The Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7 (1976); Curry, supra note 78, at 52 n.6; KiNTNER, supra
note 8, at 5-8.
80. Patton, supra note 78, at 533 (common law actions involve various defenses and
complex burdens of proof).
81. See May, 16 Brief Times Rptr. at 1043.
82. Trx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) has only one of
twenty one provisions that require scienter.
83. See Curry, supra note 78, at 52 (remedy of fraud at common law replaced by statu-
tory strict liability); Dhooghe, supra note 78, at 477 (aggrieved consumer can bring statu-
tory strict liability cause of action).
84. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980) (treble damages deter
future violations); Woo v. Great Southwest Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298-99
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (consumers are allowed treble damages to deter unlawful conduct
by merchants and sellers); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (legislative intent behind provision allowing treble damages was deterrence).
85. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17A4 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
86. Id. Section 17.44 provides:
"This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and de-
ceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection."
Id.
87. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981) (holding
that the courts are obligated to give the TDTPA the most liberal application possible with-
out doing violence to its terms); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. 1980) (re-
fusing to restrict interpretation of TDTPA absent legislative intent).
88. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985) (holding third-party
beneficiaries "consumers" under the Act); Big H Auto Auctions, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665
S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984) (resale purchaser considered "consumer" under TDTPA);
Rotello v. Ring Around Prod., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (Farmers
purchasing soy beans held "consumers" under Act); Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage and
Sales, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (corporation was a consumer under the
TDTPA after 1975 amendment to Act); Temple News Agency v. Want Ads of Waco, 573
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ices''89 under the Act. Additionally, the Texas courts liberally expanded
the measure of actual damages available under the Act.90 One commen-
tator suggested that a judicially expansive interpretation of the Act is
warranted to protect consumers against new forms of misrepresentation
and deception, and to avoid the need for annual revision of the Act.9 1
While the Texas courts' liberal interpretation of the TDTPA might in
fact serve to protect consumers against novel deceptive trade practices,
this practice certainly has not curbed the Texas legislature's zealous de-
sire to amend the Act annually.
9 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADo AcT's OBSCURrIT
Two primary reasons exist for the CCPA's relative obscurity since
its enactment in 1969. First, the Colorado Act contains fewer "catch-
all" provisions in its "laundry list" of deceptive practices than the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.93 Second, the Texas Act imposes strict
liability for violations of the TDTPA by not requiring scienter for the
broadest and most inclusive provisions of the Act.94 Although both Acts
stem from identical parentage 95 and include a similarly worded "laun-
dry list" by imposing a scienter requirement,96 the Colorado General
Assembly increased the burden of proof a CCPA plaintiff must shoulder
as well as the number of defenses available to the CCPA defendant. The
wording of the Colorado Act provides an absolute defense to a seller
who makes a negligent misrepresentation or who makes an honest mis-
take that results in a misrepresentation. Thus, the increased burden of
proof, together with the increased number of defenses available under
the Colorado Act, necessarily raise the cost and risk of litigation by forc-
ing the plaintiff to investigate the defendant's state of mind and prove
S.W.2d 269 (rex. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a partnership could be a "consumer" for pur-
poses of the Act).
89. See, e.g., Big H Auto Auction, 665 S.W.2d at 758 (holding that resold goods are
"goods" for purposes of the Act); Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d
705, 707-08 (rex. 1983) (expanding scope of banking services included within the term
"services" in the TDTPA); Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 883 (rex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the services of an attorney are subject to the proscriptions in the TDTPA); United
Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716 Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding stamp vend-
ing machine to be "goods" under Texas DTPA).
90. Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (rex. 1985) (consumer should receive
greatest amount of damages factually established); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc.,
667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (rex. 1984) (actual damage for mental anguish is recoverable under
the TDTPA upon a finding of knowing violation); White v. Southwestern Tel. Co., 651
S.W.2d 260, 262 (rex. 1983) (lost profits recoverable under TDTPA).
91. Edward R. McCarthy, Jr., Comment, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and Possible Ram!ications of Recent Amendments: Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented?, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 899 (1980).
92. See supra note 3.
93. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
96. For example, the TDTPA proscribes "passing off goods or services as those of
another," TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991), whereas
the CCPA only penalizes a seller who "[k]nowingly passes off goods, services, or property as




that the defendant knowingly engaged in a deceptive trade practice.
The increased cost of litigation and heightened risk posed by the scien-
ter requirement outweigh the relatively minor damages usually involved
in typical consumer disputes and perhaps discourage consumers from
bringing actions under the Colorado Act.
Two provisions of the CCPA add an objective intent requirement.
The first penalizes a defendant who "[rjepresents that goods are origi-
nal or new if he knows or should know that they are deteriorated, altered,
reconditioned, reclaimed, used or second-hand."'9 7 The second provi-
sion uses an objective intent requirement to forbid a seller from repre-
senting "that goods, food, services, or property are of a particular
standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or
model, if he knows or should know that they are of another."9 8 Although
an objective standard does not pose the significant hurdles of a scienter
requirement, it still requires a plaintiff to establish that a reasonable per-
son in the seller's position should have been aware of the misrepresenta-
tion. Similar to a scienter requirement, the objective intent standard
also increases the risk of litigation, increases the cost of litigation and
discourages plaintiffs from bringing an action under the Colorado Act
because of the small amount of damages typically involved.
Whatever the reason for imposing the intent requirement, the re-
sult is that few consumers are ever "protected" by the CCPA. As an
Ohio court observed in Thomas v. Sun Furniture &Appliance Co. ,99 a scien-
ter requirement under all provisions of a UDAP statute "effectively
emasculate[s] the act and contradict[s] its fundamental purpose."' 0 0 In-
deed, one might justifiably query why the Colorado General Assembly
imposed a scienter requirement for almost every provision of the CCPA
in light of the purported objective to provide "prompt, economical, and
readily available remedies against consumer fraud. ' 101
The second reason the CCPA remains veiled in enigma is, perhaps,
a function of the first reason. In Texas, the volumes of reported case
law on the TDTPA together with an abundance of law journal materials,
provide practitioners with current trends, case holdings and updates on
legislative changes to the Act. Certainly, a practitioner feels more com-
fortable making a claim under a consumer protection act once case pre-
cedent and scholarly secondary materials explore and define the
wrinkles and contours of the act. Because it is used so infrequently,
there are no commentaries in Colorado discussing the extent or limita-
tions of the CCPA and practitioners cannot assess the viability of a cli-
ent's claim that might potentially fall under the CCPA.
Practitioners should however note that the CCPA has been liberally
construed when litigated and there are provisions that do not require
97. COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1)(f) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
98. Id § 6-1-105 (1)(g) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
99. 399 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
100. Id. at 570.
101. Western Food Plan v. District Ct., 598 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Colo. 1979).
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scienter. Equally as important are the damage provisions that allow a
successful client to recover attorney fees, court costs and treble dam-
ages, and although a showing of scienter might be necessary, the dam-
age provisions make a successful claim under this Act much more
fruitful than under common law theories of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. Colorado practitioners who know of the CCPA can reap benefits
for themselves and their clients by utilizing the CCPA instead of bring-
ing actions for fraud or misrepresentation. Once Colorado attorneys
begin to familiarize themselves with the CCPA and begin to use the Act
in place of traditional common law remedies, the reported case law and
secondary materials will generate more awareness which, in turn, will
cause increased usage. Indeed, the legislature might take a renewed in-
terest in amending the CCPA to more accurately fulfill its original pur-
poses. The domino effect would soon begin.
V. INCREASED USE: PANACEA OR PANDORA'S Box?
Undoubtedly, the TDTPA has, over the years, helped many victim-
ized consumers. Unfortunately, the liberal interpretation of the TDTPA
combined with yearly legislative expansions have caused concern that
the Texas Act no longer fulfills its objectives. This section explores
whether an increased usage of the CCPA would cause similar problems
in Colorado and whether a gradual, well-controlled increase in usage
could possibly elude such difficulties.
Even a few years after its passage, commentators recognized the po-
tential threat posed by a reckless expansion of the TDTPA's reach.
The DTPA remains a law of vast potential both for abuse and
for legitimately compensating the wronged consumer. It is a
grand experiment which requires a profound search for the
purpose of the Act. Each element of the prima facie case
should be examined against the need to protect the consumer
rather than influenced by a misguided desire to purify the ad-
vertiser's language at any expense to the merchant. Only by
carefully balancing the needs of the consumer with the burden
imposed on the merchant in the marketplace can the fairest and
most lasting solution be reached.
1 0 2
Despite this commentator's thoughtful admonitions, the TDTPA rapidly
expanded to unmanageable proportions. All provisions of the TDTPA
have been litigated with such frequency that the Texas judiciary and leg-
islature scarcely have opportunities to step back and objectively com-
mence a "profound search for the purpose of the Act." 108 If such a
"search" was performed and the needs of the consumers were carefully
balanced with the burdens placed on marketplace merchants, the Texas
legislature and judiciary would most likely conclude that the one time
"panacea" has now transformed into a Pandora's box.





When the Texas legislature originally enacted the TDTPA, it reas-
sured merchants that "no reputable, respectable, honest businessman
has anything to fear by the passage of this law."' 0 4 To the contrary, the
strict liability imposed by the TDTPA should cause any sensible business
person great concern-if not outright fear. 105 Whether a businessper-
son is "honest," "reputable" or "respectable" makes no difference
when a strict liability standard is used. It is apparent that the legisla-
ture's words of assurance were little more than empty promises.
Although the strict liability standard combined with liberal judicial inter-
pretation of the TDTPA convey substantial benefits to the consumer,
they also pose significant social costs.106 The TDTPA that originally
served to protect unsophisticated consumers from deceptive practices
now serves to "protect" multi-million dollar corporations against other
multi-million dollar corporations.1 0 7 Since the TDTPA now protects
large corporate entities from other corporate entities, the result is ex-
tremely large awards never anticipated by the original framers. Applica-
tion of the TDTPA to large commercial transactions makes little sense in
light of the Act's purpose. First, it can hardly be said that large corpora-
tions are "unsophisticated" or "inexperienced" in marketplace transac-
tions. Presumably, most large corporations have the wherewithal and
ability to seek legal advice before entering into large transactions. Some
commentators even argue that allowing large commercial transactions
to fall under the TDTPA effectively renders the UCC obsolete.' 08 In-
deed, why would a large corporation ever seek recourse for inferior or
non-conforming goods under the UCC when treble damages were avail-
able under the TDTPA?109 Furthermore, it would seem that the large
amounts involved in most commercial disputes by themselves create in-
centives to fully litigate a commercial claim without the added benefits
provided by the TDTPA.
Another reason for the passage of UDAP statutes is deterrence.
However, the statute is an ineffective deterrent when applied to com-
mercial disputes. In a corporate setting, the large awards available under
the TDTPA will inevitably increase the cost of doing business. 10 The
104. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 644 S.W.2d 170, 176-77 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982).
105. See generally Harrison, supra note 6, at 12-15; Michelle R. Sherman, Texas DTPA:
Treble Trouble?, 37 BAYLOR L. REV 993 (1985); Robert A. Rowland, III & EvelynJo Wilson,
DTPA as Offensive Weapon for Businesses, 20 Hous. LAw. 28 (1982).
106. Peter 0. Steiner, The Legalization ofAmerican Society: Economic Regulation, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1285, 1286 (1983).
107. Compare 1973 TEx. GEN. LAws 322, 323 (original statute confined definition of
"consumer" to individuals) with TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (4) (West 1987)
(current definition of consumer includes partnerships, corporations and governmental
subdivisions). In fact, the only restriction on the term "consumer" is that the plaintiff
cannot have assets of more than $25 million. Id.
108. Robert E. Goodfriend & Michael P. Lynn, Of White Knights and Black Knights: An
Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 33 S.w. LJ. 941, 1002-
03 n.355 (1979) (DTPA threatens to displace UCC due to higher recoveries).
109. Breach of warranty claims are litigated with much greater frequency under the
TDTPA because of the more appealing remedies. Id. at 1002 n.355.
110. Harrison, supra note 6, at 891.
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unsuccessful corporation ultimately passes on the cost increases from
TDTPA litigation to the consumer, while the successful corporation re-
tains the difference between the actual damages and the enhanced dam-
ages allowed under the TDTPA as windfall. In a market that is not
purely competitive, the unsuccessful corporate defendant has no incen-
tive to comply with the TDTPA since the individual consumer ultimately
pays any damage award. The lack of incentive to comply with the
TDTPA translates into a lack of deterrence. Thus, a major purpose of
the TDTPA is not met when commercial transactions are allowed to fall
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Colorado and Texas are at opposite ends of the
UDAP spectrum. The TDTPA imposes strict liability while the CCPA
requires either scienter or objective intent. Neither statute truly fulfills
the underlying purposes of UDAP legislation-the TDTPA coming clos-
est of the two. If it is true that the underlying principle of UDAP legisla-
tion is to provide prompt, economical and readily available remedies
against fraud and misrepresentation, then Colorado must seriously con-
sider whether its current statute can ever truly accomplish that goal. By
analogy to the TDTPA, it would appear that a relaxation of the scienter
requirement in the CCPA would give consumers greater access to
prompt, economical and readily available remedies. However, even
under the current statute, there is still potential for consumer redress
and practitioners should be aware of the liberal damages available under
the statute. As practitioners begin to use this statute with greater fre-
quency, the contours and limitations of the Act will emerge. Moreover,
once practitioners begin to divert attention from traditional common
law remedies to the CCPA, consumers will truly begin to enjoy the pro-
tection granted by the Colorado General Assembly over twenty years
ago. At the present time, the CCPA is by no means a panacea to decep-
tive and unfair trade practices, but neither is it a Pandora's box. In the
course of CCPA litigation, Colorado courts should remain true to the
goal of the CCPA by carefully weighing the purposes of the CCPA and
the needs of the consumer with the potential for over-liberalization of
the CCPA. If the courts develop CCPA case precedent recognizing both
the need for consumer protection and the potential for abuse, Colorado
should be able to protect its consumers against deceptive trade practices











State Statute Itemization Actions Damages ages Fees
Ala. Code § 8-19-891 X X X
Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 X X X
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1521 X X
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 4-88-101 X X X
Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 (West) X X X X X
Cal. Civ. Code § 1700 (West)
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 X X X X X
Con. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110 (West) X X X
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 25
D.C. Code Ann. tit. 28-3904 X X X X X
Fla. Stat. Ann § 501.201 (West) X X
Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-370 X X X X
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 481A-1 X X
Idaho Code § 48-601 X X X X
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121.5 § 261 X X X X
Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1 X X X X
Iowa Code Ann. § 714.16 X
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-623 X X X
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 X
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 X
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 206 X
Md. [Com. Law] § 13-101 X X X
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 1 X X
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.901 X X X
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325D.42 (West) X X X
Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-1 X X X
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 X X X
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 30-14-101 X X
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1601 X X
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.360 X
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:1 X X X X X
NJ. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 (West) X X X X
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-1 X X X X
N.Y. [Gen. Bus.] Law § 349 (McKinney) X X X
N.C. Gen Stat. § 75-1 X X X X
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-15-01 X X
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333 (Page) X X X
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 751 (West) X X X X
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 X X X X
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1 (Purdon) X X X X
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1 X X X X
S.C. Code § 39-5-10 X X X
S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-I X X
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(1)
State Statute
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101
Tex. [B&C] Code Ann. § 17.41 (Vernon)








Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2451a X X X
Va. Code § 59.1-196 X X X X
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.020 X X X
W.Va. Code § 46A-6-101 X X
Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 100.18 (West) X X X







THE IMMUTABLE COMMAND MEETS THE UNKNOWABLE MIND:
DEIFIC DECREE CLAIMS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
AFTER PEOPLE V. SERRAVO
INTRODUCTION
"[L]egal insanity combines concepts of law, morality and medicine
with the moral concepts derived primarily from the total underlying con-
ceptions of ethics shared by the community at large." Evaluating this
combination of law, morality, medicine and community ethics, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in People v. Serravo2 held that a deific decree3 claim in
an insanity defense acts only as one factor of the sanity judgment, not as
an exception creating a presumption of insanity. 4 The Serravo decision
tips the balance between society's desire to prosecute wrongdoers and
its obligation to protect the accused, who does not possess the capacity
to understand the crime. This decision focuses on the prosecutorial as-
pect of the law and legal system by refusing to accord a proven deific
decree claim the status of a presumption of insanity.
This Comment discusses the Colorado Supreme Court's position in
People v. Serravo; a case of first impression. Part I examines the back-
ground surrounding the various insanity tests developed in both com-
mon law and codified law throughout the United States. Part I also
examines Colorado's case law and statutory development of the insanity
tests and addresses the development of the deific decree doctrine in
Colorado and other jurisdictions. Part II provides the facts of People v.
Serravo,5 and discusses the Colorado Supreme Court's holdings concern-
ing the insanity questions presented. Part III analyzes the current na-
tional status of the deific decree doctrine and reviews the Serravo
decision in light of that doctrine. This Comment criticizes the Colorado
Supreme Court's position in Serravo because the decision does not fol-
low precedent established by cases developing the deific decree doctrine
in the United States. In light of the current understanding of mental
illness and insanity, an individual who believes a deity directly com-
mands him or her to act may appreciate the wrongfulness of the act, but
is nonetheless under such deluded compulsion that the individual has
no choice but to act. This lack of choice strongly suggests a presumption
of insanity. This Comment also criticizes the holding that a deific decree
is merely one factor to be weighed and evaluated in considering a crimi-
nal defendant's sanity, rather than creating a presumption of insanity.
1. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 138 (Colo. 1992) [hereinafter Serravo I] (refer-
ences to People v. Serravo, 797 P.2d 782 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) are hereinafter Serravo 1).
2. Serravo II, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992).
3. A "deific decree" claim is one in which an individual believes he or she has been
commanded by God to perform some act. The person genuinely believes a deity is speak-
ing to him or her directly. See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
4. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 128-29.
5. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 782.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Insanity Tests
The insanity defense currently exists in four categories: the initial
M'Naghten test,6 the irresistible impulse test,7 the Durham product test
8
6. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This test requires that a defendant act
under a mental disease or defect and not know either the nature and quality of the act or
its wrongfulness. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); Gurganus v. State, 451 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1984);
State v. Allen, 609 P.2d 219 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216 (Miss.
1982); Clark v. State, 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881 (Neb.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); State v. Hartley, 565 P.2d 658 (N.M. 1977); State v.
Jackson, 273 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1981); State v. Brown, 449 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1983); State v.
Law, 244 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1978); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974). For
a detailed discussion of M'Naghten, see also Fernand N. Dutile & Thomas H. Singer, What
Now for the Insanity Defense?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1104 (June 1983) (containing a history
of the insanity defense and its possible future developments); Jodie English, The Light Be-
tween Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 1 (1988) (discussing the effect of Insanity Reform Act of 1984 on the M'Naghten test);
Lois G. Forer, Law and the Unreasonable Person, 36 EMORY LJ. 181 (1987) (illustrating the
conflict between psychiatry and laws that are too restrictive); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257 (1987) (basis for general defenses and excuses in criminal law);
Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our
Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283 (1988) (reevaluation of insanity defense and
mental illness' role in modem criminal law system); Norval Morris, Ake Dah, 52 U. Cm. L.
REv. 553 (1985) (containing an anecdotal essay of a Burmese Buddhist deific decree);
Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 393
(1988) (M'Naghten applied to alcohol-induced crimes); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 599
(1989-90) (history and modernization of the insanity defense); Andrew K. Haynes &Jonas
Robitscher, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY LJ. 9 (1982) (explaining the modem
trend toward elimination of insanity defense); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication:
An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371
(1986) (underlying rationale for and history of insanity defense and M'Naghten as a cogni-
tive test); Emily Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of "Mental Disease or
Defect" Under the Modern Penal Code Test of Insanity. A Question of Psychology or a Question of
Law?, 69 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1990) (discussing psychopathy, knowledge, responsibility and
legal status); Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988) (exploring various biological bases for
excuses/criminal defenses, including the postpartum depression and the "Twinkie" de-
fenses); Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity De-
fense, 46 LA. L. REv. 337 (1985) (origins and alternatives to the insanity defense);Judith A.
Morse & Gregory K. Thoreson, Comment, Criminal Law-United States v. Lyons: Abolishing
the Volitional Prong of the Insanity Defense, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177 (1984)-(illustration of
test "shift" in the Fifth Circuit and the elimination of the volitional aspect of the test);
Harry J. Philips, Jr., Comment, The Insanity Defense: Should Louisiana Change the Rules?, 44
LA. L. REv. 165 (1983) (development of the present defense and alternatives); George
Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE LJ. 1661 (1987) (early back-
ground does not provide defense or excuse; "free will" versus "determinism").
7. This test requires that an individual not be able to control his or her actions due
to impulse or controlling disease. See Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897); State v.
Hartley, 565 P.2d 658 (N.M. 1977); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1974).
For a discussion of the "irresistible impulse" test, see Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology
and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1988); Norman G.
Poythress, Jr., Personal Responsibility in Psychiatry and the Law: A Philosophical Critique of Con-
temporary Concepts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1985) (reviewing MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND
PsycHiATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984)). ,
8. This test requires that the defendant's actions be the direct outcome or product of
a mental disease. See Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929); State v.Jones,
50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); see also Edward de Grazia, The
Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1955) (Durham gives psychiatrists greater
power to separate the criminal and the insane); Manfred S. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as
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and the substantial capacity test from the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code.9 While the four tests vary in important aspects, they
all contain similarities. All four tests seek to (1) provide a clear standard
by which to adjudge insanity and (2) approach the theory of limited re-
sponsibility by emphasizing different aspects of the mental state neces-
sary for a determination of insanity. While not every jurisdiction allows
an affirmative defense of insanity,10 all four tests are adopted in at least
an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 325 (1955) (Durham test will foster cooperation be-
tween doctors and lawyers); Wilber G. Katz, Law, Psychiatry, and Free Will, 22 U. CHI. L. REV
397 (1955) (Durham test removes automatic presumption of free will); Philip Q. Roche,
Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 320 (1955) (crim-
inality and mental illness are interrelated and Durham test gives greater scope); Henry Wei-
hofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 356 (1955) (Durham test allows
greater scope of inquiry than M'Naghten); Gregory Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Jus-
tice, 22 U. CHI. L. REV 331 (1955) (Durham test gives doctors too much power in the
courtroom).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985). The Code reads as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, 312 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinaf-
ter LAFAvE]; United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United
States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v.
United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the "substantial capac-
ity" test, see Campbell, supra note 6; Denno, supra note 6; Amy L. Nelson, Recent Develop-
ments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1991) (demonstrates availability of the insanity defense
even when legislative discretion does not create an insanity defense).
10. The following states allow insanity as an affirmative defense: ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1
(Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1987);
CALIF. EVID. CODE § 522 (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3, 16-3-28 (1992); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 704-402 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 628:2 (1984 & Supp. 1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 220.15 (McKinney 1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01(N), 2901.05 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.305 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 22-5-10 (1988); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1985).
Jurisdictions that allow insanity as a defense are: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502
(1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-802 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210 (1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 651
(West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 1208 (1990); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 768.20a (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 553.040 (Vernon 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-04.1-03 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); 18 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 315 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.12.010 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-1 (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-304 (1991).
For states that have abolished insanity as anything other than a negation of mens rea,
see IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992).
While not codified in North Carolina or Virginia, courts in these states have held that
insanity is an affirmative defense. See State v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 795 (N.C. 1985);
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one jurisdiction. Colorado has adopted the M'Naghten test, which is the
most commonly accepted test.1 1
The M'Naghten 12 test is the accepted standard in approximately
one-half of the jurisdictions that allow the insanity defense.1 3 It states
that a defendant is not responsible 14 if the person either (1) acted under
a mental disease or defect and (2) did not know the nature and quality of
his or her act or knew the nature and quality of the act but did not know
the wrongfulness of the act. 15 While the M'Naghten test focuses on the
individual's knowledge of his or her actions, the test does not determine
what type of knowledge is required. Controversy arises over the neces-
sary distinction between cognitive knowledge and affectual or emotional
knowledge.' 6 While cognitive knowledge is intellectual and objective,
affectual knowledge focuses on the actor's ability to appreciate the im-
pact of the act on others and himself or herself. Courts' interpretations
of when an individual has actual knowledge of his or her actions ranges
from the requirement that the defendant need have only a minimal
awareness of facts 17 to the capacity to choose between acts. This
"choice" is an acknowledgement of alternatives to the action and the
action itself with a reasoning process undergone before action.18 For
example, a mother who has an urge to kill her child might know that
such an action is not appropriate and seek help to act otherwise.
However, when the defendant labors under an insane delusion such
Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934,936 (4th Cir. 1963) (Virginia). Florida courts have
held that insanity serves as a complete defense. See Davis v. State, 82 S. 822 (Fla. 1902).
11. LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 311.
12. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M'Naghten has various acceptable
spellings, including McNaughten, M'Naughten and McNaghten. This Comment uses
M'Naghten.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) (codifying M'Naghten); LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 312. The
following states utilize the M'Naghten test in some form: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1991);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-101 (West 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (Bums 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West Supp. 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a (West
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-97(b) (Supp.
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.15 (McKinney 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Anderson Supp. 1991); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A §§ 1-
103, 6-201 (West 1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-
10 (Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-5-10 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-
501 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.12.010 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-304 (1991).
The MNaghten test is established by the courts in the following cases: see Davis v.
State, 32 S. 822 (Fla. 1902); Kansas v. Smith, 574 P.2d 548 (Kan. 1977); State v. Lewis, 22
P. 241 (Nev. 1889); State v. Harris, 28 S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1943).
14. A person who is not responsible is not criminally liable for the consequences of
his or her actions. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 317 n.70.
15. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 311.
16. Id. at 313.
17. Id. For example, an actor may have a simple memory of details of events leading
up to and including the act. See also Guttmacher, supra note 7, at 326 (knowledge test is too
restrictive for determining fitness to stand trial or in determining post-trial dispositions).
18. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 313. See THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 388 (Sa-
muel J. Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971) (affective knowledge as standard);
Weihofen, supra note 7, at 358; Zilboorg, supra note 7, at 333.
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as a deific decree, 19 the perspective changes. The case is no longer sim-
ply a question of knowledge of actions and their consequences, but
rather one of compulsions and abilities to resist. According to the
judges in M'Naghten, a person operating under a delusion must "be con-
sidered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with re-
spect to which the delusion exists were real." 20 If an individual commits
a lawful act according to the facts of his or her delusion, that person is
not culpable since the reality perceived indicates the action is a legal
one. However, if he or she commits a crime according to the reality
within the individual's delusion, the court may hold him or her responsi-
ble for the act.
Several jurisdictions using the M'Naghten test also include, as either
an alternative test or as an element of the M'Naghten analysis, the irresis-
tible impulse test.21 This test focuses on the volitional aspects of the
defendant's actions and encompasses situations when the defendant
knew the action was wrong but could not control himself or herself due
to a sudden impulse or a controlling disease.22 If both M'Naghten and
this test exist in a jurisdiction as alternatives, the defendant's mental
state need only fulfill one of the tests.
23
Criminal law, with the modem inclusion of codified law and a
greater understanding of mental illness, has developed two additional
tests which combine the common law M'Naghten and irresistible impulse
tests while systematically merging new developments in treatment and
understanding of mental illness with the common law insanity defenses.
The Durham product test examines the effects of a mental disease or de-
fect alone.2 4 The American Legal Institute's Model Penal Code sub-
stantial capacity test views the individual's act in light of his or her entire
mental state or capacity.
25
The Durham product test rejects the M'Naghten test outright by in-
sisting the act be solely the product of a mental disease or defect. 26 The
act must be causally related to the disease afflicting the defendant. For
19. Other insane delusions may incorporate voices or visions recognizable only by the
person having the delusions. They may also incorporate beliefs such as people becoming
objects, objects being personified or paranoia of persecution by other individuals or
groups. See Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468 (Conn. 1988); State v. Seifert, 454 N.W.2d
346 (Wis. 1990); Roosa v. Northern Wyo. Community College Found., 753 P.2d 1028
(Wyo. 1988).
20. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 718 (1843). See Anthony Platt & Bernard L.
Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent
Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227 (1966); LAFAvE,
supra note 8, at 311.
21. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 320. The following have codified both tests: GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3 (Michie 1992); N.M. CRIM. STAT. ANN. § 14-51-2 (Michie 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992).
22. Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887); Regina v. Oxford, 173 Eng. Rep. 941
(1840). See SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (1925); ISAAC
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 263 (5th ed. 1871).
23. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 320.
24. Id. at 324.
25. Id. at 330.
26. Id. at 323.
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instance, an individual suffering from kleptomania steals; the theft stems
from the illness itself. The defendant's mental capacity for understand-
ing the act has no bearing on the issue. The only question presented is
whether or not the act arises from some mental disease or defect. 2 7 Be-
cause insanity is comprised of multiple symptoms that may be different
in every case, this test considering the act as stemming directly from the
illness itself and not its symptoms was adopted in Durham v. United
States.28 Under this approach, the defendant is not responsible for his or
her actions if the act was a product of the person's mental disease or
defect. 29 The Durham product test is broader than either the M'Naghten
or the irresistible impulse test used alone or in combination with each
other. First, the Durham test allows greater participation in the legal
arena by medical professionals.3 0 Second, juries decide whether the ac-
tion charged in the instant proceeding is a direct consequence of the
defendant's mental illness or is simply an illegal act done by someone
who may be mentally ill.3 1 The distinction can often be discerned by the
question, "But for the illness, would the act have taken place?" If the
illness is the only reason the act took place, the actor is not accountable.
If the person's act did not occur solely because of the illness, but rather
for a reason such as revenge, he or she may still be mentally ill, but not
excused. The Durham test is not popular in the legal community because
of its perceived ability to weaken counsel's impact on a trial by appear-
ing to give both the medical community and the jury too much power
and control in the courtroom. By changing the focus of the litigation
from the legal question of responsibility to a medical question of actual
and specific mental illness, the Durham test gives additional weight and
impact to both the doctor's diagnoses and the jury's sympathies.
The American Law Institute created the most modem of the ac-
cepted insanity tests in the Model Penal Code. 32 This test combines
both the M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse tests and includes both
intellectual and affectual knowledge on the part of the defendant. The
Model Penal Code test maintains that if, because of a disease or defect
27. Id. at 323; see State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); State v.Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871)
(both cases provide that the criminal act must be a "product" of mental disease or defect).
28. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
29. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 323.
30. See de Grazia, supra note 7, at 342 (psychiatrist's input will assist the factfinder);
Guttmacher, supra note 7, at 329 (Durham test will foster cooperation between doctors and
lawyers); Roche, supra note 7, at 322 (doctors will bring greater understanding of mental
illness to the legal world); Zilboorg, supra note 7, at 333-34 (Durham test gives doctors too
much power in the courtroom).
31. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 324. See also THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 342
(Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre, Jr. eds. 1961); Herbert Wechler, The Criteria of
Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 367 (1955) (long-standing illnesses are not always
enough for insanity); Frederic Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 336 (1955).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985):
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law.
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(excluding psychopathic disorders),3 3 the individual lacks substantial ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform
his or her conduct to the requirements of the law, that individual shall
not be held responsible for his or her actions.3 4 In determining an indi-
vidual's sanity, the defendant's alleged symptoms must be evaluated,
even when they include claims of a direct command from God.
B. The Deific Decree Doctrine
The theory behind the deific decree doctrine is that when a human
truly believes God personally commanded him or her to perform a hor-
rendous act, that person suffers from a serious mental illness. 3 5 Coinci-
dentally, those jurisdictions that follow M'Naghten have also been those
to consider the deific decree.3 6 Because the M'Naghten test inherently
focuses on the legal wrongness question of statute violation rather than
the moral wrongness question of society's perception of the act as
wrong, courts originally considered the legal wrongfulness rather than
the moral wrongfulness of the act.
3 7
It has been previously decided, however, that a defendant is no less
insane because he or she knows of the illegality of the act when there is a
deific decree.3 8 Knowledge of the laws of man may appear inconse-
quential when compared to obedience to a deity.3 9 A standard ofjudge-
ment that considers a wrong to be committed based upon simple
knowledge of an act's legal wrongness is considered too austere. Having
a mere "consciousness" or general awareness of the law's existence
would then be enough to convict a defendant, and that may not even be
necessary.40 "Ignorance of the law is no excuse;" and a lack of positive
knowledge of the law does not abolish responsibility. 4 1 With the use of
a legal standard, the doctrine of the deific decree would not exist because
33. Psychopathic disorders are those that demonstrate an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE 4.01(2)
(1985); United States v. Lawrenson, 210 F. Supp. 422 (D. Md. 1962), aft'd, 315 F.2d 612
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 938 (1963).
34. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 329; Francis A. Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, 45 MAR9.. L. REv. 494 (1962).
35. State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945
(N.Y. 1915); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989);
State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
36. The M'Naghten jurisdictions ruling on the deific decree doctrine are New Jersey,
New York and Washington. See Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401
(NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961); People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915);
Rice, 757 P.2d at 889; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650; State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash.
1983). California is the only exception as it is the only non-MNaghten jurisdiction consid-
ering the deific decree. See People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). See
also Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 429 (1990).
37. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945.
38. Id at 948.
39. id at 945 and 947; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
40. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 134 (Colo.1992). See also State v. Hamann, 285
N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979); State v. Andrews, 357 P.2d 739 (Kan. 1960); McElroy v. State,
242 S.W. 883 (Tenn. 1922); Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952).
41. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 134.
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it would not matter what the motivations were for the action; the only
important element would be whether or not the defendant knew the act
was unlawful. The occurrence of the deific decree is recognized as the
only general instance of wrong as purely moral wrong.
4 2
When the severity of the crime is great and there is a deific decree
claim, it is presumed that a defendant cannot appreciate the wrongful-
ness of the act.4 3 The evaluation of the moral awareness of the defend-
ant is important because both morals and community values are
reflected in the laws of the communities themselves. Focusing purely on
moral wrongs does, however, leave a great deal of room for personal
subjectivity to be inserted into the analysis. 4 4 All the courts evaluating
this doctrine still use societal standards for comparison, requiring that
the individual know the act is immoral according to the society's broad
value system and not the defendant's personal value system.45
The approach most used in this conflict between legal and moral
knowledge and wrongfulness is a unification of the two perspectives.
Concern does not center on violations of the laws of man or God, but
rather on the two combined. To be adjudged sane, an individual must
recognize his or her violation of the laws of both man and God.4 6 Since
recognition of what is illegal invariably gives an individual insight into
what is considered immoral in the community, one must be able to rec-
ognize both concepts in the justification of the law being violated. 4 7 De-
termining if this recognition takes place is the general approach taken by
most courts. The deific decree, however, continues to be acknowledged
as the only exception for a purely moral evaluation.
48
Jury instructions for a deific decree claim have evolved to a point
where the court may either give an instruction that does not define
wrong,4 9 thereby leaving both legal and moral wrongs as a possibility
for the jury to consider, or provide an instruction that directly includes
both legal and moral wrongs, not precluding either from considera-
tion.50 A specific jury instruction, however, is allowed in some states
only when it is claimed that the delusion subsumes the defendant's free
42. State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1322 (N.J. 1990); Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
43. People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr., 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Schmidt, 110 N.E. at
945.
44. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 137.
45. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1322.
46. Id.; Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650
47. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 137.
48. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
49. See cases cited supra note 45; State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 903 n.16 (Wash. 1988),
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). The non-defining instruction given in Rice reads in rele-
vant part:
For a defendant to be found not guilty by reason of insanity you must find that, as
a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant's mind was affected to such an
extent that the defendant was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the acts
with which the defendant is charged or was unable to tell right from wrong with
reference to the particular acts with which the defendant is charged.
Id.
50. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650 (jury instruction's preclusion of consideration of certain
factors related to the defendant's deific decree was erroneous).
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will.- ' As with most other laws, deific decree cases must be decided on a
case-by-case basis.5 2 The deific decree doctrine does not, however, ap-
ply to instances of action based upon a set of religious beliefs or faiths.
53
In general, regularly practiced religious beliefs are not considered delu-
sional or insane delusions. They are not claimed as such by their adher-
ents54 and therefore are not protected by the insanity defense. 55 True
adherents to a religion do not claim that their beliefs are insane and
delusionary. Even though a religious tenet may seem strange to a
nonbeliever, the tenet is not seen as delusional even when it violates the
law.
The deific decree doctrine has evolved from a complete defense in
People v. Schmidt 5 6 to an affirmative defense negating the mental state
required as an element of the crime in State v. Worlock.5 7 In Schmidt, the
New York Court of Appeals did not accept that a defendant could do
something horrendous in the name of and under the command of God
and know it to be unlawful: "If, however, there is an insane delusion
that God has appeared to the defendant and ordained the commission of
a crime, we think it cannot be said of the offender that he knows the act
to be wrong."5 8 By the time Worlock was decided, courts viewed the de-
ific decree as an affirmative defense, with a religious delusion serving as
the basis for the claims.5 9 The Worlock court combined the objective
(right from wrong) aspect of the M'Naghten test with a subjective insanity
defense which depends solely on the individual's delusions.60 Fewjuris-
dictions have actually dealt with the deific decree doctrine. Washington,
California, New York and NewJersey are leaders in this doctrine's field,
as the only states dealing with the deific decree to any great degree.
Colorado first addressed the deific decree in People v. Serravo.
6 1
C. Deific Decree Case Law
The major cases dealing with the deific decree come from
M'Naghten jurisdictions. Because Colorado is another M'Naghten juris-
diction, these courts' reasonings should be persuasive in Colorado. In
fact, the Colorado Supreme Court refers to other jurisdictions utilizing
51. Rice, 757 P.2d at 889.
52. Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650.
53. State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
54. John S. Hilbert, Comment, God in a Cage: Religion, Intent, and Criminal Law, 36
BUFF. L. REV. 701 (1987).
55. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 488.
56. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
57. 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990).
58. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 949.
59. This refers to the large number of cases in which a defendant claims to have heard
the voice of God, seen Satan in another, felt like God was on his or her side, etc. An
analysis of these claims is beyond the scope of this Comment.
60. IVorlock, 569 A.2d at 1314; State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 880 (1961).
61. Serravo II, 823 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1992).
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the M'Naghten test in varying aspects of Serravo.6 2 There are seven cases
focusing on insanity in the United States because of a deific decree as a
defense.63 All of these courts analyzed the issue from different aspects,
but each court arrived at the same two conclusions. First, each defend-
ant honestly believed God commanded him or her to do some horren-
dous act. Second, each defendant is insane. It should, therefore, make
no difference how a court approaches the insanity test. Eventually, all
courts, after hearing the evidence and understanding the doctrine,
should arrive at the same conclusion of insanity. A person who is able to
demonstrate that a deific command forced him or her to perform some
heinous act is clearly not functioning in the same reality as other mem-
bers of society. This difference should at least force a court to examine
the claim very carefully.
In People v. Schmidt,64 the defendant claimed God commanded him
to kill a woman in sacrifice. In deciding the preeminent case in the field,
the Schmidt court established a doctrine that has been consulted in al-
most every other case concerning the deific decree. The court found
that if an individual is commanded by God to act, the person may be well
aware of the illegality of the act but is blinded to the immorality of the
behavior.6 5 The overwhelming need to fulfill what is seen as a com-
mand from God makes it extremely difficult to understand how the per-
son can know that his or her actions are wrong.66 The moral duty a
citizen carries to obey the law is outweighed by the delusionary belief of
an absolute duty to God.67 The Schmidt court reasoned that a delusion-
ary individual is no less insane because he knows his acts are prohibited.
To the contrary, knowing the act is prohibited yet being unable to con-
form to the law emphasizes the degree to which the aid of the court is
needed, not its wrath.
68
State v. Di Paolo69 was decided in NewJersey, also a M'Naghtenjuris-
diction. In Di Paolo, the defendant claimed insanity. He later claimed
that he feigned insanity so that others would not know he was insane.
Following a strict interpretation of the M'Naghten test, the court evalu-
ated only the defendant's ability to appreciate the quality or nature of
his act or his knowledge of its wrongfulness, but also took the unusual
step of allowing the defense to present the defendant's entire psychiatric
62. Id. at 138. The Court discussed "wrong" as moral wrong, id. at 135, and societal
versus personal standards of morality, id at 138.
63. People v. Hudec, 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Worlock, 569 A.2d at
1314; Di Paolo, 168 A.2d at 401; Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945; State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889
(Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); Cameron, 674 P.2d at 650; Crenshaw, 659
P.2d at 488.
64. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915).
65. Id. at 948.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 949.
68. Id. at 948. ("Such a man is no less insane because he knows that murder is prohib-
ited by human law. Indeed, it may emphasize his insanity that, knowing the human law, he
believes that he is acting under the direct command of God.")
69. 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961).
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record for the jury to evaluate.7 0 While instructing the jurors to abide
by the rules established by the M'Naghter test, the court also allowed
them to consider all aspects of the defendant's past behavior and
claims. 71 The deific decree was not necessarily a turning point in the
case, but served as the focal point for the development of the defense's
case above and beyond the original M'Naghten case.
In State v. Crenshaw,7 2 the Washington Supreme Court designed the
uppermost limits of the deific decree doctrine. The defendant claimed
that, as part of his beliefs as a practicing Muscovite, 73 he was com-
manded by God to kill his wife because she had been unfaithful. 74 The
defendant claimed that the obligation to kill an unfaithful wife was a
practiced belief in his religion, and that all his acts were directly or-
dained by God. The court ruled that the defendant was not insane.
75
Reasoning that a practiced belief or religious tenet is not an insane delu-
sion, the court noted that "[s]ome notion of morality, unrelated to a
mental illness, which disagrees with the law and mores of our society is
not an insane delusion." 76 The court further noted that a tenet of a
religion is a fundamental part of practicing that religion; it is not a per-
sonal or individual command by God given specifically to the person in
question. These beliefs are not the same as insane delusions. Very few
true adherents to a religion would claim that their religious beliefs were,
in fact, delusions. 77 As courts have noted, "laws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices." s7 8 While the tenets them-
selves are not considered delusionary and are not regulated by the gov-
ernment or the courts, the outward expression of those tenets is
regulated by the law. A religious follower may believe that conducting
human sacrifices is a necessary part of worship, but the actual practice of
this belief will make the actor legally responsible, even with the religious
rationalization.7 9 The court likens this claim to that of an individual
joining a cult. Even though the value system may be different and the
duties contrary to those imposed at law, if the member chooses to act in
such a way as to violate the law, he or she is not relieved of responsibility
70. Id. at 407.
71. Id.
72. 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
73. A conservative sect of Russian Orthodoxy created in the 1478 unification of the
Muscovy and Novogrod empires. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, THE STUDY OF HISTORY 244, 372
(1947).
74. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d at 494.
75. IME at 495.
76. It (citing State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880
(1961)).
77. Id. at 494.
78. Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1882) (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S.
145 (1878)).
79. Id.; People v. Corrigan, 87 N.E. 792, 796 (N.Y. 1909). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (bigamy, even when recognized by the Mormon Church, is
illegal in practice in the Utah territory); People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903) (par-
ents and faith healing for their children, rather than medical care).
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before the law.8 °
State v. Cameron,8 1 citing Schmidt for the proposition that individuals
laboring under a deific decree are no more or less insane when they are
aware of the illegality of their acts. In Cameron, the defendant stabbed
his stepmother seventy times to rid her of the "evil spirit" that pos-
sessed her.8 2 In the defendant's mind, his stepmother was persecuting
him, as were Yasser Arafat and the Ayatollah Khomeni. Because of that
persecution, God ordered him, the defendant, to kill her.8 3 The Cameron
court accepted the deific decree doctrine enunciated in Schmidt, Di Paolo
and Crenshaw, and further expanded it to include the court's cognizance
of the uniqueness of each situation. The court stated that while this case
may be included in the exception created in Crenshaw, each deific decree
claim must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
8 4
Peaple v. Hudec,85 decided in California, is the sole case of the seven
cases not to arise in a M'Naghten jurisdiction. California is a Model Pe-
nal Code state, the test considered the most flexible of the four used
because of its emphasis on substantial capacity to determine right from
wrong rather than an absolute knowledge of right and wrong. In Hudec,
the defendant heard the "voice of God" for several years. For some
time, the voice commanded Hudec to kill his father to both please God
and keep the defendant from becoming a homosexual.8 6 As a Model
Penal Code state, California requires that, for sanity, the defendant ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct and have the ability to conform it
to the law.8 7 In a deific decree case, the individual is consumed by his or
her delusion and is unable to appreciate either the action or its conse-
quences. The Hudec court found that even though the defendant under-
stood the wrongfulness of his act, he could not understand its
consequences and was compelled to act on the orders of God and there-
fore was insane.
8 8
Washington courts again came to the forefront in State v. Rice.
8 9
Rice addressed specific elements of the treatment of a deific decree
claim. The court held that a ruling of insanity arising with a deific de-
cree claim may be restricted in its applicable scope. This restriction on
the procedural treatment of deific decree-based insanity provides that an
individual may be insane only if the defendant's free will is completely
subsumed by the delusion.90 If the possibility exists that the defendant
retained some control over his or her reality, the defendant is not legally
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983).
82. Id. at 652.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 654.
85. 213 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
86. Id. at 186.
87. Id. at 187.
88. Idl
89. 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
90. Rice, 757 P.2d at 904.
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insane, even if he acted pursuant to a deific decree. 91 In addition, a
specificjury instruction on insanity induced by deific decree is applicable
only when there is substantial evidence to support such a theory. Mere
allegations of an insane delusion will not suffice.
92
State v. Worlock,93 the most recent deific decree case prior to Serravo,
explicitly establishes the interpretation to be given to a M'Naghten test.
The court stated that "[t]he only generally recognized instance in which
a 'moral' wrong standard has provided an insanity defense is when the
defendant has killed under the delusion that he or she was acting pursu-
ant to a 'command from God'."' 94 Worlock also strengthens the argu-
ment for a judgmental standard that is guided by societal mores rather
than individual value systems and allows for jury instructions that com-
bine both "legal" and "moral" wrongs into one instruction. 95 All seven
of these cases form the foundation of the deific decree doctrine. This is
the precedent the Colorado Supreme Court should have followed in
making its decision.
D. Colorado Insanity Law
The Colorado General Assembly began its first real excursion into
the realm of legal insanity in 1951.96 Colorado's first insanity statute
combined both the M'Naghten right from wrong test and the irresistible
impulse test.9 7 Over the years, the statute changed semantically, 98 and
the statute changed substantively in 1983. 99 At that time, the legislature
removed the irresistible impulse test from the statute and added the
present Section 2, excluding psychopathic behavior from the insanity
defense. l0 0 The question of an individual's sanity is a question of fact
91. Id
92. Id.
93. 569 A.2d 1314 (NJ. 1990).
94. Id. at 1321 (citations omitted).
95. Id at 1322.
96. 1951 Colo. Laws, ch. 144, § 507(2) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-8-1(2)
(1953)).
97. The relevant text of the statute reads:
A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the Act as to be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that Act, or being able so to dis-
tinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to destroy the
will power and render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from
doing the wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity may
be manifested, whether by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But care should be
taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental depravity,
or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other motives, and kindred
evil conditions, for when the act is induced by any of these causes the person is
accountable to the law.
Id
98. The phrase "or defective in mind" was added after every instance of "disease."
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1973).
99. In 1983, the Colorado General Assembly amended CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101
(1973) by enacting An Act Concerning Culpability for Crimes Committed While the De-
fendant is Insane or Mentally III, 1 Session Laws of Colorado, ch. 188, § 16-8-801 (1983)
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1983 Supp.).
100. The relevant text of the current statute reads:
(1) The applicable test of insanity shall be, and the jury shall be so instructed:
"A person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission
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that must be decided by the trier of fact.' 0 '
Colorado approaches the concept of insanity in three ways: the
straightforward plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the claim of im-
paired mental capacity and the claim of "temporary" and "settled" in-
sanity. A plea of insanity is treated as any other affirmative defense.
Defense counsel is required to provide proof, to at least a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant was in fact insane and did not
have the mens rea necessary to commit the crime. The rarely used or
recognized claim of impaired capacity is restricted to when the defense
is trying to show less than complete insanity as sufficient for an acquittal.
An example of such a claim is intoxication and its negation of the mens
rea needed for specific-intent crimes, such as second-degree murder.'
0 2
The largest debate in this area of the law outside the meaning of the
statute itself is the "temporary" versus "settled" insanity dispute.
"Temporary" insanity, not codified in Colorado, is usually the
product of a short-term experience with a mind-altering substance, such
as illegal drugs or prescription pharmaceuticals.10 3 The temporary in-
capabilities the defendant suffers render him or her unable to distin-
guish between right and wrong.' 0 4 The effects may be unexpected and
uncertain for the individuals themselves' 0 5 and are difficult to predict.
"Settled" insanity occurs after long-term use of a mind-altering sub-
stance. 10 6 Colorado tentatively accepted this doctrine in People v.
Bieber,10 7 stating that "an inability to distinguish between right and
wrong because of a mental infirmity derived from excessive substance
abuse should be recognized as a form of legal insanity when the mental
infirmity persists after the effects of the substance itself have dissi-
pated."' l0 8 Long-term use of barbiturates, for example, may cause brain
damage; this brain damage may be serious enough to be classified as a
mental defect and qualify for a claim of insanity.
Colorado courts are divided on how to interpret the insanity statute
itself. In People v. Serravo, the trial court recognized insanity in an indi-
of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to
that act is not accountable .. "
(2) The term "diseased or defective in mind", as used in subsection (1) of this
section, does not refer to an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986).
101. People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665, 668 (Colo. 1982); Palmer v. People, 424 P.2d
766, 770 (Colo. 1967).
102. People v. Cornelison, 559 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Colo. 1977).
103. People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 625 (Colo. 1987) (defendant ingested one hundred
twenty cough drops in a twenty-four hour period and became intoxicated).
104. Id. The defendant's consumption of the one hundred twenty cough drops caused
a psychotic disorder known as "organic delusional syndrome" or "toxic psychosis" and,
according to medical testimony, the defendant was "incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong." Id.
105. Id. (Defendant was not aware of the sudden side effects of dextromethorphan
hydrobromide, the active ingredient in cough drops).
106. H. Patrick Furman, The Definition and Determination of Insanity in Colorado, 21 COLO.
LAW. 693, 694 (1992).
107. People v. Bieber, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 151, 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
108. Id. at 152.
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vidual who knew his act was legally wrong but believed it to be morally
right, and the appellate court agreed.10 9 The Colorado Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that the standard should be one of moral wrongs eval-
uated in comparison to society's values and norms, rather than an indi-
vidual's values." 0 Rather than focus on the purely individual or the
purely legal aspects of the case, the court chose a new approach, stating
that the acts must be judged against a standard of cognitive knowledge
of the social morals surrounding the actor.1 1 1
II. PEOPLE V. SERRAVO
A. Facts
On the evening of May 9, 1987, Serravo was out late. When he
returned home, he read a portion of the Bible and walked to his upstairs
bedroom and watched his wife sleeping. 1 12 Believing that she was an
obstacle to his divine mission to establish a religious community by con-
structing a sports complex dedicated to God,'1 3 he stabbed his wife in
the back.11 4 Serravo believed his wife passed a divine "test" because the
wounds did not kill her.' 15 He told his wife intruders stabbed her"16
and called the police and told them an intruder stabbed his wife.
117
Several weeks later, Mrs. Serravo discovered letters her husband wrote
in which he admitted stabbing her"18 while operating under a decree
from Jehovah. 19 When confronted by his wife, Serravo admitted stab-




The State charged Robert Serravo with first-degree attempted mur-
der after deliberation, 12 1 first-degree assault 12 2 and commission of
crimes of violence.' 23 Serravo pled not guilty by reason of insanity, was
acquitted' 24 and was subsequently committed to a state hospital
facility. 125
109. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 132.
110. Ia at 136-37.
111. Id. at 138.
112. Id at 130.
113. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 782; Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 131.
114. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 130-31.
115. Serravo I at 782.
116. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130.
117. Id
118. Id. at 131 ("[o]ur marriage was severed on Mother's Day when I put the knife in
your back.").
119. Id (" 'I have gone to be with Jehovah in heaven for three and one-half days,' and
that 'I must return for there is still a great deal of work to be done'.").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 130; see also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2-101(1) and 18-3-102(1)(a) (1986).
122. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130; see also CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-202(1)(a) (1986).
123. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130; see also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-309 (1986).
124. Serravo II, 832 P.2d at 130.
125. Id. at 132.
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The prosecution presented, as an expert witness, a psychiatrist who
diagnosed Serravo as having either temporal lobe/organic delusional
disorder or paranoid schizophrenia.' 26 The prosecution's doctor stated
that Serravo knew the stabbing was illegal, but believed it to be morally
justified. 12 7 Since Serravo knew the stabbing was illegal, the prosecu-
tion argued that Serravo was sane. 128 The defense presented four psy-
chiatrists and a psychologist who all testified to a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia. 129 Examining both the legal wrongness and the moral
wrongness of the act, all the defense doctors stated they believed Ser-
ravo was unable to distinguish right from wrong. °3 0 No one disputed
the fact of Serravo's mental illness. However, the prosecution objected
to the court's jury instruction providing the insanity standards, which
stated:
As used in context of the statutory definition of insanity as a
criminal defense, the phrase "incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong" includes within its meaning the case where a per-
son appreciates that his conduct is criminal, but, because of a
mental disease or defect, believes it to be morally right.'
5 '
Believing the instruction should contain only an objective standard, the
People appealed the instruction's inclusion of a subjective moral stan-
dard and the instruction's possible interpretation by the jury as subjec-
tive-standard. 1
3 2
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, stating that
when the defendant, by reason of mental disease or defect, believed he
was inspired by God to commit an act, the phrase "incapable of distin-
guishing right from wrong" may include a person who knows the con-
duct is criminal, but believes it to be morally right.' 3 3 The appellate
court noted that the common law M'Naghten rule does not determine
whether moral wrong or legal wrong is to be considered in the standard
of judgment, and that the majority of state courts "apply a moral stan-
dard of wrong."' 3 4 The Colorado legislature determined that "wrong-
fulness" should be judged under a societal standard of moral
wrongfulness. 13 5 The appellate court recognized this legislative inten-
tion, 136 but noted that in most cases, the laws simply enunciate the so-
cial morality of that community.'
3 7
Because of this difference, the court of appeals viewed the deific
decree aspect of Serravo's case as an exception, recognized by otherju-
126. Id. at 131.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 131.
129. Id. at 131-32.
130. lE
131. Id. at 132.
132. Id. at 132-33.
133. Serravo I, 797 P.2d at 783.
134. Id.
135. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986).




risdictions,13 8 to the "knowingly legal wrong, morally right" stan-
dard.1 39 In this instance, when an individual knows some act is both
legally and morally wrong but because of mental disease or defect be-
lieves God ordered him to do it, the individual shall be found insane. 140
The deific decree does not, however, include an act performed pursuant
to a particular faith or belief system.14 1 A person acting under a deific
decree must be an individual that believes God is speaking directly to
him, personally commanding him to act. The State appealed to the Col-
orado Supreme Court on both the jury instruction and the deific decree
exception granted Serravo by the Colorado Court of Appeals. The State
further contended that the trial court's interpretation of the phrase "in-
capable of distinguishing right from wrong" was in error and inserted
the wrong standard ofjudgment into the jury deliberations.' 4 2
C. The Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
State's questions concerning (1) the phrasing added to the jury instruc-
tion and the standard it created, (2) the district court's interpretation of
the phrase "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong,"
(3) the issue of double jeopardy found in a retrial of the defendant's
sanity and (4) the deific decree exception.143 The court affirmed the court
of appeals' decision in part and reversed in part.
14 4
The court found that thejury instruction stating that the phrase "in-
capable of distinguishing right from wrong" included persons who
"know their acts are criminal but believe them to be morally right" was
improper. 14 5 This interpretation was too general and allowed for the
probability that the individual's subjective system of moral values would
become the basis of the jury's decision.14 6 The appropriate jury instruc-
tion for an insanity definition must state that "incapable of distinguish-
ing right from wrong" refers to a defendant's cognitive inabilities. 14 7
The inability to distinguish right from wrong because of a mental defect
or disease utilizes a social standard of morality even though the individ-
ual may know the act is criminal. 14 8 The fact that it is a social standard
that must be utilized must be made perfectly clear with no room for
138. iE
139. Id ("[W]e adopt an exception that has been drawn by otherjurisdictions in situa-
tions in which a person commits a criminal act, knowing it is illegal and morally wrong




142. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 130.
143. Id at 129-30.
144. Id at 130.
145. Id. at 138.
146. Id
147. Id at 138-39 ("[L]egal insanity... incorporates psychological and moral compo-
nents that are not necessarily limited by the confines of positive law .. " and therefore
needs clarifying instructions).
148. Id. (emphasis on societal standard of morality).
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ambiguity in the jurors' minds.
149
The supreme court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of
the phrase "incapable of distinguishing right from wrong." The court
held that "right" and "wrong" referred to moral wrongs as opposed to
legal wrongs. 150 These moral wrongs, however, are to be measured not
by the individual's value system, but rather by the societal value sys-
tem.15 1 Because concepts of right and wrong develop through commu-
nal experiences, to allow a standard of a personal system of values
ignores a fundamental base of social norms and values.1 52 The social
standard also allows for a more objective review of the defendant's ac-
tions. If an individual's values set the standard, there would be no cer-
tainty, objectivity or security for evaluation by the courts or society at
large. 153 If the legislature intended otherwise, the language of the stat-
ute would have better reflected its intentions, perhaps by including spe-
cific language, such as the words "individual standard."'
5 4
Regarding the threat of double jeopardy posed by a retrial of Ser-
ravo's sanity, the court ruled that even with the erroneous jury instruc-
tion, a retrial of Serravo's sanity would create double jeopardy for
Serravo. 15 5 The court reasoned that when a finding of insanity in a bi-
furcated trial negates the mens rea by eliminating the possibility of the
defendant having the required mental status needed for a crime, the
finding of insanity adjudicates the merits of the case. 15 6 When an appel-
late court determines that the evidence of a case is insufficient to sustain
the verdict, there is an adjudication on the merits because, regardless of
any trial court errors, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 7 The court noted that Colorado
courts interpret the Colorado statute more expansively than federal
courts interpret the federal statute. Once a court enters an acquittal, it
precludes a retrial, even if the trial court's errors are based on non-guilt
factors. 15 8 The same statute that allows the prosecution to appeal these
149. Id. (ambiguity may lead the jury to use a personal standard for judgment and there-
fore possibly arrive at an erroneous conclusion).
150. Id. at 137 (awareness of immorality may be impaired by illness or defect without
any effect on a "sterile awareness" of illegality).
151. Id at 137-38. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976, 982 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See also State v. Corley, 495 P.2d 470 (Ariz. 1972); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752
(Cal. 1985); Moses v. State, 263 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980);
People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962).
152. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 138.
153. Id. at 137.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 140 (citing U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 18 (No
person shall... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense").
156. Serravo 1I, 823 P.2d at 140; See Coolbroth v. District Court, 766 P.2d 670 (Colo.
1988); People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 439 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1968).
157. Serravo HI, 823 P.2d at 141 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 US 1 (1978)).
158. Id. See People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413 (Colo. 1981); People v. Paulsen, 601
P.2d 634 (Colo. 1979); Krutka v. Spinuzzi, 384 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1963); Menton v. Johns,
377 P.2d 104 (Colo. 1962); Castner v. People, 184 P. 387 (Colo. 1919); Roland v. People,
47 P. 269 (Colo. 1896).
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issues1 59 states that "[n]othing in this section shall authorize placing
the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense."
160
The final issue was the status of the de/fic decree delusion claim by
Serravo. The court held that the deific decree claim is not an exception
to the insanity test, but that it is afactor to be considered when assessing
the defendant's ability to "distinguish right from wrong." 161 If the de-
luded individual believes that God appeared and commanded the act, he
or she does not believe the act is wrong and does not meet the social
morality standard.' 62 If the deific delusion destroys the defendant's
cognitive ability to "distinguish right from wrong" as judged by a socie-
tal morality, the defendant is legally insane. 163 The jurors must con-
sider and evaluate the possibility of fraud in this situation in their roles
as the "consciences of the community."''
D. The Dissent
Justice Vollack argued that the majority erred in not considering the
language of the insanity statute 165 when it decided whether the phrase
"incapable of distinguishing right from wrong" meant moral wrong ver-
sus legal wrong. 166 The language of the statute reflects the "right from
wrong" approach of M'Naghten,167 and the language reflects the legisla-
ture's intent. The statute did not include language reflective of the
Model Penal Code test, but instead, keeps the identical language as
found in the original M'Naghten decision.' 6 8 The Colorado legislature's
refusal to adopt the Model Penal Code language entirely is obviously
intentional since Model Penal Code language can be found in Colorado
Revised Statute § 16-8-101(2), 169 which excludes psychopathic disor-
ders. In addition, Justice Vollack argued that "incapable of distinguish-
ing" demonstrates the cognitive capacity necessary for a determination
of insanity. 170 M'Naghten demands that the defendant be totally devoid
of cognitive ability, thus, "incapable of distinguishing" indicates the leg-
islature's intention that the defendant must be without any cognitive
ability.' 7 1 Under this interpretation, the defendant is not insane if he or
she is conscious of his or her act's illegality, thereby using a legal wrong-
159. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102(1) (1986).
160. ld; Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 142.
161. Serravo I1, 823 P.2d at 139.
162. l at 139, 140 (citing People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915).
163. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 140.
164. Id at 140 n. 13.
165. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(l) (1986).
166. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 142 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
167. 1d; People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987); Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020
(Colo. 1959); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
168. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 144 (J. Vollack, dissenting) (the statute contains no "wrong-
fulness" or "criminality" language; only "right from wrong").
169. Id at 144 n.6 (the definition of "disease or defective in mind" is verbatim from
MPC § 4.01, see supra note 6); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(2) (1986).
170. Serravo 11, 832 P.2d at 144 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
171. Id at 144-45; see Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); ABA MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1, at 330, 343 (1984).
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fulness standard.1 72 This standard examines only the defendant's cog-
nitive capabilities, and recognizes only those devoid of such
capacities. 173
Judge Vollack states that the issue of moral wrong is nearly moot
when examined from a common-sense perspective. Nowhere in the
original M'Naghten was the word "moral" used.174 The idea that soci-
ety's laws mirror the social morality is itself incorrect. Only some of the
moral standards become laws and, until that time, are an unreliable
test. 175 A more objective, consistent test is based upon that which has
been fixed and established as society's law.
17 6
Justice Vollack also states that the deific decree exception is a very
narrow exception recognized by few states1 77 and limited to those indi-
viduals whose free will has been overcome by their delusionary belief.' 78
In Serravo's jury instruction, the individual's religious beliefs, a subjec-
tive standard, was injected into an objective test.179 According to Jus-
tice Vollack, this directly contradicts the court's decisions concerning
criminal responsibility and the legislature's position on measuring a de-
fendant's conduct. 180
The dissent feels double jeopardy is not present in Serravo because
in a bifurcated sanity trial, the defendant is not placed in jeopardy until a
final determination of his or her guilt is reached. 18 ' This immediate lack
of concern for guilt or innocence is strongly delineated in Colorado
law.' 8 2 A bifurcated sanity trial does not address the elements of the
crimes charged, but merely addresses the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the crime. 183 The determination sought in a sanity trial is
the defendant's sanity, not guilt, innocence, possible capabilities or
potential.'
84
172. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 145 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see State v. Hamann, 285
N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979) (legal right or wrong); M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(1843); Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952) (contrary to law).
173. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (J. Vollack, dissenting) (codifying M'Naghten in COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-8-101(1)); see Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987);
Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
174. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 146 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
175. Id. at 147.
176. Id.; see State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979).
177. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d
488 (Wash. 1983), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash.
1988).
178. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 147 (citing Rice, 757 P.2d at 889).
179. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 148 (J. Vollack, dissenting).
180. Id.; see Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
181. Serravo I, 823 P.2d at 148-49 (J. Vollack, dissenting); see Serfass v. United States,
420 U.S. 377 (1974); People v. Paulsen, 701 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1979); State v. Rodriguez,
679 P.2d 615 (Haw. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1078 (1984).
182. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-104 (1986); see People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo.
1981).





The appellate court has adopted the deific decree doctrine as an
exception to the societal standard of moral wrong encapsulated in the
M'Naghten test. 18 5 This exception covers individuals who act knowing
that their behavior is either illegal or morally wrong according to soci-
ety's standards, but believing that God has decreed the action.1 8 6 Ser-
ravo knew at the time of the attack that the stabbing was morally wrong
and illegal, yet he still believed that God had decreed the actions.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the court of appeals was in
error in classifying the deific decree doctrine as an exception to the "so-
cietal standards of morality" test.187 The court held that the doctrine
should be considered as only one factor in evaluating an individual's
cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong.' 8 8 The Colorado
Supreme Court views an individual legally insane if that person's cogni-
tive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the crime has
been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has com-
manded the act, which is in technical agreement with the court of ap-
peals. 189 The approaches taken to the deific decree doctrine, however,
make a great deal of difference. The individual may not be able to deter-
mine the act that God commands is wrong. If that determination is not
possible, then the M'Naghten test applies and the individual cannot dis-
tinguish right from wrong. According to Cameron, however, "one who
believes that he is acting under the direct command of God is no less
insane because he nevertheless knows murder is prohibited by the laws
of man." 190 This notion stems from the fact that deific decrees contain
an additional problem not rooted in cognition. A personal command by
God to a believer will always outweigh a legal dictate imposed by man-
kind. In a believer's eyes, God would never order an act that is contrary
to the divine plan.
The Colorado Supreme Court made a grievous error when it re-
moved the deific decree doctrine from the realm of 'an exception and
made it simply another "factor" to be assessed in weighing a human
being's sanity. For a human to truly be overcome by a delusion such as a
deific decree, there must be a great deal of mental illness or devastation
inside that being. Electing to only consider delusions in pursuit of a
determination of whether a person knew the wrongfulness of his or her
actions does not accord the delusion the seriousness or respect it de-
serves. As Cameron made clear, each presented claim of a deific decree
must be evaluated individually and considered totally. 19 1 To decide
prospectively that such a claim is to be viewed as only a "factor" is to
remove some of the court's power to review the case and place emphasis
185. Serravo 1, 797 P.2d at 783.
186. Id
187. Serravo II, 823 P.2d at 139.
188. Id.
189. Id at 139-40.
190. State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1983).
191. Id.
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on that which appears most important. As the Washington court in
Schmidt pointed out, the occurrence of a divine decree may "emphasize
his insanity," for as the court stated, "If a man insanely believes that he
has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand
how such a man can know that it is wrong for him to do it."192 Norval
Morris' essay on Ake Dah, a Burmese Headman who thought his son was
a reincarnation of the Buddha, is most illustrative of this point. Ake Dah
said, "I have been tested and proved worthy .... I did what God com-
manded, and he spared me and spared my son .... I did what had to be
done, [what] God told me to do. You either understand ... or you do
not."
193
Across the United States the deific decree doctrine has been recog-
nized by the states that have been forced to deal with it. Until Serravo,
courts have been consistent by the continual reliance upon precedent
developed and established into a vibrant field of law. To relegate a per-
son's cognitive abilities to a back burner in pursuit of an intellectual tro-
phy is to fail to realize the full matrix of that which makes human beings
people.
Legal insanity is a mixture of things: law, medicine and morality. It
includes one additional element: humanity. People v. Serravo is a reflec-
tion pool for the various struggles and searches that are occurring in
modern-day insanity law. Courts try to determine what, of a myriad of
choices, is the best approach to use in evaluating another human's
mental processes. Courts appear to try to follow the latest develop-
ments in a quickly-growing field of law that is forced to examine the
relationships between people and their individual deities. Serravo strug-
gles with being a case of first impression in Colorado, a state not known
for groundbreaking achievements in this area of the law. The case is
relatively straightforward, except that both the appellate court and the
supreme court ruled on the different issues in question, such as the defi-
nition and importance of subjectivity, objectivity and double jeopardy,
divergently and with sometimes conflicting reasoning.
Finally, when faced with a developing field of the law, People v. Ser-
ravo does what most pools do when disturbed. It ripples gently, waiting
to be washed over by the next center of motion. It has very little effect,
carries very little weight, and is not remembered after the next distur-
bance takes place.
IV. CONCLUSION
The insanity defense is a varied and troublesome area of the law.
There are four legal tests, each focusing on a different aspect of the de-
fendant's mental state and used in different areas of the United States.
One particular doctrine found within insanity law, often controversial
192. 110 N.E. 945, 948 (N.Y. 1915) (quoting Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1881)).
193. Morris, supra note 5, at 563-64, 566.
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and always unsure, is that of the deific decree. The few cases concerning
this doctrine arise mainly in four states. Each varies widely in legal style
and emphasis. The cases, while addressing different concerns within the
doctrine, have all worked together to create a substantive body of law
with limits and accepted procedures that are workable within those juris-
dictions. Colorado's approach to general insanity law is much the same
as these states' approaches and this state could easily adopt the doctrine
as it has evolved. Colorado uses the M'Naghten test as its basis for in-
sanity decisions, as do the leading states, and could easily extend its rea-
soning along the lines established by the seven leading cases in this
field.
The Colorado Supreme Court chooses, however, to ignore the the-
ory that a person claiming and proving a deific decree for his or her act
may be more deserving of a presumption of insanity than another de-
fendant who claims general insanity. The court overruled an appellate
court that allowed the deific decree as an exception to the traditional
M'Naghten test and demanded instead that it be considered only as a
factor in the trier of fact's analysis. The dissent, however, was no better
as a champion for a rational approach to the issue. Justice Vollack
agrees with the court only when deciding that the deific decree should
not be an exception. His position is that to consider the issue at all is to
nullify the objectivity needed for the M'Naghten test. As a result there
has been no progress in Colorado's insanity or deific decree law.
People who honestly believe God personally speaks to them and
commands them to commit a heinous act are generally not sane. As
Judge Bazelton wrote in Durham v. United States, " '[o]ur collective con-
science does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.' "194
Deluded individuals are in need of legal doctrine to protect them and
provide them with the assistance they need. The Colorado Supreme
Court had a chance to assist a population in need of help with very little
effort. It is a shame the court did not seize that opportunity when it had
it.
Margaret E. Clark
194. 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (quoting Holloway v. U.S., 148 F.2d 665, 666-
67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
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